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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent global financial crisis raises fundamental questions about the ob-
jectives and conceptual foundation of international regulation of financial insti-
tutions. Increasing vulnerability at individual bank level, and the build-up of
system-wide risk led to destabilizing the global economy. Policy makers and
banking supervisors question existing approaches to financial regulation and
discuss a presumably systemic failure of the international regulatory framework
which is proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).
The BCBS develops banking supervision standards and guidelines. The aim
is to enhance the understanding of key supervisory issues and to improve the
quality of banking supervision at world level. The Committee was first estab-
lished in 1974 by the central bank governors of the G10 countries1. Over the
years, bank regulation has undergone continuous development. The collapse
of German Bankhaus Herstatt in Cologne was quite spectacular in June 1974
and induced the central bank governors to propose their first recommendations
on capital requirements of financial institutions in 1988. This capital accord,
1The G10 countries are made up of 11 industrial countries: Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. See e.g. Bank for International Settlements (2013b) for details.
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dubbed Basel I, was aimed at strengthening capital adequacy of significant banks
worldwide. The BCBS recast the first Basel Accord in 1999 by publishing three
consultation papers and, finally, adopted the second regulatory framework, Basel
II, in 2004. The financial crisis in 2008 encouraged the BCBS to rethink the
objectives of their recommendations and how to best meet them. It has been
shown that bank regulation is still lagging behind and hindsight is easier than
foresight. To address the market failures revealed by the recent crisis and to
reinforce financial stability in the global banking system, fundamental reforms
to the regulatory framework Basel II were introduced and the BCBS published
its third Capital Accord, Basel III.2 Primarily capital and liquidity requirements
for financial institutions were amended. In addition to the already existing but
developing recommendations, two new key elements were introduced: a non-
risk based Leverage Ratio (LR) and Capital Buffers. Introducing a non-risk
weighted requirement as a supplementary measure to the risk-sensitive capital
requirements, can help to reduce the incentive for financial institutions to un-
derstate risk or to stock up on sovereign debt issued by European countries
experiencing economic stress. The latter is an unintended consequence of the
Basel III implementation into the European Union law. Generally, banks assign
capital depending on how risky their sovereign debt is. Banks in the Euro-zone,
however, have a workaround. The debt issued by Member State’s central gov-
ernments, and central banks have a 0% risk weight.3 In addition, the non-risk
weighted LR intends to constrain the build-up to excessive leverage in the bank-
ing sector, which helps to maintain and enhance the stability of the financial
system. However, some academic researchers and practitioners disagree with
the BCBS. Calls are beginning to be made that introducing the LR as a binding
constraint has a number of side effects. Decreasing loan volumes and increasing
2Details on Basel I, Basel II and Basel III are given in Basel Committee (1988), Basel
Committee (2006) and Basel Committee (2009) respectively.
3This topic is taken up again in Section 2.2.
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loan interest rates are the two most debated ones among researchers and practi-
tioners. These undesirable incentives created by this measure are supposably not
in accordance with the objective pursued by the BCBS. More likely, they could
cause substantial financial damages which would end in a destabilized banking
sector, as shown in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Their model illustrates the effects
of higher loan interest rates on the riskiness of the pool of loans. Thus, it is up
for discussion if this non-risk based measure will actually help to prevent the
next global financial crisis by stabilizing individual financial institutions or will
entail significant negative economic impact, leading to a destabilizing and vul-
nerable banking system. This thesis suggests, that a LR requirement may have
the unintended consequences of increasing risk in the financial system rather
than reducing it. The framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) will be central to
the line of argumentation.
To sum up, the global financial crisis has motivated a large number of aca-
demic researchers to examine existing and evolving regulatory issues related
to financial distress. So far, there is a rich literature on Basel I and Basel II.
This thesis picks up the threads of discussion concerning the proposed non-risk
weighted regulatory recommendation by the BCBS and tries to drive them for-
ward. The main issue is to analyze the uses of the new key element, the LR,
and its side effects from the perspective of maintaining and enhancing financial
stability. Still, theoretical and empirical analysis regarding this non-risk based
measure is limited. This thesis provides the following contributions:
An introduction to fundamental concepts of financial intermediation, bank reg-
ulation and financial stability is provided in Chapter 2. Further, this chap-
ter contains a brief literature review on research being done on the regulatory
framework Basel III and the financial soundness measures subsequently used in
Chapters 3 and 4. First of all, Chapter 3 considers theoretical underpinnings
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of both the regulatory and financial stability measures. Then, an empirical in-
vestigation to analyze the capitalization of the banking sector and its financial
risk is provided. Finally, results of the financial risk analysis are discussed. In
order to address the research question, a panel data regression model, which
investigates the nexus between the LR and financial stability and its reasons,
is proposed in Chapter 4. First, the empirical methodology and hypotheses
are developed. Then, the regression model is estimated and the performance
of descriptive statistics and regression diagnostics is presented. Presentation of
findings regarding the panel data analysis and detailed discussion follows. Fi-
nally, robustness of the regression results is investigated. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Background Theory and
Literature Review
Before entering the analysis in the following chapter, it is relevant to under-
stand why financial intermediaries exist. A review on the contemporary theory
of financial intermediation can give a clear answer and puts the subject into
the right context. Further, a common understanding of bank regulation and
financial stability is essential to delve deeper into this thesis. Bank regulation
is constantly adapted and revised by banking supervisors. This fact can be ex-
plained by the permanently increasing complexity of the global financial system
and the occurrence of financial crises from time to time. Furthermore, financial
stability is a broad term and can be expressed in several ways. Every regula-
tory and stability concept recently discussed in literature cannot be reviewed in
this introductory chapter. However, the relevant regulatory framework for this
thesis and the selected measures to signal financial fragility are described in this
chapter.
The purpose of the second chapter is to provide an overview of financial
5
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intermediation and to establish a common understanding of the terms bank
regulation and financial stability. The chapter is structured as follows: Section
2.1 illustrates, first of all, the functions and the role of financial intermediaries,
and secondly, the reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries. In Section
2.2 the key elements of the third Basel Accord are presented before putting the
focus on the LR requirement. Then, the term ’financial stability’ is defined
by introducing two dimensions of system stability and two proxies to measure
financial soundness. In Section 2.3, a brief literature review is presented. Firstly,
recent academic literature in the area of bank regulation, more precisely, Basel
III, and secondly, academic research done on the introduced financial stability
measures is summarized.
2.1 Financial Intermediation
“Banks” are not the only institutions which offer a variety of financial products.
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2010) discuss at length what a bank is, and what
banks do. Often banks compete against other institutions, such as the capital
market or insurances. Banking operations may be complex and varied, but be-
fore giving a definition of a bank, a closer look at its main function is illustrated.
The simplest way of describing a bank is to study the allocation of funds between
economic agents, or more precisely, to study the borrower-lender relationship.
Some agents are in financial surplus and others in financial deficit. The former,
called lenders, wish to profitably invest their funds, whereas the latter, referred
to as borrowers, require to obtain outside finance in order to operate profitable
investment projects. However, there are several factors which complicate the ef-
ficiency of performing the allocation of funds between those agents. The agents’
attitudes towards risk, or the level of information regarding the contracting sit-
uation, are probably the most important ones. Thus, the central question is
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 7
how supply and demand of capital can be balanced. The formation and devel-
opment of markets is the answer to this question. In economics, a market refers
as to an aggregate of sellers and buyers of a certain good, or service, and the
transaction between them. A financial market is a market place where financial
contracts, such as equities, bonds, derivatives, or currencies, are traded. Freixas
and Rochet (2008) argue that for centuries, banks alone essentially performed
the economic function of the financial system. Financial markets have developed
dramatically over the last 50 years. As a result, financial markets and banks
are now providing nearly the same services while banks used to offer some ex-
clusively. As opposed to capital markets, a bank is an institution who finances
a significant fraction of their loans through the deposits of the public by grant-
ing loans and receiving deposits from the public. Such intermediaries between
capital supply and demand are called financial intermediaries. The bank is a
financial intermediary in the narrow perspective while rating agencies, a broker
or a dealer are financial intermediaries in the broader perspective1.
This section, first of all, illustrates the basic functions and the fundamental
role of financial intermediaries, and finally, discusses various sets of explana-
tions of their existence. Dewatripont et al. (1994) and Freixas and Rochet
(2008) contributions formalized the emergence of financial intermediaries while
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Santomero (1984) provided two major re-
views of contemporary financial intermediation theory which has been discussed
in the existing intermediation literature of the past two decades.
2.1.1 The Functions of Financial Intermediaries
Examining the basic functions which financial intermediaries perform, helps to
provide a better understanding of how financial intermediation improves the
allocation of capital. Not every bank has to perform each of the following
1Further details are given in Section 2.1.2.
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functions. For instance, universal banks do perform all of these functions, but
specialized banks do not need to. As discussed by Freixas and Rochet (2008)
and Merton and Bodie (1995), contemporary banking theory classifies these
functions into four main categories:
1. Offering liquidity and payment services
2. Managing risk
3. Monitoring borrowers and processing information
4. Transforming assets
First of all, a financial intermediary offers liquidity by providing borrowers with
access to capital and providing liquidity to investors. Assets are assumed to be
inherently illiquid while liabilities are much more liquid. Banks create liquidity
by offering claims with higher short-term returns for given long-term returns.
The amount of liquidity, though, is influenced by the liquidity in the financial
markets. In addition, a financial intermediary provides ways of settling and
clearing payments to facilitate the exchange of goods, assets, and services. Banks
can serve this function with wire checking accounts, transfers, and credit, or cash
cards. These mechanisms for securities transactions are designed to deal with
the risks and the costs, such as processing fees, associated with the process. Risk
may arise due to the fact that one party may not fulfill its terms. For instance,
the borrower does not repay its loan, or the lender fails to deliver.
The second function of financial intermediaries is to manage risks. Ways
to manage uncertainty and to control risks are provided. Freixas and Rochet
(2008) define four sources of risk: credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk,
and off-balance sheet operations. Particularly, the latter has been soaring in the
last decades. Credit risk, historically, was small. Still, bankers tried to make
their loan secure through, for example, collateral. Through time the riskiness
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of loans seems to have increased. This change in credit risk can be traced back
to the start of investment banking which can be seen as a different concept
from traditional credit activity. Investment banks have a different philosophy
of banking because it involves advancing money to the industry rather than
being a simple lender who gets good guarantees. This implies making more
risky investments and buying stocks. However, this appraisal of risk on a loan
is one of the main functions of bankers. In addition, Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) argue that the asset transformation function has implications for the
management of risks. For instance, when issuing liquid deposits guaranteed by
illiquid loans or transforming maturities, a bank takes market risks (interest
rate risk and liquidity risk). These risk may arise when the cost of funds, which
depends on the level of short-term interest rates, rises above the interest income
which is determined by the interest rates of the loans granted by a bank. The
bank may face unexpected withdrawals, even though they pay no interest on
deposits. This results in seeking more expensive sources of funds. The financial
intermediary will have to manage the combination of these two market risks in
order to balance the difference in maturity and the one in the marketability of
the claims held and that of the claims issued. The increasing involvement of
financial intermediaries in financial markets implies that they are more and more
subject to market risk. Furthermore, off-balance sheet operations can be defined
as loan commitments, credit lines, and guarantees that do not correspond to a
genuine liability or asset for the bank but only to a conditional commitment.
Banks sell and buy risky assets, weather or not they are reported on the balance
sheets. Thus, banks may want to manage this risk, for example, by hedging their
risks.
The third function of financial intermediaries discussed by Freixas and Ro-
chet (2008), is monitoring and information processing. Diamond (1984) also
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argues that due to problems resulting from imperfect information on borrowers,
it is necessary to invest in the technologies that permit financial intermediaries
to screen loan applicants and to monitor their project. This function implies
that financial intermediaries and firms develop long-term relationships which
help to mitigate the effects of moral hazard. This can be seen as one of the
main differences between issuing securities and bank lending in financial mar-
kets. Bond prices are assumed to reflect market information whereas the value
of a bank loan results from this long-term relationship which implies that the
value is prior unknown to the market and to the regulator. Thus, Merton (1992)
refers to bank loans as being opaque. In this context, financial intermediaries
provide price information useful for decision-making in various sectors of the
economy.
Finally, three functions of transforming assets are being discussed by Freixas
and Rochet (2008) and Merton and Bodie (1995): convenience of denomination,
risk transformation, and maturity transformation. The former refers to the fact
that a bank chooses the unit size of its products in a way that is convenient for
clients. Financial products are either desired by investors or issued by a firm.
Often small deposits face large investors willing to borrow indivisible amounts.
Traditionally, this viewpoint of asset transformation is seen as the main justi-
fication of financial intermediation. The link between the financial products,
deposits and loans, can be provided by this function of asset transformation.
For instance, a bank performs the transformation of large-denomination finan-
cial assets into smaller units or collects small deposits in order to invest the
proceeds into large loans. Risk transformation is the process whereby finan-
cial intermediaries can spread the risks of lending by having various borrowers.
Financial intermediaries are willing to risk that some borrower is not paying
back the loan because they lend capital to a large number of borrowers. The
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eventual loss can be absorbed due to the charged interest rate on all other loans.
In addition, risk transformation occurs when the risk-return characteristics of
bank deposits are better than the ones of direct investments. This scenario may
occur when indivisibilities in the investment arise, in which case a small investor
cannot diversify its portfolio. Maturity transformation is the transformation of
securities with short maturities, offered to depositors, into securities with long
maturities, which are desired by borrowers. In general, borrowers need capital
for long periods of time and many depositors want to be able to withdraw their
deposits at short notice or on demand. If people rely on borrowing directly
from the lenders there would be a problem: the lender would probably not be
prepared to lend for a long enough period. The financial intermediary borrows
capital from a vast number of small depositors which are able to withdraw at
short notice, and lends for a long period of time. Thus, financial intermediaries
lend for longer periods of time than they borrow. This function necessarily
implies a risk. Given the depositor’s claim, the banks’ assets will be illiquid.
However, this risk can be limited due to interbank lending or derivative financial
instruments available to banks.
Next, a common understanding of the role of financial intermediation and why
financial intermediaries exist is presented.
2.1.2 Explanations for the Emergence of Financial Inter-
mediaries
Although this thesis is specifically focused on banks, this subsection adopts a
broader perspective and studies financial intermediaries in general, as illustrated
in Freixas and Rochet (2008). This perspective includes an economic agent,
broker and dealer which are clear examples of intermediaries in the financial
sector. The economic agent specializes in the activity of buying and selling
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financial claims. This notion of intermediary is analogous to a retailer in the
theory of industrial organization where an agent buys goods or services from
producers and sells them to final customers. Broker and dealers operate on
financial markets, and thus belong to the financial intermediaries in the broader
sense. A bank can be seen as a retailer of financial securities. Securities issued
by borrowers are bought, i.e. banks grant loans, and these securities are sold
to lenders, i.e. a bank collects deposits. Banking activity though is considered
to be more complex. Banks deal with financial contracts rather than with
financial securities. The difference is that contracts cannot be easily resold
whereas securities are anonymous and thus easily marketable. As opposed to
other financial intermediaries, banks must hold these contracts in their balance
sheets until they expire. In addition, banks transform financial contracts and
securities because the characteristics of borrowers’ contracts are usually different
from the ones of depositors, as seen in the previous section.
The objective of the theories of financial intermediation is to explain the
emergence of intermediaries by means of a model. In general, first of all, a
market, where financial contracts are dealt, is modeled. Then, it is shown that
the utility for all individuals in the market increases by the existence of a fi-
nancial intermediary. Note that in the ideal world of frictionless and complete
financial markets, financial intermediation is of no importance. Campbel and
Kracaw (1980) argue that in a market environment with perfect information,
financial intermediaries could perform no unique service that investors are un-
able to reproduce as easily. Investors and borrowers obtain optimal risk sharing
and would be able to diversify perfectly. As soon as indivisibilities and noncon-
vexities in transaction technologies are introduced, perfect diversification is no
longer feasible. Thus, it has long been understood, that financial intermediation
is to be developed as a response to market imperfections. The foundation for
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understanding the existence of financial intermediaries is traditionally provided
by transaction costs and asymmetric information. Hellwig (1992), amongst oth-
ers, argues that the transaction cost approach does not in fact contradict the
assumption of complete markets in the neoclassical theory. In a market with no
financial intermediary, transaction costs hamper individuals to obtain a optimal
diversification. To undertake a large number of coalitions between investors and
borrowers, will be inefficient due to transaction costs. Financial intermediaries
can be seen as coalitions of individual borrowers and lenders who exploit both,
economies of scope and economies of scale in the transaction technology. As a
result, the number of coalitions between investors and borrowers is minimized
and individuals obtain almost perfect diversification.
The second approach derives from the neo-institutional perspective. Asym-
metric information are central to the foundation of these theories. Market im-
perfections due to asymmetric information can be seen as a specific transaction
cost. Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2010) and Thakor and Boot (2008) explain
the different types of asymmetric information. The informational asymmetries
differ according to the timing in which the asymmetry takes place. In general,
literature distinguishes between three basic types: adverse selection, moral haz-
ard, and costly state verification. Adverse selection asymmetry arises when the
information is asymmetric even before the contract is signed. One party in a
transaction knows something about its own characteristic that the other party
does not know. This asymmetry is often referred to as a hidden information
problem in a market, where, for example, sellers may know more about a prod-
uct than the customers. This asymmetry was first pioneered by Akerlof (1970)
who examined the markets for used motor vehicles. Applied to the borrower-
lender relationship, the borrower could lie about his individual risk. Low risk
borrowers are more likely to have a higher probability of repaying a loan. Due
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to the lack of information, a bank cannot identify “good” borrowers. Thus, this
asymmetry can provoke that bank offers attract an adversely biased selection of
applicants. Moral hazard implies that the information is symmetric before the
contract between lender and borrower is accepted but asymmetric afterward.
Two cases can be classified: hidden action and ex post hidden information. The
former is characterized by a non verifiable action carried out by the borrower
after the signature of the contract. For instance, the borrower could change his
investment choice by investing in a different project which is not beneficial or
profitable for the lender. The latter implies that the borrower will know more
than the lender about an important variable once the contract is accepted. Thus,
actions undertaken by the borrower are not directly observable by other parties,
nor perfectly inferred by observing the outcomes. Moral hazard results in temp-
tations for shirking, or carelessness by borrowers, and increases the probability
of undesired outcomes for one party, in this case the lender, post contractual.
Costly state verification is characterized by the care about end-period-wealth.
Information is asymmetric in the sense of that the performance of an invest-
ment project may be observed at no cost only by the borrower, while it can
be observed by the lender only after paying a state-dependent verification cost.
Thus, the verification of the performance is costly to the lender. In addition, the
costly state verification problem gives the borrower the incentive to lie about
the investment project’s performance in order to lower the repayment amount
to the lender.
Various theories which attempt to explain the existence of intermediaries in
capital markets have been offered. In the following, selected explanations for
the emergence of financial intermediaries which place the emphasis on lending
business transactions, are presented. With regard to the following analysis in
this thesis, the theories of financial intermediation which focus on the deposit
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business transactions, are neglected2. Due to the increasing complexity of the
models, each theory focuses on very few market imperfections and neglects all
others. In this context, the theories distinguish between transaction costs and
informational asymmetries as a reason for the existence of financial intermedi-
aries. Table 2.1 summarizes the theories which are discussed next.
Foundation of theories Paper
Transaction costs Benston and Smith (1976)
Informational asymmetries ex ante Leland and Pyle (1977)
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)
interim Thadden (1995)
ex post Diamond (1984)
Williamson (1986)
Table 2.1: The traditional theories of financial intermediation
Benston and Smith (1976) made an effort to provide an explanation of the
purpose of intermediaries, assuming a model with an imperfect market approach
which relied on transaction costs. Their work shows that the analysis of trans-
action costs is central to the motivation of the intermediary function. Financial
intermediaries create financial commodities whenever it is assumed that these
commodities can be sold for prices which are expected to cover the direct costs
and opportunity costs. By acquiring financial commodities, a consumer’s con-
sumption decision can be affected in the way that inter-temporal and intra-
temporal transfers of consumption can be achieved. Individuals derive a higher
utility by incurring lower transaction costs. Benston and Smith (1976) argue
that several forms of financial intermediation, such as stock exchanges, dealer,
2See, amongst others, Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Their model considers banks as coali-
tions of depositors. Thus, the existence of financial markets impairs the provision of liquidity
insurance by deposit banks, i.e. the insurance against liquidity shocks is provided by banks.
Demand for this insurance comes from the assumption of risk aversion of depositors in the
model.
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or banks, try to reduce transaction costs. However, the form which is exempli-
fied by banks has a comparative advantage over, for example, a stock exchange.
This intermediary purchases large blocks of securities, packages those in a form
that is demanded by some individuals, and finally, sells this package at a price
which covers all its transaction costs. Thus, the authors represent with their ap-
proach the essential feature of financial intermediation, focusing on transaction
costs. Transaction costs can explain the existence of financial intermediation but
their magnitude does not appear sufficient to be the only cause in many cases.
Therefore, it is suggested by many researchers that informational asymmetries
are a more powerful explanation and a primary reason that financial interme-
diaries exist. Numerous financial markets are characterized by asymmetrically
informed lenders and borrowers. Borrowers typically know their industrious-
ness, collateral, and moral rectitude better than lenders do. In general, lenders
would benefit from knowing the borrowers’ true characteristics. However, infor-
mation asymmetries, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and costly state
verification, hamper the direct transfer of information between market partic-
ipants. Financial intermediation is shown to dominate lending and borrowing
between individuals.
Given the adverse selection (ex ante) informational asymmetry, Leland and
Pyle (1977) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) work can be viewed as an ex-
planation for the emergence of financial intermediaries. Leland and Pyle (1977)
were the first to propose that a financial intermediary is an evaluator of credit
risk for the inexperienced depositor by functioning as a filter to interpret signals
in a financial environment with imperfect information. The authors argued that
a large number of firms is required to gather and sell information about particu-
lar classes of assets due to the limited information on the quality of these assets.
Nevertheless, two problems hamper these firms which try to sell such informa-
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tion directly to investors, and thus, nonfinancial firm signaling is quite fragile.
The first is, that resources that a firm invests in obtaining these information
become available to the market as a public good. Accordingly, difficulties to
capture the return associated with its value arise. The second problem is that
potential users have difficulties in distinguishing good information from bad. If
this is the case, the price of information reflects its average quality. While the
entry for firms offering poor information quality is easy, firms which expend
resources to collect good information leave the market because they receive a
value reflecting the average low quality. In this context, the equilibrium will be
consistent of only low quality information.3 These problems can be overcome
if an intermediary, which buys and holds assets on the basis of its specialized
information, gathers the information. The firm’s information is embodied in
a private good, the returns from its portfolio. The willingness of the interme-
diary to dedicate wealth to the firm serves as a signal. It demonstrates that
the underlying assets are found to be of sufficient value and the commitment to
the portfolio. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) formalized the ideas of Leland
and Pyle (1977). They give a further explanation of the emergence of financial
intermediation, focusing on diversified information brokers, such as credit bu-
reaus, investment bankers, or accounting firms. These intermediaries perform
an intangible service, generating information and are able to lower costs of in-
formation production. To see this, imagine that a firm needs to raise capital
from a large number of investors. Without an financial intermediary (referred
to as an intermediating information broker in the model of Ramakrishnan and
Thakor (1984)), information production would be duplicated as each investor
wishes to screen the firm. In this context, an intermediary reduces the du-
plication in information by, for example, certifying the firm’s economic worth.
Thus, it is concluded, that financial intermediation improves welfare if ex ante
3Akerlof (1970) referred to the same problem by using a market for used cars.
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informational asymmetries are present in capital market.
Thadden (1995) chose the moral hazard (interim) informational asymmetry
to identify reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries. As in Diamond
(1984), he argued that information gathering is costly, and thus, there is an
incentive to centralize information monitoring in one person’s hand, the inter-
mediary. Due to his assumption of interim informational asymmetry, the line
of argumentation why financial intermediaries may act as delegated monitors of
projects, is different than in Diamond (1984) model. In this model, monitoring
can have a positive effect on which project the borrower will be undertaken
rather than on the verification of the performance of a project by eliminating
the borrower’s moral hazard problem with respect to investment choice.
Given the costly state verification (ex post) informational asymmetry, two
essential papers developed a theory of financial intermediation: Diamond (1984)
and Williamson (1986). Diamond (1984) paper can be seen subsequent to Le-
land and Pyle (1977). He demonstrated the value of diversification in reducing
monitoring costs. In contrast to Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), who focused
on private information about the projects’ ex ante prospects, Diamond (1984)
focused on the ex post realized returns. It is assumed that the information, in
this case the performance of an investment project, by a given person cannot
be observed or monitored without cost by others. Thus, monitoring can be
referred to as any activity aimed at preventing opportunistic behavior of the
borrower ex post. The theory of financial intermediation is based on reducing
these cost of monitoring information. If there are many lenders who invested
in a project, the cost of monitoring the data which a borrower observes, may
be very high. In this context, monitoring involves increasing returns to scale
which implies that this task is more efficiently performed by specialized firms.
Therefore, individual lenders tend to delegate the task of costly monitoring to
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an intermediary instead of performing it themselves. A gross cost advantage
in collecting this information can be achieved. In line with the argumenta-
tion of Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Diamond (1984) argued that if each
lender monitors directly, a duplication of effort will arise. Moreover, a free-rider
problem could be the alternative, in which case no lender monitors. However,
delegated monitoring introduces a new problem: the provided monitoring infor-
mation may not be reliable. Therefore, the monitor has to be given incentives
to do the job properly. Financial intermediaries can provide solutions to this
incentive problem as discussed by Diamond (1984). He suggests that investors
can impose non-pecuniary penalties on the financial intermediary who does not
perform its monitoring activity well. In addition, the cost of monitoring can be
made as small as possible by diversifying the bank’s loan portfolio. To sum up, a
financial intermediary has a net cost advantage relative to direct borrowing and
lending. Williamson (1986) model considered ex post asymmetrically informed
borrowers and lenders, as well. Accordingly, the focus is on the return on the
borrower’s investment project. The lender is able to monitor the output of the
projects but monitoring is very costly. As in Diamond (1984), financial interme-
diaries perform a “delegated monitoring” role and are single agents. In contrast,
the authors assume that the lender monitors only in the event of default. It
is concluded, that the costly monitoring of lenders and large-scale investment
projects imply increasing returns to scale in borrowing and lending. This effect
can be exploited by financial intermediaries.
To sum up, in a context of informational asymmetries, financial interme-
diation is a way to improve efficiency. Whether it is screening projects in a
context of ex ante asymmetries, preventing opportunistic behavior of borrowers
during the realization of the project, or punishing and monitoring a borrower
who does not meet contractual obligations, ex post. Yet, these activities could
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be performed by the individual lenders themselves or by specialized firms such
as rating agencies. However, financial intermediaries have a comparative advan-
tage in these activities: exploiting scale economies by financing many projects,
providing funds of several investors to balance the small capacity of investors
compared to the size of projects, and reducing the costs of monitoring (the
surplus gained from exploiting scale economies has to be more than the costs).
Accordingly, they are a response to the incapability of market-mediated mech-
anisms to efficiently resolve informational asymmetries.
2.1.3 The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) Model
The next model is not necessarily a traditional theory of the emergence of finan-
cial intermediaries but established a link between financial intermediation and
equilibrium credit rationing. As this model is central to the line of argumen-
tation in Chapter 4, it is discussed next. Credits are rationed by banks which
can be seen as a classic form of market failure. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) frame-
work, where borrowers and lenders are risk neutral, sought to explain why banks
ration credit by focusing on two informational asymmetries: adverse selection
and moral hazard. More precisely, their work “Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information” analyzed the effects of higher loan interest rates on the
“riskiness” of a bank underlying credit rationing as an equilibrium feature of the
loan market. Banks and borrowers seek to maximize profits and the lenders
are concerned about the interest rate they receive on a loan and the loan riski-
ness. The authors illustrated that the level of interest rates a bank charges its
borrowers affects the riskiness of its loan portfolio due to the adverse selection
effect and the incentive effect. The main finding in their analysis is that a bank’s
expected return can peak at a “bank-optimal”, r∗, loan interest rate due to these
two informational asymmetries. The adverse selection effect is a consequence
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of different quality of borrowers, i.e. different type of borrowers imply different
probabilities of repaying the loan which affects the expected return to a bank.
Banks cannot distinguish among credit applicants, but would like to be able to
identify low risk borrowers who are more likely to repay, in order to maximize
their return. Consequently financial institutions need to use screening devices
in order to identify the borrower type. The interest rate can be used as such
a screening device. A bank assumes that different borrower types are willing
to pay different interest rates. High risk borrowers act on the assumption that
the probability of repaying the loan is relatively low and are willing to borrow
at high interest rates which will possibly lower the bank’s profits. Thus, an in-
crease in loan interest rates affects low risk borrowers more adversely than high
risk borrowers and drives low risk borrowers out of the market. The authors
conclude that an increase in loan interest rates increases the average “riskiness”
of a bank’s borrowers. To clarify, an example is provided: there are two indis-
tinguishable types of borrowers, a low risk and a high risk borrower, who seek
to borrow ¿1 to invest in a project that will pay a random amount, C, at the
end of the period. The maximum interest rate on a loan, r∗S , that a low risk
borrower is willing to pay for a loan satisfies
ˆ ∞
[1+r∗
S
]
[C − {1 + r∗S}] dFs(C) = µ, (2.1)
and the maximum interest rate, r∗R, that a high risk borrower is willing to pay
solves ˆ ∞
[1+r∗
R
]
[C − {1 + r∗R}] dFR(C) = µ, (2.2)
where fS (·) ∼ (0,∞) and FS (·) are the density and cumulative distribution
of C, respectively, for the low risk borrower and fR (·) ∼ (0,∞) and FR (·) for
the high risk borrower. It is assumed that FR (·) is second-order stochastically
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dominated by FS (·) and thus is a mean-preserving spread of FS (·).4 Further µ
is the expected minimum return of each borrower. The assumption that increas-
ing risk across the borrower types is defined through a sequence of second-order
stochastic dominated relationships, i.e. that the distribution function of the
low risk borrower involves less risk than the distribution function of the high
risk borrower, implies that high risk borrowers are willing to pay a higher in-
terest rate for a loan. It can be followed: r∗R > r
∗
S . Under this assumption
any increase in interest rates of loans precipitates adverse selection, i.e. low risk
borrowers are discouraged by high interest rates and drop out of the market.
As a consequence, the credit applicant pool is on average riskier which could
lead to a decrease in the bank’s expected return. Giving a credit rationing
equilibrium, the demand for loans at r∗ exceeds the supply of loans at r∗. Any
bank that increases its loan interest rate beyond r∗, would lower its expected
return. Thus, the bank is unwilling to extend credit to a rationed borrower even
if the borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate. The case of moral haz-
ard works analogously in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) framework, but now a single
borrower is facing multiple investment opportunities. The bank is not able to
monitor perfectly and costlessly all the actions of borrowers and take into ac-
count the effect of charged interest rates on loans on the behavior of borrowers.
The authors show that charging high interest rates increases the attractiveness
of riskier projects, i.e. increasing interest rates skew the borrower’s project
preference toward greater risk. These projects are characterized by higher re-
4Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume that FR (·) corresponds to greater risk in the sense of
mean preserving spreads, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). It can be followed that projects
undertaken by high risk borrowers have a greater variance than projects undertaken by low risk
borrowers. However, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) argue that, for measuring risk, the mean
preserving spread criterion is stronger than the increasing variance criterion. In addition, the
authors show that risk-adverse investors prefer the project with the lower variance given two
projects with equal means. Note that Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), for simplicity, assume that
borrowers and lenders are risk neutral while proving that the interest rate acts as a screening
device.
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turns in the case of success5, but lower probability of success which leads to the
known effect of lower repayment probabilities. Again, low risk investors who
more likely invest in safe projects with modest returns, drop out of the market
because the high interest rates will reduce their profit. The authors conclude
that the expected return from the undertaken projects to a bank is affected in
two ways. In the short run, a direct effect is observable that higher interest rates
increase the return to a bank. In the long run, the adverse selection and the
incentive effect of interest rates lead to lower bank returns and credit rationing.
If an increasing number of high risk projects are undertaken, the riskiness of
loans increases and a bank’s expected return decreases. At the “bank-optimal”
interest rate the expected return is maximized. At this point demand for loans
exceeds supply. Due to credit rationing beyond this point supply does not equal
demand but loans are riskier and expected returns decrease. Therefore, credit
rationing can arise from moral hazard (often referred to as the incentive effect),
adverse selection, or both.
Next, a common understanding of the terms bank regulation and financial sta-
bility is established.
2.2 Bank Regulation and Financial Stability
The recent global financial crisis showed the vulnerability of the financial sys-
tem. Taylor (2009) argues that the crisis became acute in August of 2007 where
money market interest rates rose dramatically. The situation was worsened in
September and October of 2008. A serious credit crunch with large spillovers
weakened an economy that was already suffering from the enduring impacts of
the housing bust in the US and the oil price boom. In literature, a manifold
5Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), p. 396, give theoretical justification that expected profits on
the project increase with risk.
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reason for the worsening of the crisis was the decision of the US government, not
to step in to prevent the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 20086.
The collapse of this bank may have helped to trigger a banking crisis that swept
across the globe. The BCBS argues that excess leverage, capital of insuffi-
cient quality and inadequate liquidity buffers led to the build-up of the crisis at
individual bank level. A pro-cyclical deleveraging process and the interconnect-
edness of systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs)7 were finally
responsible for the build-up of system-wide risk. Taylor (2009) affirms that risk
in financial institution’s balance sheets has been the heart of the crisis from the
beginning.
International regulators and policy makers address these vulnerabilities by
adopting a new regulatory framework as a reaction to the latest banking crisis.
The paper “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector”8 by the BCBS is
being referred to as Basel III by practitioners. The Basel Committee is located
at the Bank for International Settlements. Currently, its members are supervi-
sory authorities of each member state and representatives of the central banks
from 27 countries. The BCBS develops recommendations and banking supervi-
sion standards. The recommendations by the Committee are non-binding but
are adopted by far more countries than the member states. Before giving an
in depth description of the Basel III accord9, the development of this capital
framework is illustrated. The first accord, Basel I, was proposed by the BCBS in
1988. After the collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt, there was concern among the
central bank governors that the significant banks throughout the world might
have inadequate capital levels. That concern led to recommending comprehen-
6See e.g. Basel Committee (2010c).
7SIFIs are financial institutions whose disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity
and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial
system and economic activity, see Basel Committee (2010c).
8See Basel Committee (2009).
9See Bank for International Settlements (2013a).
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sive changes in the requirements for the capital adequacy of credit institutions.
Under this capital framework, the liable capital of credit institutions must be
equivalent to at least 8% of their weighted risk assets. This measure is designed
to cover default risk. The originally simple framework, Basel I, from 1988 was
replaced by the Basel II accord in 2004. In 1999 the BCBS published a first
consultation paper on the recasting of the capital requirements under Basel I.
A second and third consultation paper followed and finally, negotiations ended
with the adoption of the new Basel II accord. The main criticism of Basel I was
that the accord did not allow for any differentiation in the calculation of the
capital requirements for credit risk. The actual risk was frequently not properly
captured. Now, it is possible to calculate capital requirements for credit risk
in a more risk-sensitive manner due to various procedures for measuring credit
risk. Credit institutions are free to use the credit risk standardized approach or
the internal ratings-based approach (IRB). The main difference between these
two approaches is the assignment of risk-weights. Using the former approach,
credit institutions can either apply fixed risk-weightings or credit ratings of rec-
ognized rating agencies, whereas institutions which use the IRB can apply own
estimates. Thus, the key objective of the Basel II framework is to make the
capital requirements take greater account of risk. Other objectives are to cre-
ate basic principles for qualitative banking (Pillar II) and to impose disclosure
requirements (Pillar III). The key elements of the Basel II framework are based
upon the three pillars of Basel. The pillars were first introduced under Basel II
but still stand under Basel III, and thus are discussed briefly. Decamps et al.
(2004) provides an overview. Pillar I aligns the rules for determining the capital
requirements and gives a definition of the concept of capital for banking super-
vision purposes. The capital requirements of Pillar I include credit and market
price risks and were extended to operational risks for the first time under Basel
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II. Pillar II governs provisions regarding the Supervisory Review Process. This
pillar imposes requirements on institutions and national supervisory authori-
ties. Banks are required to assess their overall risk profile in addition to the risk
specified under Pillar I. Thus, the key elements are the supervision by supervi-
sory authorities and the establishment of adequate risk management systems.
Pillar III contains disclosure requirements that institutions have to meet in or-
der to strengthen market discipline. It is expected that well-informed market
participants reward credit institutions that have effective risk management in
their lending and investment decisions and punish riskier behavior accordingly.
This gives the credit institutions the incentive to control their risks and manage
them efficiently. Obviously the implementation of the Basel II accord did not
achieve its goal to sustain the stability of the financial sector. Its shortcomings
were revealed during the crisis. The traditional regulatory approach, based on
capital requirements has come up short in maintaining financial stability. It
becomes apparent that banks struggled even though capital requirements were
met. It is more likely, that excessive leverage seemed to be the root of the crises.
As a response to the ongoing criticism towards Basel II, the Basel Committee
revised the accord again, a time-consuming process that led to the new capi-
tal and liquidity framework. At the Seoul Summit in November 2010 the G20
leaders endorsed the Basel III Accord, which addresses the weaknesses of the
second Basel accord by introducing a number of micro and macro prudential
measures. The aim being to promote greater resilience of the global banking
system and to contain systemic risk in order to support stable economic growth
at any time. The new requirements should preclude financial institutions from
taking excessive risks and enable them to withstand future periods of stress
without extraordinary government support. The Basel III accord will be trans-
lated into national laws and regulations. The implementation was supposed to
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start on January 1, 2013 and fully phased in by January 1, 2019. Basel III was
developed and proposed by the BCBS. The European Commission has drafted
its Capital Requirements Directive, “CRD IV”, in 2012, to bring the regulatory
standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity of the BCBS via a Regulation
and a Directive into European law. On 26 June 2013 the Capital Requirements
Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive were adopted by the Eu-
ropean Union and published in the Official Journal of the European Union10.
Both regulatory frameworks were entered into force on 17 July 2013. Next, the
package of the Basel III accord will be illustrated. The following key elements
are considered:
1. Improving the quality, quantity and international consistency of the capi-
tal base.
2. Introducing a Leverage Ratio as a risk-independent control parameter.
3. Introducing additional capital buffers: Capital Conservation Buffer and
Countercyclical Buffer.
4. Introducing a short and long term liquidity ratio: Liquidity Coverage
Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).
5. Improvement of the coverage of counterparty risk.
The focus in this thesis is on the second listed key element of the Basel III
Accord, the Leverage Ratio (LR), which has already been adopted by the US
in their national law under Pillar II of the Basel II agreement. However, under-
standing the new definition and requirements of regulatory capital is helpful in
order to define the newly introduced non risk-based control parameter. Thus,
10Detailed information on the legislative package is provided by the European Union, see
European Union (2013a) and European Union (2013b) for the Directive and the Regulation,
respectively.
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the proposed elements of the Basel III framework, as discussed by Basel Com-
mittee (2009), are presented briefly. They can be differentiated into two groups:
the risk-based capital requirements which distinguish between different levels of
risk, and the non-risk based requirement which disregards such differences. To
begin with, the risk-based capital requirements are introduced. First of all, the
accord aims at improving the quality of regulatory capital. The Basel Commit-
tee raised the quality of capital by putting the focus on Tier 1 capital to absorb
losses. Tier 1 capital can be divided in two forms of capital: common equity
and additional Tier 1 capital. The criteria for Tier 1 capital are strongly geared.
Accordingly, hybrid capital instruments may only be recognized as components
of Tier 1 capital to a limited extent and subject to much stricter conditions.
The BCBS has set out 14 criteria for common equity which apply to joint stock
companies and non-joint stock companies. That the capital instrument repre-
sent the most subordinated claim in the event of the institution’s liquidation
is the most important criteria. Moreover, this instrument is to be transferred
for an unlimited period and is only to be repaid in the event of liquidation.
Furthermore, at the time of issue, the regulated institution may not promise in
its contractual terms or statutory that the capital instrument will be bought
back, redeemed, or canceled. Tier 2 capital is drastically simplified and Tier 3
capital abolished. All capital instruments that no longer are eligible for Tier 1
or Tier 2 capital will be phased out over ten years, e.g. minority shareholdings,
goodwill and intangible assets. Capital requirement is still 8%, but the capital
composition has tightened up considerably. The quantity of the common equity
especially needs to be increased, more precisely, from 2% (Basel II) to 4.5% by
January 1, 2015. This leads to an increase of Tier 1 capital from 4% currently
to 6% in the same period. The difference between the total capital requirement
of 8% and the Tier 1 capital ratio can be met with Tier 2 capital.
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In addition, the regulated institutions must gradually build up a capital con-
versation buffer which consists solely of common equity by 2019. This capital
conversation buffer of 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets brings the total common
equity ratio to 7% from 2019 onwards. Financial institutions are allowed to
draw down the buffer to absorb losses during periods of stress. The closer their
regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirements, the greater the
cutback of earnings distributions. Additional capital buffers above the mini-
mum requirement also contribute to a further increase in the capital base and
can be drawn upon in periods of financial and economic stress. Whereas Basel
II did not address capital buffers, Basel III introduces two different types which
have to be met with common equity. The second buffer is the countercycli-
cal buffer, within a range of 0- 2.5%, which will be implemented according to
national circumstances and will regulate credit growth. Macroeconomic indica-
tors, such as the gross domestic product (GDP), can be used to decide on the
size of the buffer. This buffer is designed to avoid systemic risk. The macro
prudential goal is achieved by dampening excessive, aggregated credit growth
in the banking sector which can exacerbate crises. For instance, the collapse of
the US sub-prime sector was triggered by excessive growth in the credit sector.
A country will only put the buffer in effect when excess credit growth could
result in a system-wide build-up of risk. In this case, the countercyclical buffer
will be introduced as an extension of the capital conversation buffer. Financial
institutions that have a ratio less than 2.5% will face restrictions on payouts of
dividends, share buybacks and bonuses. Both buffers will be phased in beginning
on January 1, 2016 and fully effective in January 2019. In the European Union,
a further tool to prevent and mitigate macroprudential and systemic risks has
been built into the CRD IV package11. Banks that have been determined to
by systemically relevant are obliged to built up a systemic risk buffer as from
11See European Union (2013b).
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2016, as well. As of 2019 this buffer should be fully built up. The amount of
additional capital varies between 1-3% of the risk weighted assets, depending
on the degree of systemic relevance. Higher levels of capital to absorb losses are
essential to broader financial stability. A study of the Basel Committee suggests
that an increase in the banking sector’s common equity from 7% to 8% reduces
the annual probability of a financial crisis by at least 1 percentage point12. This,
in turn, produces an expected annual economic output benefit of between 0.2%
and 0.6%. The financial institutions should achieve the new standards through
earnings retention, de-risking of certain capital market exposures and appropri-
ate capital raising, not through decreasing lending to the economy which would
have a negative impact on the economic recovery after the recent financial crisis.
Next, the Committee has proposed to include two liquidity ratios in the
regulatory framework to ensure that banks, which are internationally active,
are able to withstand severe liquidity stress in the future. Liquidity risk was
often disregarded and not considered to be a key risk at system level. Thus,
in 2010 the BCBS adopted a document named Basel III: International Frame-
work for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring13. Since then,
globally uniform minimum standards are introduced. This has been the least
harmonized area of banking supervision. The aim is to ensure that interna-
tionally active banks are able to withstand severe liquidity stress in the future.
The short term LCR insures that sufficient liquid assets are available to meet
any cash flow gaps throughout a 30 day system-wide liquidity shock and be no
lower than 100%. Generally, the higher the value of the ratio, the larger the
margin of safety that the financial institution possesses. Accordingly, the more
robust is their structural liquidity profile. The same applies for the NSFR. This
ratio complements the short-term minimum standard and promotes resilience
12See Basel Committee (2010c).
13See Basel Committee (2010b).
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over medium and long-term time horizons. The NSFR aims to ensure funding
of investment banking inventories, off-balance sheet exposures, securitization
pipelines and other assets and activities of banking organizations with at least
a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles.
The financial institutions have less experience with those ratios but have to self
ensure against acute liquidity stress scenarios. Therefore, the Basel Commit-
tee decided to phase them in gradually, i.e. before introducing the minimum
standard, an observation period of four years is planned.
Furthermore, the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk are also
strengthened. Extensive changes to the capital charges for counterparty risk
are included in the package of Basel III. These exposures, particularly arising
from derivatives, repos and securities financing activities, are required to be
measured using stressed inputs. During the financial crisis, heavy losses on
derivatives transactions were induced by increased credit value adjustments.
Financial institutions have to hold capital for mark-to-market losses associated
with the deterioration of counterparty’s credit quality. Higher capital require-
ments imply incentives to transfer over-the-counter (OTC) activities to a central
counterparty. The creation of a new concentration of systemic risk needs to be
avoided by managing and capitalizing them appropriately.
After presenting the risk-based capital requirements, the explanation of the
non-risk based “backstop” follows. As stated above, the focus of the analysis is
on the non-risk weighted LR. It is widely believed that excess leverage by banks
contributed to the global banking crisis. To address this issue, a risk independent
LR is introduced as an additional prudential tool to complement the capital
requirements. As discussed in Luoma and Spiller Jr (2002), leverage allows a
bank to increase potential losses or gains on an investment or position, beyond
the possibility of its own funds. Balance sheet leverage is widely recognized
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and the most visible form of leverage. A balance sheet is leveraged when a
bank’s assets exceed its equity base. Banks generally acquire more assets to
increase their return on equity. Invisible leverage exists, also, for instance, off-
balance sheet leverage, which is based on market-dependent future cash flows,
is considered as economic leverage. A widely used measure of leverage is the
LR that addresses both balance sheet and economic leverage. The regulatory
purpose is to limit the level of a bank’s debt. Banks will not be able to reduce
their leverage by selling assets in periods of stress, which puts market prices
under pressure and leads to a declining value of assets that banks continue to
hold on their balance sheet. The BCBS will test a minimum LR of 3%14. This
ratio will be phased in cautiously and binding for every financial institution. The
focus is put on this new regulatory measure in Section 3.1.1 where an in-depth
discussion follows.
To sum up, the Basel III framework will both, amend risk weighted capital
requirements and superimpose a non-risk weighted LR. Including risk weighted
measures obliges banks to assign capital depending on how risky their assets
are. The criticism that was voiced in the aftermath of the financial crisis, was
that the Basel II rules encouraged financial institutions to purchase mortgage-
backed securities by assigning these securities a low risk weight. Ironically, the
Basel III framework will provide an even stronger incentive for banks to pur-
chase sovereign debt instruments issued by countries in Europe that are facing
significant economic problems. To see this, the Basel II rules15 for risk weighting
banking book exposure are recalled. Generally risk weights for sovereign debt
were determined depending on the rating for each country. Thus, claims on
sovereigns and their central banks were risk weighted under the Basel II frame-
work as presented in Table 2.2. As stated in the Basel II framework, solely
14See Basel Committee (2010a) for further details on the recommendations of the BCBS.
15See Basel Committee (2006) for the complete framework.
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Credit AAA to A+ to BBB+ to BB+ to Below Unrated
Assessment AA- A- BBB- BB- B-
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%
Table 2.2: Basel II: risk weights of sovereigns and their central banks
claims on the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Community received a
0% risk weight. The system of risk weighting under the Basel III framework,
however, ascribes zero weight to certain sovereign debt. As stated by the Euro-
pean Union in its Capital Requirements Regulation the risk weight assignment
to exposures to the European Central Bank is unchanged and remains to be a
0% risk weight16. As opposed to Basel II, exposures to Member State’s central
governments, and central banks denominated and funded in the domestic cur-
rency of that central government and central bank is assigned a 0% risk weight,
also. Basel III rules oblige banks to assign capital depending on the risk of
the sovereign assets, but Euro-zone banks have a workaround. Thus, lenders
are getting away with holding no capital against their eurozone sovereign debt.
Moreover, Basel III assigns the risk weight of 0% to sovereign debt of many
countries experiencing economic stress such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy
and Spain. Debt issued by these countries is coupled with higher returns due
to paying significantly higher interest rates than, for example, comparable US
Treasury instruments. However, no higher capital charge is required under the
Basel III proposal. The low capital charge and the expected higher returns
provide a strong incentive for some financial institutions to increase their expo-
sure to risky foreign country debt. This incentive has the politically pleasing
effect of keeping sovereign borrowing costs low. Bank investors are worried that
lenders are not holding enough capital. This provides additional evidence that
the proposal of Basel III needs to align a non-risk weighted measure. The LR is
16See European Union (2013b), Article 114.
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introduced as a supplementary measure to the risk-based capital requirements.
A non-risk weighted measure can reduce both, the incentive to understate risk
and the incentive to stock up on high risk government bonds in order to avoid
higher capital requirements. However, it is up for discussion what will occur
when this non-risk based regulatory measure is introduced. Banks may try to
game this measure just as they game the risk weighted capital requirements.
Accordingly, the LR proposal may have the unintended consequence of actually
increasing the risk in the financial system rather than reducing it. The thesis
provides further evidence on this subject.
After establishing a common understanding of the term Basel III, the broadly
discussed term ’financial stability’ is to be defined. International banking reg-
ulation and supervision reflects the growing prominence of financial stability
objectives. Financial stability, which is not directly observable, has become a
core component of regulation reforms. Among others, Crockett (2000) argues
for distinguishing between two dimensions of financial stability: the micro- and
macroprudential dimensions. The former is characterized by the soundness of
individual institutions in the financial system. The objective is to limit “id-
iosyncratic risk”, i.e. limiting the likelihood of failure of each institution and
thus protecting depositors. The latter is characterized by the stability of the
financial system as a whole. Its objective is to limit “systemic risk”, i.e. limiting
costs to the economy from moral hazard induced by regulation or financial dis-
tress. The likelihood of failure, not of individual institutions, but of significant
portions of the entire system is to be limited. The focus of the macroprudential
perspective is on the risk of correlated failures and pays attention to institution
specific characteristics which are significant for the economy, such as size, while
the microprudential dimension is not concerned with correlations and considers
individual institutions in its own right. It might be expected that the health of
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the financial system is represented by the soundness of its financial institutions.
Morris and Shin (2008) argue that to enhance financial stability at the macro-
level, soundness at the individual level needs to be achieved simultaneously. This
achievement is quite difficult because actions to ensure one institution’s sound-
ness are specific to this institution and may not be consistent with enhancing
the soundness of another institution. In addition, objectives of financial sta-
bility may differ in the macro- and microprudential dimensions. For instance,
cutting back on lending in a recession is only natural for individual banks, but
if all banks tighten their lending standards, a further deterioration in the credit
quality of portfolio at system level can be expected. By all means, enhancing
the soundness of a particular institution should not stand in conflict with main-
taining the stability of the whole financial system. Further, it is agreed that
vulnerable or even insolvent banks may weaken the entire system due to sys-
temic risk. Thus, promoting each individual’s soundness is an encouraging start
to achieving overall financial stability. Banking supervisors tend to have a
greater microprudential focus. For instance, minimum capital requirements did
not differentiate between banks according to their size and/or significance for
the economy under Basel II . Also, the Basel II accord shall be deemed to have
too much of an institution-specific focus and have lost sight of macro prudential
elements. Supervisors try to consolidate a shift in perspective, complementing
the microprudential dimension with increased awareness of the macropruden-
tial one. There is agreement among the central bank governors of the G10
countries that the Basel III framework is a fundamental strengthening of global
capital standards. The accord fixes many of the shortcomings of micro-level
supervision and also incorporates the broader system wide focus by introducing
macro prudential measures. In addition, the European Union incorporates into
the revision of the CRD IV package a number of tools to prevent and mitigate
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macroprudential and systemic risks. Nevertheless, the opinions on the new Basel
III accord are likely to diverge strongly. Still, there are many points open for
discussion and the BCBS faces major challenges in handling financial instability
at system level. For instance, the current European sovereign debt crisis, which
principally emerged from Greece in May 2010, triggers a serious concern that
the financial stability of the Euro area is put at risk at sovereign and individual
bank level. This crisis contributes to underlying severe tensions in euro-area
sovereign debt markets and, overall, to European financial instability.
In order to make a precise and explicit statement about a bank’s individual
solvency, a measure has to be defined to value the overriding understanding of
the term ’financial stability’. It is useful to create an indicator which is able
to disclose changes in the distress of banks over time. In this context, financial
stability is defined in terms of the Distance to Default (DD) and the Probability
of Default (PD) of individual financial institutions in this thesis. An in-depth
discussion of these measures follows in Section 3.1.2.
2.3 Literature Review
There are two literatures which are directly related to this thesis. First of all,
the literature which is central to bank regulation is reviewed.
Regarding the first aspect of this research, financial regulation, there is an
abundant literature on Basel II. Amongst others, Adams et al. (2004), Repullo
and Suarez (2004), and Liebig et al. (2007) examine the Basel II framework.
Due to the up-to-dateness of the new regulatory framework, Basel III, just a
few studies have been published. A brief review of academic literature on Basel
III is given in the next paragraph. The new requirements are mostly supported.
Morris and Shin (2008) is in line with the view of the Basel Committee (2009).
The authors argue that excessive leverage leaves the financial system vulnerable
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to a sudden reversal, and thus a LR is necessary as a binding constraint. Hellwig
(2010) supports the idea of introducing a LR requirement as well. He argues
for ratios well beyond 10% in order to provide a robust buffer against high
losses. He even goes a step further by proposing to replace risk-sensitive capital
requirements. In his opinion, this will be the only possibility to limit gaming the
risk-based measures. Blum (2008) analyzes capital requirements under Basel
II and supports the idea that a risk-dependent measure is needed to induce
“truth telling” in risk reporting. In addition, the author describes the LR as a
ceiling on the put option value of limited liability. The leverage constraint forces
banks to invest more of their “own” money and thus bear a larger part of the
downside risk themselves. He rationalized the LR by presenting a theoretical
model that examines the pros and cons. Blum (2008) concludes that a LR
should have already been in place under Basel II, even though, he asserts that,
as a consequence, low risk banks are disadvantaged. These banks have to hold
more capital than would be socially optimal or efficient.17 In contrast, “risky”
banks may hold too little capital relative to the risks.
However, the key elements of Basel III have not always gained acceptance.
Critical voices have emerged in literature and illustrate that, at least, some el-
ements are roundly rejected by academic researchers. Kashyap et al. (2010)
examine the impact of higher capital requirements, the focus being on large
financial institutions. They conclude that, firstly, the new capital requirements
need to be phased in gradually because costs of raising “fresh” equity are higher
than the ongoing costs associated with holding equity. Secondly, an impact on
the cost of loans is conceivable, but it is only a modest impact and not a ma-
jor concern for customers. Finally, even though the effects on loan rates are
expected to be modest, concerns about decreasing credit activity and a migra-
17Blum (2008) makes the assumption that capital is socially costly and defines a social waste
by high opportunity cost of capital, i.e. banks that have more capital than necessary to avoid
insolvency. This is a quite standard assumption in banking literature.
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tion of this activity to the shadow-banking sector are raised. This potentially
leads to an increase in fragility of the banking system as a whole. Kiema and
Jokivuolle (2011) provide theoretical evidence that a LR requirement in com-
bination with the risk-based capital requirements might affect loan pricing and
quantities. The authors conclude that loan volumes remain unchanged. Fur-
ther, they show that, in order to obtain high LRs, low-risk lending rates might
increase and high-risk rates decrease which leads to an eventual risk-shifting
from low-risk loans to high-risk loans. According to the authors, the only op-
portunity for low-risk loan banks to cope with LR requirement is to include
high risk loans in their portfolios. In this context, this restriction might reduce
bank soundness, counter to regulatory intentions. Hakura and Cosimano (2011)
study the same effect using an empirical model. The authors analyze the higher
capital requirements under Basel III on bank lending rates and loan growth us-
ing data of the 100 largest banks worldwide over the period from 2001 to 2009.
As empirical strategy, a generalized method of moments estimation procedure
is used. Two regressions are run: the first one to analyze the optimal level of
capital and the second one to investigate the bank’s loan rate. It is concluded
that with an increase in required capital, the marginal cost of loans (defined
as the weighted average for the marginal cost of equity and deposits) will in-
crease, as long as the cost of equity exceeds the cost of deposits. This increase
in loan rates, in turn, declines loan growth in the long run. Frenkel and Rudolf
(2010) examine the macroeconomic and financial effects of a LR requirement.
Similar to the findings of Hakura and Cosimano (2011), the study concludes
that this constraint on banks’ business activity creates undesirable incentives,
such as, cutting back on lending, which could lead to a slowdown in economic
activity. Overall, the authors endorse higher levels of equity but conclude that a
LR requirement increases vulnerability rather than bank soundness. Miu et al.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 39
(2010) study the new capital stability rules by Basel III from a theoretical and
empirical standpoint, putting the focus on capital buffers rather than on the
LR. However, the authors conclude that introducing a LR seems to be redun-
dant and not connected to current practices in risk optimization. In addition,
financial institutions should not rely on these capital buffers but rather improve
the capital quality. Kamada and Nasu (2010) provide theoretical and empirical
evidence that a constraint on leverage requirement has side-effects by impacting
the quality of assets. Asian banks and banks in the G10 countries are compared
by using an asset quality index as the key concept. Not distinguishing different
types of bank assets by their riskiness could be disadvantageous by increasing
the effective capital requirement on low-risk assets. The authors conclude that
one possible reaction to the LR is that banks will shift their asset portfolio from
safer to riskier assets. Therefore, ignoring any potential differences in risk pro-
files may arise another inherent limitation. In addition, it is argued that local
conditions of business models and financial environment should be considered
when adopting a LR.
To sum up, recent literature on Basel III, more precisely, on the new non-
risk-weighted LR, is not in agreement and there is need for further research.
On the one hand, the new framework gains increasing acceptance by academic
researchers, but on the other hand, possible side-effects of the LR, counter to
regulatory intentions, are being discussed. Two of these side-effects could be
increasing loan rates and decreasing loan volumes.
The second related literature studies how to best estimate financial stability and
predict corporate default risk. It is a widely discussed topic in credit risk re-
search. Economic theory provides different approaches to measure firm’s default
probability. In particular, recent empirical and theoretical studies discuss differ-
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ent indicators of corporate bankruptcy prediction18. The option pricing model
developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) has prevailed. The
model to forecast defaults is a market data based one. Instead of using the book
value of debt, the main input to estimate the indicator Distance to Default (DD)
is the value of equity and its volatility. Duffie et al. (2007) show the model’s
predictive power of default probabilities over time for US industrial firms. In in-
dustry practice the Merton model was first adopted by Moody’s KMV19. These
practitioners are a leading provider of company default risk analysis and fo-
cus on the determination of default probability for all publicly traded firms.
In contrast, financial institutions are usually very opaque. Chan-Lau and Sy
(2007) argue that the structure of liabilities is very different compared to non-
financial institutions and banks are often tightly regulated. Thus, calibrating
the model on banks introduces some challenges. However, Crosbie and Bohn
(2003) confirm the applicability of this model on financial institutions and its
overall excellent performance in detecting bank vulnerability. Regulatory ac-
tions, or rather signals when regulators should intervene or banks should take
corrective actions themselves, are ignored. Even though this method has been
initially adopted to company default risk, empirical research exists showing that
the concept of the DD is a predictive power to detect individual bank distress.
In this context, Gropp et al. (2004) compare the performance of commonly ap-
plied bankruptcy prediction models. The DD and bond spreads are applied
as indicators to signal bank fragility using market and balance sheet data of
European banks over the period from 1991-2001. Empirical results show that
both indicators are suitable to predict bank soundness. Particularly the DD
is a suitable and all-encompassing indicator of financial stability because this
method covers all essential bank risk elements such as the value of asset, as-
18See, amongst others, Miller (2009) and Bharath and Shumway (2008).
19See Crosbie and Bohn (2003).
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set volatility and leverage. However, predictive power of the DD is poor when
failure of a bank is close. Still, the authors support the idea that the DD in-
dicator may even outperform other indicators such as bond spreads. Gropp
et al. (2006) summarize and extend the results obtained by Gropp et al. (2004).
Harada and Ito (2011) detect empirical evidence of the usefulness of the DD
to measure pre- and post-merger performance of large Japanese banks in the
late 1990s and 2000s. The findings show that a merger is not a guarantee for
an improvement in bank soundness and does not help banks to escape from
failure. Financial health of the merged bank depends on the soundness of the
pre-merged banks. In addition, merged banks often produce a negative DD right
after the merger. Thus, the financial system in Japan did not benefit from the
mergers in terms of financial soundness. Harada et al. (2010) provide further
evidence for the predictive power of the DD. Eight Japanese banks were exam-
ined by calculating and analyzing the DD and a DD spread20. Generally both
indicators were reliable in forecasting the default of those banks. Based on a
contingent claims analysis, Sald´ıas (2012) develops an aggregated DD series to
monitor vulnerabilities in the European banking sector using a dataset of the
largest, systemically important banks in Europe between 2002 and 2012. Two
indicators are generated: an average distance to default using individual equity
options and a portfolio distance to default using STOXX Europe 600 banks in-
formation. If both indicators and their gap are employed to monitor systemic
risk, the analysis is notably enhanced. Due to the forward-looking feature of
the DD, this approach allows an early signaling of distress. Vulpes and Brasili
(2006) apply a dynamic factor model to measure co-movements in EU-15 bank’s
risk during the period from 1994 to 2004. This model allows one to decompose
the DD into three components: a country-specific, an EU-wide and a bank-level
idiosyncratic component. The authors rely on Gropp et al. (2004) and confirm
20The DD spread is defined as a DD of a failed bank minus the DD of sound banks.
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the suitability of this indicator to signal bank fragility. Michalak (2011) utilizes
the concept of the DD to provide empirical evidence that an increase in short
term interest rates has a negative impact on a bank’s soundness. The author
uses data from stock-listed Western European banks over a period from 1997
to 2008. The DD, more precisely, the Expected Default Frequency is used as a
proxy for the vulnerability of those banks. The related theoretical and empirical
work mentioned above reveal that the concept of the DD has become a pop-
ular proxy for bank soundness. This indicator is used for research concerning
financial stability, systemic risk, and banking crisis.
To conclude, a rich literature on the role of the DD in credit risk research has
emanated. Not only practitioners, but also researchers consider the DD as a
reliable indicator for financial stability. Based on the theoretical and empirical
evidence on the predictive power of the DD to measure banks’ default risk, this
indicator is used for further research in this thesis. Furthermore, recent contribu-
tions of literature cover bank regulatory issues. Yet, opinions differ whether the
regulatory framework by the BCBS increases financial stability or rather vulner-
ability. Overall, theoretical and empirical literature is not conclusive about the
relationship between the Basel III framework and financial stability. Empirical
studies on this topic are rather scarce. In particular, the linkage between the
key concept of the DD, as an indicator for financial stability, and the non-risk
weighted regulatory measure has not been covered in recent literature.
Chapter 3
Financial Risk Analysis
This chapter reports on financial risk in the global banking sector. With a
view to the investigation of the nexus between the LR and financial stability
in Chapter 4, this thesis will now look at the regulatory and stability measures
are examined independently from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Analyzing the LR of individual banks gives information on the capitalization of
the banking sector. Compared to the calibration target proposed by the BCBS,
it can be examined if banks are adequately capitalized, and thus considered to be
healthy and sound. Furthermore, default risk has been modeled by the distance
to default (DD) and the probability of default (PD) to monitor the soundness
of financial institutions in recent years. These are popular indicators due to
encompassing most elements of bank risk. The financial soundness measures are
calibrated in order to investigate individual bank distress and overall banking
system fragility.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, theoretical underpinnings
are discussed. Section 3.2 presents the bank sample used for empirical research
done in this and the following chapter. Furthermore, this section describes
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the application of the measures to the data set. Section 3.3 reports empirical
results for the LR series, the DD and PD series, respectively. Finally, Section
3.4 concludes.
3.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
This section presents the theoretical background and technical discussion of the
relevant measures for this work. First, the LR as proposed under the Basel III
framework by the BCBS is discussed. Then, the DD and PD are considered by
applying the Black-Scholes-Merton model as theoretical framework.
3.1.1 Leverage Ratio Requirement
The LR requirement as proposed by the BCBS, is presented and discussed in the
following consultation papers: Basel Committee (2009) and Basel Committee
(2010a). Not only does the BCBS believe, but it is widely believed that the
build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage at individual bank level,
as in the financial system, contributed to the global banking crisis. Furthermore,
the Basel III framework gives financial institutions the incentive to understate
risk in order to avoid the higher capital requirements. Finally, banks can have
an incentive to stock up on exposures to risky sovereign debt, see Section 2.2 for
further details. To address these issues, the Basel Committee supplements the
Basel II risk-based framework with a non-risk based level of capitalization, i.e.
risky assets attract the same regulatory requirement as safe assets. The control
parameter serves as a backstop to the other risk-sensitive measures. It has been
discovered that the high levels of leverage which were monitored prior to the
crisis, were not accurately accounted for in the risk-based capital requirements
of the Basel II framework. The decision to introduce a LR was endorsed by the
Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision, the Committee’s
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governing body on September 7th, 2009, and supported by the G20 leaders at
the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009. The objectives were the following:
 containing the build up of excessive leverage in the banking sector,
 introducing additional safeguards against model risk attempts to game the
risk based requirements.
Acharya (2009) argues that many on- and off-balance sheet items that turned
out to have substantial risk in the global financial crisis, indeed received very
low risk-weights under Basel II. Prior to the crisis, banks had shown strong risk
based capital ratio while building up excessive leverage. When the financial
crisis occurred, banks with excessive leverage were forced to deleverage. The
downward pressure on asset prices increased which encouraged banks to further
deleveraging. These banks entered a downward spiral in asset values, and ex-
perienced increased losses and reduced capital levels. By putting a limit on the
level of a bank’s debt, the risk of the destabilizing deleveraging processes, that
can damage the economy and the broader financial system, can be mitigated.
Precisely, the deleveraging dynamic in periods of stress are reduced because the
build-up of excess leverage in good times and maturity mismatches will be con-
strained. Thus, the LR is considered as a binding constraint on the upside of
the cycle which is characterized by ample funding conditions. Morris and Shin
(2008) argue that banks are able to increase their leverage easily in a boom dy-
namic but are often forced to deleverage in periods of financial stress. In recent
literature not only the desirable uses of the proposed LR from the perspective
of maintaining financial stability are discussed, but also a number of side ef-
fects that may arise when introducing the LR as a supplementary measure to
the risk-based capital requirement. Some academic researchers such as Kiema
and Jokivuolle (2011) or Frenkel and Rudolf (2010) argue that negative financial
and macroeconomic effects outweigh the benefits of introducing a LR constraint.
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More precisely, widely discussed is the negative impact on asset quality, loan
rates and volumes at individual bank level and thus the increasing fragility in
the banking sector1.
The LR will be phased in cautiously, i.e. supervisory monitoring the first two
years and testing during a parallel run starting in 2013. Based on the results of
the parallel run period and appropriate review and calibration, final adjustments
will be made with a view to migrating to Pillar 1 treatment in 2018. The LR,
as proposed by the BCBS, and finally, adopted by the European Union, can be
written as follows
LRBCBS =
Capital
Total Exposure
, (3.1)
where Capital and Total Exposure require a definition. For the capital measure
the Committee intends to consider common Tier 1 capital and the additional
going concern Tier 1 capital as possible measures. Thus, total Tier 1 capital,
as defined by the Basel III framework, can be considered. Common equity
basically consists of common shares, stock surplus and retained earnings. All
elements of Tier 1 capital are listed in paragraphs 52 to 56 of Basel Committee
(2010a). The generally preferred total exposure, or assets measure, follows the
accounting measure. Advantages of this approach is that accounting data is
available and generally not risk-based. The Committee also discussed whether
or not to include off-balance sheet items in the measure of exposure. First of
all, there is a common understanding that these items were a significant source
of leverage during the last crisis. Secondly, excluding them could create an
incentive to shift items off the balance sheet to avoid the LR constraint. The
European Union decided to incorporate off-balance sheet items into the total
exposure measure2. To begin with, 3% is the calibration target for the Tier 1
1See, amongst others, Kamada and Nasu (2010) or Hakura and Cosimano (2011). Further
details are given in the literature review, see Section 2.3.
2See European Union (2013b).
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capital to total exposure ratio which should be reported as the average of the
monthly LR over the quarter. The ratio applies on a consolidated basis, as
well as, at the level of individual banks. The benefit is that introducing the
LR is nearly costless due to its relative simplicity. Hence, the LR restriction
will be binding for every financial institution. The idea is that a wide range of
countries will adopt an internationally harmonized and appropriately calibrated
ratio in the future. Competitive disadvantages due to the lack of standardized
assumptions surrounding the calculation in each accounting regime can emerge
and have to be taken in consideration. Moreover, LRs can vary across countries
and lead to a lack of comparability among them. The BCBS states that the
details of the ratio will be harmonized internationally to ensure comparability
by adjusting for remaining differences in accounting.
As stated by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011), a restricted LR
is already in place in the United States. This country imposed a LR requirement
on regulated banks, laid down in Pillar 2 of the Basel II framework. The ratio
is expressed as Tier 1 capital to total average adjusted assets, defined as the
quarterly average total assets minus intangible assets, such as goodwill, software
expenses, and deferred taxes. Off-balance sheet items are not included in the
exposure measure. The ratio is set at 3% for banks rated “strong” and at 4% for
all other banks. In addition, banks are subject to prompt corrective action rules,
requiring them to maintain a LR of at least 5% in order to be considered well
capitalized. Table 3.1 presents the capitalization categories which can be found
in the rules and regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011).
Whether or not US banks managed their way through the crisis better than the
European countries, remains to be seen. Switzerland is another country which
introduced a LR under Pillar 2 of the Basel II framework in 2008 but solely for
two banks: Credit Suisse and UBS. Their calculation is equal to the US LR. The
CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL RISK ANALYSIS 48
Capitalization category LR
Well capitalized ≥ 5%
Adequately capitalized ≥ 4%
Undercapitalized ≤ 4%
Significantly undercapitalized ≤ 3%
Critically undercapitalized ≤ 2%
Table 3.1: Capitalization category by Prompt Corrective Action Rules
minimum level is set to 3% at the consolidated level and at 4% at individual
bank level. Impacts of the introduction of a minimum LR in Switzerland and
the US will be analyzed in Section 3.3.1.
Before turning to the empirical analysis of the LR, the results of the Basel
III monitoring exercise are presented. This study, set up by the BCBS, exam-
ines the impact of the rules contained in the regulatory document “Basel III: A
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”3 on
selected financial institutions. The exercise is based on rigorous reporting pro-
cesses to review the implications periodically. The data collection takes place
semi-annually using data as of end-June and end-December of each year. The
first report on the Basel III monitoring is for German institutions and provided
by the German Central Bank4 (GCB). The second report provided by the Eu-
ropean Banking Authority5 (EBA) gives information on the results of the Basel
III monitoring exercise at European level. The last one is published by the
BCBS6 itself, and presents the results at world level. To create comparability
with the results presented in the financial risk analysis, Section 3.3.1, the re-
ports at European and world level based on data as of December 31, 2011 are
described. The results for German banks are only available based on data as
of June 30, 2012. Note that only findings regarding the LR are presented. All
other findings of the Basel III Monitoring exercise are neglected. All reports
3See Basel Committee (2010a).
4See Deutsche Bundesbank (2012).
5See European Banking Authority (2012).
6See Basel Committee (2012).
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calculate two alternative measures of the LR. The differences refer to the nu-
merator of Equation (3.1). The first measure is defined as the Basel III LR and
exactly matches the definition of Equation (3.1). The second, is the Basel II
LR which includes Tier 1 capital eligible under the Basel II agreement. The
main difference consists in improving the quality of regulatory Tier 1 capital
by recognizing hybrid capital instruments only as components of Tier 1 capital
to a limited extent. These instruments are subject to much stricter conditions
under Basel III. The denominator includes off-balance sheet items in both cases.
For the interpretation of the results, the terminology used to describe a bank’s
leverage is clarified. Generally, when a bank is referred to being more leveraged,
this refers to a multiple of exposure to capital. Hence, banks with high level of
leverage have low LRs.
The EBA includes in its sample a total of 156 banks from 18 countries in
Europe and further distinguishes between 44 banks of Group 1 and 112 banks
of Group 2. Of interest is Group 1, because these banks have Tier 1 capital
in excess of EUR 3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are
defined as Group 2. The exercise is carried out assuming full implementation of
Basel III. It is reported that Group 1 banks show an average LR of 2.9%, while
Group 2 banks’ LR is slightly higher and stands at 3.3%. Therefore, 51% of
the 41 participating Group 1 banks and 70% of the 111 Group 2 banks would
meet the 3% benchmark as of the end of December 2011. In addition, the EBA
provides findings regarding a hypothetical LR which is based on the current
definition of Tier 1 capital eligible under the Basel II framework. Under this
definition, the average current LR of Group 1 is at 4.1% and of Group 2 at
4.6%. Higher LRs under the Basel II Tier 1 definition result from the objective
of improving the quality of the capital base under the new Basel Accord. Figure
3.1 reports the distribution of the results across participating banks for Group
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Figure 3.1: EBA - Basel II LR and Basel III LR of Group 1
This figure shows the distribution of the results of the Basel III monitoring exer-
cise by the European Banking Authority. Source: European Banking Authority
(2012), p. 20-21.
1 as of June 2011 and December 2011. On the left the LR using Tier 1 capital
according to Basel II rules, and on the right the LR using the fully phased-
in Basel III definition of Tier 1 capital is illustrated. The dashed red lines
show the calibration benchmark of 3%, while the thin red lines represent the
median. The mean is shown as “x”. The blue box is defined by the 25th and
75th percentile value while the the 5th and 95th percentile are represented by
the lower and upper end points of the black vertical lines. The EBA concludes
that the average LR has improved slightly compared to the previous report.
The BCBS reports that a total of 209 banks from 26 countries world wide
participated in their study. The same definition of Group 1 as stated above
applies, including 102 banks, while Group 2 includes 107 banks. Data is collected
as of 31 December 2011 at the consolidated level. Findings regarding the LR
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are as follows: the average Basel III LR for the entire sample is 3.6%, while the
average for Group 1 is at 3.5% and for Group 2 at 4.4%. Overall 73% of the
entire sample, 72% of Group 1 and 75% of Group 2, would meet the target of
3% as of December 2011. Using the Basel II Tier 1 capital definition, the mean
for all banks is 4.5%, for Group 1 is 4.4% and for Group 2 is at 4.9%. 93% of
all banks, 96% of Group 1 and 91% of Group 2, would meet the target.
Figure 3.2: GCB - Basel II LR and Basel III LR (all, Group 1, and Group 2)
This figure shows the distribution of the results of the Basel III monitoring
exercise by the German Central Bank. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2012),
p. 21.
The German Central Bank reports results as of 30 June 2012 and includes
a total of 33 German banks in their sample of which 8 banks are considered
Group 1 and 25 Group 2 banks. The average Basel III LR for all banks is at
2.0%, for Group 1 banks at 1.8% and for Group 2 banks at 3.1%. 52% of the
entire sample would meet the calibration target of 3%. Further information on
individual groups is not given but visible in Figure 3.2. The figure illustrates
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the Basel II LR and Basel III LR for the entire sample, Group 1 and Group 2,
using a box plots diagram as well. Using the Basel II definition of Tier 1 capital,
the average LR for all 33 banks is 3.2%, Group 1 at 3.0% and Group 2 at 3.9%.
Overall, the monitoring indicates a positive correlation between the level of
leverage and bank size since the mean of the LR for Group 1 banks is signifi-
cantly lower than for Group 2 banks. It can be concluded that Group 2 banks
are less leveraged on average. This difference increases under Basel III. Nev-
ertheless, the changes in the definition of capital under Basel III is likely to
affect Group 1 banks to a greater extent than banks in Group 2. Results are
recapitulated in Table 3.2. Regarding Group 1, it can be concluded that Ger-
Basel II LR (%) Basel III LR (%)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
EBA* 4.1 4.6 2.9 3.3
BCBS* 4.4 4.9 3.5 4.4
GCB** 3.0 3.9 1.8 3.1
Table 3.2: Results Basel III-Monitoring
*as of 31 December 2011
**as of 30 June 2012
man banks on average have the lowest LRs. Values improve at European level,
and including banks at world level increases the weighted average LR again.
Findings regarding the LR for Group 1 provided by the EBA and the German
Central Bank are subsequently compared to the empirical results in the Section
3.3.1.
3.1.2 Financial Soundness Measures
Next, the theoretical background and the technical discussion of the DD and
PD are presented by applying the Black-Scholes-Merton framework.
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Theoretical Background
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) argue that the most effective measure of default prob-
ability derives from models that employ both financial statements and market
prices. Thus, the authors explain that measuring default risk requires certain
accessible types of information: market prices of the bank’s debt and equity,
financial statements and appraisals of the bank’s prospects and risk. Market
prices are inherently forward looking. They combine investor’s willingness to
sell and buy equity and debt securities of the bank, and therefore embody in-
vestor’s views and forecasts. In the determination of default probability, prices
can enhance considerably to the predictive power of the estimates. As a method
to assess and evaluate a bank’s soundness, the concept of the distance to default
(DD) and probability of default (PD) is proposed. In general, the probability of
default of a bank is determined by three main elements: (i) the market value of
assets, (ii)asset value risk, and (iii) leverage. The former represents the present
value of the free cash flows in the future, produced by the bank’s assets, dis-
counted at the appropriate discount rate. The pertinent measure is always the
market value. The second element should always be linked to the uncertain
estimate, the value of assets. The latter is a measure of the extent of the bank’s
contractual liabilities measured as the book value of liabilities. Initially, this
method had been disseminated by the proprietors of the KMV corporation to
monitor company default risk and has gained prominence since then. Finan-
cial soundness measures are calculated using a structural model based on the
option pricing theory by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Crosbie
and Bohn (2003) describe this particular application of the classic bond pricing
model of Merton (1974) that was developed by Moody’s KMV in detail. For
simplicity, it is considered that a bank liability structure consists of equity and
junior subordinated debt, i.e. each bank issues just one unit of equity and one
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zero-coupon bond. The sum of the values is equal to the value of the bank. Un-
derlying the structural approach, it is assumed that the payoff to shareholders
of a firm is modeled as a call option on its market asset value and can be written
as
E = max(0;VA −D) , (3.2)
where E is the payoff to equity holders, and VA the value of a bank’s assets
which is equal to its debt D and its equity. The strike price of the option is
defined by the face value of its debt, named the default point. This implies that
a company or a bank defaults, when the market price drops below the strike
price. As long as the market value of assets is below the default point, the payoff
to shareholders is zero. If it is higher, bank’s assets are used to pay debt hold-
ers, and then the residual value is distributed to equity holders. Thus, equity
holders are residual claimants on the bank since they get paid after bondhold-
ers. As banks’ assets decrease and move closer to the default point, the market
value of the call option also declines. The normalized distance between these
two values is called the DD, representing the first measure of bank distress in
the following financial risk analysis. In related literature, the DD is a popular
and widely used measure of banks’ fragility. Gropp et al. (2006) argue that
the DD provides easily interpretable signals and yields useful information on
increased fragility if the following criteria is fulfilled: the bank’s value of assets
declines, the asset volatility or leverage increases. Thus, it has become a bench-
mark indicator to monitor health in financial institutions. Further, Gropp et al.
(2006), Gropp and Moerman (2004) and International Monetary Fund (2009)
demonstrate that the DD is a capable model to predict a serious deterioration in
banks’ condition.7 This forward-looking measure, as discussed by Crosbie and
Bohn (2003), considers both liquidity and solvency risk. The DD is defined by
7The literature review provides further information, see Section 2.3.
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the number of standard deviations of the market value of assets away from the
default point. For instance, a bank with a DD of 1.0 indicates that the default,
within a specified time, is a one-standard deviation event. It is presumed that
the fluctuation of the mark-to-market value of assets follows the recent historical
value, using the current value as a starting point. The model defines that a bank
defaults when the face value of debt is below the market value of assets. Hence,
the default barrier or point is where these two values are equal. The higher the
DD, the greater the distance of a bank from the default point, the lower the
risk. Thus, an increase in the DD implies greater bank stability or soundness.
A DD of zero does not indicate a bank failure at that point of time. Rather, a
bank needs to earn extra profit and roll over short-term debts, or assets will be
exhausted and the bank is highly likely to fail. Having a negative DD or a DD
of zero means that a bank is technically insolvent but can survive on the cash
flow basis due to rollover assumptions. Banks will often adjust their liabilities as
they near default. Nevertheless, a bank is extremely vulnerable the more a DD
approaches zero. A bank run event could cause a sudden bank failure at this
point of time due to the shortage of liquidity. If two banks in the sample have
the same distance (in the sense of standard deviation) from its default point,
the DD and the level of default risks are the same.
The Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) model determines the value
of assets and its volatility from the value of equity and equity volatility. Merton
(1974) model is the genesis for understanding the nexus between the market
value of the bank’s equity and the market value of its assets. The option pricing
model by Black and Scholes (1973) can be seen as a special case of the Merton
(1974) derivative pricing model. It provides a useful framework and illustrates
the technical details on estimating DD values. Once the unobservable variables,
the value and volatility of assets, are known, the probability that the market
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value of assets declines to the bank specific default barrier within a given time
horizon, can be calculated. Subsequently, the PD can be derived from the DD.
By definition, the DD and PD have a negative relationship: a higher DD is
associated with a lower bank default probability.
Prior to the technical discussion of the DD and PD, some critical questions
concerning the application of these measures on financial institutions is dis-
cussed next. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) address some of these critical issues that
arise, especially, in practice. First of all, the authors explain that an efficient
equity market is not assumed. The market does not reflect all the relevant in-
formation about a bank’s value, but the price reflects a summary of investor’s
forecasts and individual’s or committee’s forecasts cannot do any better. Con-
sequently, the market, as a source of information regarding the value of a bank,
is suitable. Further, the importance of off-balance sheet items is discussed. Off-
balance sheet activities are common for financial institutions. Boot and Thakor
(1991) show that the amount of off-balance sheet liabilities can be quite signifi-
cant. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) give numerical evidence that the utilized model
is robust to the precise level of liabilities. The authors increase the value of
the default point taking off-balance sheet commitments into account, all other
variables are kept the same. The corresponding DD in their example increases
slightly and the PD value does not change at all. Thus, the model deals very
well with off-balance sheet liabilities. The authors then argue that information
from the bond or credit derivatives market does not need to be included in the
PD model. Models that relate credit spreads to default probabilities are so-
called reduced-form models. These models suffer from the noise in debt market
data and hence, they can be difficult to parametrize. For instance, Gropp et al.
(2004, 2006) apply bond spreads as an indicator to signal bank fragility in their
bankruptcy prediction models. They show that the response of these spreads
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to an increase in the probability of default is non-linear, i.e. spreads have little
response far away from default and a strong reaction close to default. Particu-
larly, the information content is diminished in the case of banks, which markets
expect to bail out in the case of difficulties. In addition, more assumptions
about the relationship between loss given default and default probabilities are
required than in structural models. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) research concludes
that structural models are more effective for estimations of default probabilities
due to their empirical stability. This argumentation is in line with recent liter-
ature. Gropp et al. (2004, 2006) demonstrate that the DD outperforms or at
least improves other financial stability measures such as bond or Credit Default
Swap spreads. In contrast to Sald´ıas (2012), Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) comment
on possible shortcomings of the DD in banking. It is argued that supervisory
and regulatory complexities associated with bank interventions and closures are
not captured. The model assumes that a bank can use its total equity capital as
a buffer. However, it is possible that supervisors or regulators intervene before
its total capital is exhausted. Thus, the DD may not be suitable in order to
analyze regulatory purposes. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) argue that interventions
are costly to taxpayers most of the time, and that a default risk measure should
not incorporate the uneconomic behavior of another group. Hence, a hard eco-
nomic measure needs to be provided. In this financial risk analysis the DD is not
used in order to predict bank failures, where government interventions can be of
significance, but to assess and monitor financial soundness in the past. Hence,
this limitation discussed by Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) is not alarming. Finally, it
deserves notice that the financial soundness measures are estimated for the same
industry but across different countries. Results are compared without taken the
country of incorporation particularly into account. Due to differing account-
ing standards, one could argue that the results are biased. Crosbie and Bohn
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(2003) show that the measure PD can be estimated appropriately for each bank
regardless of its home country, and thus, is applicable across countries and even
industries. The idiosyncrasies of different countries, in particular the economic
prospects, are captured by the individual valuations of equity and assets. Hence,
the authors conclude that the DD measure incorporates well, most relevant dif-
ferences in default risk across countries. In the financial risk analysis the DD is
preferred to analyzing a bank’s soundness. The PD is derived from the DD in
order to examine fundamental relationships in the panel data analysis in Chap-
ter 4. Thus, both indicators are introduced. The variables that determine the
DD and PD of a bank over a time horizon T are recapitulated and illustrated
graphically from now until time T in Figure 3.3:
1. The current asset value VA (0).
2. The distribution of the asset value at time T .
3. The volatility of the future assets value at time T .
4. The level of the default point, the book value of liabilities.
5. The expected rate of growth in the value of assets over the horizon.
6. The length of the time horizon T
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Figure 3.3: Determinants of the DD and PD
This figure shows the six variables that determine the probability of default of
a bank over some horizon. Source: Crosbie and Bohn (2003), p. 13.
Technical Discussion
The numerical procedure to compute the financial soundness measures is pre-
sented next. The derivation of the DD is described in e.g. Michalak (2011) and
Bharath and Shumway (2008). The PD is calculated using a two-step approach:
1. Calculation of the DD per bank i at time t,
2. Translation of the derived theoretical DD of bank i at time t into a time
variant PD based on the risk neutral valuation framework.
The model recognizes that neither the market asset value nor its volatility is
directly observable and exploits the option nature of equity to derive these
values. Underlying the assumptions of the model, both unobservable variables
can be inferred, amongst others, from the observable variables value of equity
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and equity volatility. In particular, the system of nonlinear equations for the
option price and volatility is solved by an iterative procedure for the implied
asset value and volatility. After inferring the value of assets and its volatility, the
probability of default is specified in the model as a normal cumulative density
function.
The Merton (1974) framework is employed to compute a bank’s DD. Two
important assumptions are made. First of all, the model assumes that under the
empirical probability measure P the value of each bank follows a continuous-
time stochastic process, in particular, a geometric Brownian motion,
dVA = µVAdt+ σAVAdW , (3.3)
where VA is the asset value of a bank, dVA is the change in asset value, µ is
the expected continuously compounded return on VA, σA is the asset volatility
and W is a standard Wiener process. The second assumption is that a bank
has issued just one zero-coupon bond maturing in T periods. Under these
assumption, the equity of a bank is a call option, as described above, with a
time-to-maturity T . Applying the Black and Scholes (1973) formula, a bank’s
value of equity can be described as a function of its total asset value. The face
value of a bank’s debt is equal to the value of a risk-free discount bond minus
the value of a put option on the bank. Again the strike price is equal to a bank’s
default point. The model stipulates that the bank’s value of equity satisfies
VE = VA ·N(d1)−D · e−rT ·N(d2) , (3.4)
where VE is the market value of the bank’s equity, D is the default point, r is the
risk-free rate and N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function,
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d1 is given by
d1 =
ln
(
VA
D
)
+
(
r +
σ2A
2
)
· T
σA
√
T
, (3.5)
and d2 is
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T . (3.6)
Note that µ does not enter Equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6). By a standard
argument an equivalent risk-neutral measure Q exists. Under Q all assets grow
at the risk-free rate of interest r, i.e. all investors do not require any risk
premium and can be treated as if they were risk neutral. Thus, Q is often called
risk-neutral probability measure.8 The price of the option, Equation (3.4), is
given by the expected payoff of the claim under Q.
Equation (3.4) expresses the value of equity of a bank. A second equation is
used to determine the equity volatility by relating this volatility to the volatility
of its assets. By Equations (3.3) and (3.4), and Itoˆ’s lemma we have
dVE
VE
= µEdt+ σEdW , (3.7)
where
σE =
(
VA
VE
)
∂VE
∂VA
σA , (3.8)
and µE is the expected return on equity under the probability measure P. Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) show that ∂VE∂VA = N(d1), so that the asset
volatility of a bank and its equity volatility are related by
σE =
(
VA
VE
)
N(d1)σA , (3.9)
8The probability measures P and Q are equivalent by Girsanov’s theorem in continuous
time models. See e.g. Musiela and Rutkowski (2005) for further details on this theorem and
probability measures.
CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL RISK ANALYSIS 62
where d1 is defined in Equation (3.5). Note that it is switched to the risk-neutral
probability measure Q.
To translate the value of equity and its volatility into a DD and a risk-
neutral PD, these two nonlinear Equations, (3.4) and (3.9), are used. Thus, the
model describes the unobserved option value as a function of different observable
variables: the value of equity and its volatility, time-to-maturity, the face value
of debt and the risk-free rate. While the unobservable value VA needs to be
inferred, VE is easily observable in the market place by multiplying the bank’s
outstanding shares by its current stock price. Due to the nature of the model,
the sample includes only stock listed banks. Similarly, equity volatility, σE ,
can be estimated from either historical stock returns or from option-implied
volatility, while asset volatility, σA, must be inferred. Thus, the first step in
implementing the DD model is to estimate the observable variables VE and σE .
In a second step, a forecasting horizon and a measure for the face value of a
bank’s debt needs to be defined. Due to unavailability of information about the
maturity structure of liabilities, a common assumption is to use a time horizon
of 1 year and take the book value of total liabilities to be the face value of the
debt9. Thus, the default point in this model is given by
D = Ls + Ll , (3.10)
where Lsis the bank’s book value of short-term liabilities and Ll the book value
of long-term liabilities. The next step is to generate values of the risk-free rate.
After collecting this data, Equation (3.4) and (3.9) can be numerically solved
for values of VA and σA.
After obtaining the numerical solution, the DD can be calculated. Since per
assumption the value of a bank’s assets follows a log-normal distribution, the
9See e.g. Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Miller (2009).
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log asset value in T years can be written as
lnV TA = lnVA +
(
r − σ
2
A
2
)
T + σA
√
Tε , (3.11)
where ε is the normally distributed random component of the bank’s return
on assets. The relationship given by that equation describes the evolution in
the asset value path that is shown in Figure 3.3. The default point is given at
lnV TA = lnD and thus, the current distance d from the default point can be
expressed as
d = lnV TA − lnD = lnVA +
(
r − σ
2
A
2
)
T + σA
√
Tε− lnD
⇔ d
σA
√
T
=
ln
(
VA
D
)
+
(
r − σ2A2
)
· T
σA
√
T
+ ε. (3.12)
This yields the DD, which is defined as the number of standard deviations that
a bank is away from the default point, D, within a given time horizon
DD =
d
σA
√
T
− ε =
ln
(
VA
D
)
+
(
r − σ2A2
)
· T
σA
√
T
. (3.13)
Obviously, the DD increases with (a) an increase in bank asset value, (b) a
decrease in asset volatility and/or (c) a decrease in bank leverage. Secondly,
the DD of bank i at time t is translated into a time-variant PD. Sometimes the
PD is called the expected default frequency10. Accordingly, the PD is defined
as the probability that the market value of a bank’s assets will be less than its
book value of liabilities by the time debt matures and can be written as follows
PT = Pr
{
V TA ≤ DT | VA (0) = VA
}
, (3.14)
10See Michalak (2011).
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where PT is the probability of default by time T , V
T
A is the market value of the
bank’s assets at time T , and D is the book value of the bank’s liabilities due at
time T . The change in the value of the bank’s assets is described by Equation
(3.3) and thus, the value at time T , V TA , is described in Equation (3.11), given
that the value at time 0 is VA. Combining Equation (3.14) and (3.11), the PD
can be written as
PT = Pr
{
lnVA +
(
r − σ
2
A
2
)
· T + σA
√
Tε ≤ lnD
}
. (3.15)
After rearranging
PT = Pr
ε ≤ ln
(
VA
D
)
+
(
r − σ2A2
)
· T
σA
√
T
 . (3.16)
By symmetry of the normal distribution it follows
PD = N
− ln (VAD )+
(
r − σ2A2
)
· T
σA
√
T
 = N(−DD). (3.17)
Equation (3.17) shows that the PD is a function of the distance between the
value of a bank’s assets today and the book value of its total liabilities adjusted
for the continuously compounded expected return relative to asset volatility.
Thus, a lower (higher) DD ratio implies a higher (lower) default probability.
3.2 Empirical Application
This section provides the dataset used to compute the LR, DD and PD series,
and discusses particularities in the bank sample which are relevant for the fol-
lowing calibration. Further, the variables needed for the structural approach of
calculation are defined and, finally, applied to the data. First of all, the cal-
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ibration of the LR series is reported, then the calibration of the DD and PD
series.
3.2.1 Dataset
The sample used to compute the LR and the financial soundness measures in-
cludes a total of 51 stock-listed banks from 16 countries headquartered in the
Euro-zone, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland and the
United States of America11. The sample period is determined from 2006 to
2011. The choice of the observation period permits one to monitor systemic
risk over time during a crisis, years 2008 and 2009, and non-crisis period. In
addition, not only effects of the global financial crisis are expected to play an
important role, but also, the year 2011 could have been already affected by
the European sovereign debt crisis. The sample consists of 47 banks located
in Europe, accounting for more than a half of total assets in the EU banking
system. Additionally four banks are included which are based in the United
States. Amongst others, the largest banks ranked by total assets are given for
each country. These banks are considered to be the core of the banking system
in Europe and the US in terms of systemic risk, i.e. the largest systemically
important financial institutions are included in the sample. There are some
special cases worth pointing out.
The first one applies to the Concord Investmentbank AG in Germany. Data
is only available for the years 2006 and 2007 due to bankruptcy. Insolvency
filing was made in February 2009, and the bank was dissolved. The second
and third cases are similar. The Dutch bank ABN Amro Holding N.V. and
the English bank HBOS Plc were large and established banks, before these
11Denmark and United Kingdom are EU Member States with a special status. For the time
being, they did not wish to adopt the euro. Sweden and Poland are EU Member States with
a derogation. Both countries have not yet met the conditions for the adoption of the euro.
For further details on this topic, see European Central Bank (2013).
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banks were taken over by another large financial institution. The former was
acquired by the Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and Banco Santander in equal
measures in 2008. Data is available for year 2006 and 2007 in order to compute
the DD and PD series. LR is calculated at individual bank level during the
entire sample period. HBOS Plc was taken over by the English bank Lloyds
TSB in 2008. Thus, this bank is a direct subsidiary of Lloyds TSB Bank Plc
and a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Lloyds Banking Group plc. Data
availability is given for 2006, 2007, and 2008 to compute DD and PD series. LR
series is, again, computed at individual bank level during the sample period.
Furthermore, the German Comdirect Bank AG is owned by the Commerzbank
AG, and the German DAB Bank AG by the Unicredit Bank AG. In these two
cases, all data is computed at individual bank level while general data is collected
at consolidated level. Further details can be gathered from annual reports of
each bank in the respective year.
The full list of banks and other related methodological notes are presented
in Table 3.3. In addition to the bank name and home country, the ISIN Code
and Datastream (DS) Mnemonic is listed. Furthermore, the currency is listed
to show that some currency in annual reports differ from the local currency.
Balance sheet data, needed in order to calculate the LR and financial soundness
measures, for each individual bank is retrieved from annual reports which are
published under the rubric investor relations on the corresponding website of
the banks. Regarding accounting data, consolidated financial statements are
utilized except for the cases mentioned above. This approach has been adopted
due to the often unavailability of unconsolidated financial statements data. One
reason is that banks are often de-listed when holding companies are listed in-
stead. Market data, needed only for the calibration purposes of the financial
soundness measures, is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Eikon.
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Bank Name Country ISIN Code DS Mnemonic Currency
1 Commerzbank AG Germany DE000CBK1001 D:CBK EUR
2 Deutsche Bank AG Germany DE0005140008 D:DBK EUR
3 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany DE0008001009 D:DPB EUR
4 Concord Investmentbank AG Germany DE0005410203 D:CEF EUR
5 Comdirect Bank AG Germany DE0005428007 D:COM EUR
6 DAB Bank AG Germany DE0005072300 D:DRN EUR
7 Landesbank Berlin AG Germany DE0008023227 D:BEB2 EUR
8 National Bank of Greece Greece GRS003013000 G:ETE EUR
9 Bank of Ireland Ireland IE0030606259 BKIR EUR
10 ALLIED IRISH BANKS Plc Ireland IE0000197834 ALBK EUR
11 PKO BP Poland PLPKO0000016 PO:PKB EUR
12 Banco Santander Central Hispano Spain ES0113900J37 E:SCH EUR
13 BBVA SA Spain ES0113211835 E:BBVA EUR
14 Banco Espanol de Cre´dito SA Spain ES0113059002 E:OPCJ EUR
15 Bankinter Spain ES0113679I37 E:BKT EUR
16 Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain ES0113790531 E:POP EUR
17 UBI Banca Italy IT0003487029 I:UBI EUR
18 Banca Intesa SanPaolo-IMI Italy IT0000072618 I:ISP EUR
19 UniCredit Italiano Italy IT0004781412 I:UCG EUR
20 BNP Paribas France FR0000131104 F:BNP EUR
21 Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale France FR0000130809 F:SGE EUR
22 Natixis France FR0000120685 F:KN@F EUR
23 Cre´dit Agricole S.A. France FR0000045072 F:CRDA EUR
24 ING Groep Netherlands NL0000303600 H:ING EUR
25 ABN Amro Holding NV Netherlands NL0000301109 H:AAB EUR
26 Kas Bank NV Netherlands NL0000362648 H:KAS EUR
27 Dexia Banque Belgium BE0003796134 B:DEX EUR
28 KBC Group NV Belgium BE0003565737 B:KB EUR
29 BKS Bank AG Austria AT0000624705 O:KAER EUR
30 Erste Group Bank AG Austria AT0000652011 O:ERS EUR
31 Raiffeisen Bank International Austria AT0000606306 O:RAI EUR
32 Oberbank AG Austria AT0000625108 O:OBER EUR
33 Pohjola Bank Plc Finland FI0009003222 M:POH EUR
34 Barclays UK GB0031348658 BARC GBP
35 Lloyds Banking Group UK GB0008706128 LLOY GBP
36 HSBC Holdings Plc UK GB0005405286 HSBA USD
37 HBOS Plc UK GB0030587504 HBOS GBP
38 Standard Chartered Plc UK GB0004082847 STAN USD
39 Schroders Plc UK GB0002405495 SDR GBP
40 Royal Bank of Scotland UK GB00B7T77214 RBS GBP
41 Jyske Bank A/S Denmark DK0010307958 DK:JYS DKK
42 Danske Bank A/S Denmark DK0010274414 DK:DAB DKK
43 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden SE0000193120 W:SVK SEK
44 Swedbank AG Sweden SE0000242455 W:SWED SEK
45 Nordea Bank AB Sweden SE0000427361 W:NDA EUR
46 UBS Switzerland CH0024899483 S:UBSN CHF
47 Credit Suisse Switzerland CH0012138530 S:CSGN CHF
48 Bank of America Corp US US0605051046 U:BAC USD
49 Citigroup Inc US US1729674242 U:C USD
50 Morgan Stanley US US6174464486 U:MS USD
51 Wells Fargo US US9497461015 U:WFC USD
Table 3.3: Bank sample
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Apart from the three exceptions, Concord Investmentbank, HBOS and ABN,
the sample period is December 2006 to December 2011. Thus, only 48 banks are
tested for the full sample period. Note that the currency of the required data
of four banks, PKO BP, HSBC, Standard Chartered and Nordea Bank, differs
from the domestic currency. In order to standardize the currency of market and
balance sheet data, if necessary, data has been converted in the same currency
as those of the published annual report of the respective bank.
3.2.2 Application of the Leverage Ratio to Banks
The computation of the LR for the 51 individual banks in the sample is reported
next. The LR is calculated annually for each bank, generally, at the consolidated
level over the sample period from 2006 to 2011. Four cases are exceptional: the
LR is calculated at individual bank level for the German banks Comdirect Bank
AG and DAB Bank AG, and due to takeovers during the sample period for the
ABN Amro Holding of the Netherlands and the HBOS Plc in the UK. Data as
of the balance sheet date is used. The LR applied to the sample is defined as
LR =
Tier 1Capital
Total Assets
, (3.18)
where Tier 1Capital is the reported value for core Tier 1 plus additional Tier
1 capital by the banks in their annual reports. Thus, Tier 1 capital consists of
the sum of following elements:
 Common Equity,
 Additional Going Concern Equity.
The Tier 1 capital is eligible under the, at that time valid, Basel II framework
with the exception of one bank. The Commerzbank AG discloses since 2009
Tier 1 capital under Basel III definitions. German banks have to exclude silent
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partnerships from calculating its core Tier 1 capital because in German stock
corporations silent partnerships will no longer count as core Tier-1-Capital from
2013.12 Silent partnerships which have state aid character, in the case of the
Commerzbank, are accepted until 2018. Total assets represents the reported
book value of total assets by banks in their annual reports. Due to the lim-
ited availability of data, LRs are calculated only from on-balance-sheet items.
This is in line with, first of all, approaches in recent literature13, and secondly,
the estimates of the introduced LR in the United States by US banks. This
computation might be far from a perfect indicator for the soundness of a bank.
Generally off-balance sheet items should be included, as proposed by the BCBS.
Nevertheless, the aim of this analysis is to analyze possible side effects of this
indicator. Excluding off-balance sheet items are not expected to impact the
results significantly, but will merely lead to an increase of the denominator of
the ratio, i.e. the LR would decreases slightly for the entire sample. Following
this approach, results will be comparable to the Basel III monitoring exercise,
using the Basel II LR as a benchmark, and to the disclosed Tier 1 LRs by the
US banks.
3.2.3 Application of the Financial Soundness Measures to
Banks
The structural approach to calculate the DD is described in Section 3.1.2. DD
and PD series is generally calculated at consolidated level, except for the two
German banks Comdirect Bank AG and DAB Bank AG. In order to apply this
model, pioneered by the option pricing model by Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974), to individual banks, following data needs to be retrieved: the
market value of equity, equity volatility, the risk-free rate and the book value
12See Basel Committee (2010a) for further details.
13See, amongst others, Kamada and Nasu (2010).
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of short- and long-term liability. By dint of these variables, the value of assets
and its volatility can be estimated in a first step. A historical database is used
to estimate the empirical distribution of changes in DD and to calculate the PD
based on that distribution.
As observable market value of equity, VE , the yearly average market cap-
italization of individual banks is employed. Daily data for the period from
January 2, 2006 to December 30, 2011 is obtained from Worldscope Fundamen-
tals, available through the Thomson Financial Datastream Database. Yearly
averages based on the daily data are calculated in the same currency as those of
the balance sheet data of each bank. VE corresponds to the market value of the
bank by providing a total value for the banks’ outstanding shares. Datastream
Datatype Definition defines market capitalization as the product of the market
price year end and the common shares outstanding. The market price year end
represents the closing price of the bank’s stock at their fiscal year end.
The equity volatility, σE , is estimated by taking the standard deviation of
monthly equity returns in a rolling one-year window, i.e. 12 months, over the
same period as mentioned above. First of all, the monthly market price close is
obtained from Worldscope, again available through Datastream and expressed
in domestic currency. Datastream Datatype Definition defines the market price
close as the market price of the stock at the relevant month end. The month is
determined by the start date specified in the time series request, i.e. the 2nd of
January. Secondly, the difference between the logarithmic prices are taken to
measure the relative price changes. These differences, the so-called log-relative
returns, are normally distributed and satisfy
Logrelatives = ln(pricet/pricet−1) , (3.19)
where pricet is the market price close at time t and pricet−1 the market price
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close at time t − 1. Finally, to express the volatility in annual terms the stan-
dard deviation of the samples series is calculated and scaled with the annu-
alization factor
√
12 which is the number of intervals per annum for monthly
data. The equity volatility corresponds to the historical equity volatility. Sald´ıas
(2012) argues that using historical returns data is common, if the indicator has
a backward-looking specification. The financial soundness measures employed
in this analysis do not necessarily need to have a forward-looking feature, but
assess financial soundness of individual banks in the past. Thus, employing
historical volatility seems reasonable. Further examples of this approach cited
in literature are found in Bharath and Shumway (2008), Sald´ıas (2009), Gropp
et al. (2006) and Vassalou and Xing (2004).
The total liabilities, D, are obtained from the banks published annual reports
and expressed in the currency as reported in Table 3.3. The book value, as of
the balance sheet date, is used in this model. As risk free rates, r, which
correspond to the expected rate of growth in the value of assets over the analyzed
horizon, the 12 months interbank offered rates are used. They are based on
estimates by leading banks and represent the averaged rates a bank would be
charged if borrowing from another bank. Loans taken by the banks are generally
risk free and thus, these rates are considered risk-free. In addition, Bliss and
Panigirtzoglou (2004) argue that interbank offered rates are good proxies of
borrowing costs because they are highly liquid and less prone to be affected
by monetary policy actions. For banks in the Euro-zone plus Poland the 1
year EURIBOR is used and for all other banks the LIBOR rate denominated
in the domestic currency is used: Switzerland (CHF LIBOR), United States
(USD LIBOR), Denmark (DKK LIBOR), Sweden (SEK LIBOR) and United
Kingdom (UK LIBOR). EURIBOR and LIBOR are primary benchmarks for
short term interest rates in the world14. Interbank offered rates are retrieved
14Further details on interbank offered rates is provided by European Central Bank (2012).
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from Thomson Financial Datastream Database on a daily basis for the period
of January 2, 2006 to December 30, 2011. In a second step, the continuously
compounded rate is calculated
r = ln(1 +R) , (3.20)
where r is the continuously compounded risk free rate and R the simple interest
rate. Finally, yearly average rates are computed for each bank. The 12 months
rate is chosen because it fits the time horizon of the DD, i.e. corresponds to
period T , the assumed maturity of debt in this model. Hence, the time horizon
for the maturity of debt, T , is set to one year. Vulpes and Brasili (2006) and
Bharath and Shumway (2008) argue that this is a common benchmark assump-
tion due to two reasons: first of all, specific information about the maturity
structure of liabilities is not available, and secondly, annual default probabilities
are of interest for further research purposes.
Once retrieved, the required data, VE , σE , D, r and T , estimates of the value
of assets and asset volatility can be computed by solving backwards the Equa-
tions (3.4) and (3.9). The technical computing software Wolfram Mathematica
8 is applied and uses a complex iterative procedure to solve asset value and
volatility. An initial guess is used by the procedure to estimate the asset value
and to de-lever the equity returns. As the input of the second iteration of the
procedure, the volatility of the resulting returns on asset is used. A new set of
asset values and thus a new series of asset returns is determined. The iterative
procedure continues in this manner until it converges. Yearly estimates of the
value of assets and its volatility are obtained in order to calculate the DD for the
individual bank in a second step. The DD is derived from Equation (3.13). The
DD is expressed in the number of standard deviations of annual asset growth
by which the expected asset value at the fixed time horizon of 1 year exceeds
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the default point. Once the DD for each bank in the sample has been obtained,
the PD is derived from Equation (3.17) respectively. The PD determines the
probability that a bank defaults within the next year. Table 3.4 summarizes all
variables, their definition and the source of data.
3.3 Results
This section reports empirical results of the calibration of the LR and financial
soundness measures series. Again, this section starts off with the LR series
and is followed by results for the DD and PD series. Furthermore, results are
discussed and related to extraordinary events during the observation period such
as the global financial crisis.
3.3.1 Leverage Ratio Series
The capitalization of the banking system can be monitored by evaluating the
empirical findings regarding the LR. First of all, overall results for the entire
sample are discussed. Then, results for individual banks are presented and
interpreted. Table 3.5 provides summary statistics for the non risk-based reg-
ulatory measure. The number of observations is only 50 after 2008 due to the
bankruptcy of the Concord Investmentbank in the same year, see Section 3.2.1.
Turning to the minimum LRs observed in each year, it can be seen that the
LR (%)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Mean 4.83 4.64 4.65 3.98 4.65 5.03
Median 4.48 4.33 4.34 3.78 3.58 3.73
Max. 11.02 10.00 10.62 8.07 40.74 48.48
Min. 1.53 2.22 2.04 1.41 1.47 1.34
Std. Dev. 1.97 1.84 1.88 1.68 5.43 6.51
Obs. 50 50 50 50 51 51
Table 3.5: Summary statistics LR
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minimum ratio did not change dramatically over years. A small upsurge can
be observed in year 2009 and 2010. Still, it can be seen that during the entire
sample period, there are banks that did not meet the calibration target of 3%,
even though, off-balance sheet items are excluded and Tier 1 capital is defined
as eligible Tier 1 capital under Basel II. Including off-balance sheet items and
applying Basel III Tier 1 capital definition would further reduce the LRs dra-
matically. The maximum LRs are observed in 2007 and 2006. These two values
are misleading because they are entirely exceptional. The LRs belong to the
bankrupt German bank Concord Investmentbank AG. Otherwise, the highest
LR of an individual bank is monitored in 2011 at 11.2%. The observed maxi-
mum values demonstrate that some banks seem to be very well capitalized over
the sample period. The 3% requirement does not pose any difficulty in these
cases. The average LR, mean, started at its highest level in 2006 at 5.03%,
dropped by about 1% until 2008 and increased again until 2011, finally reaching
a level of 4.83%. The median shows a similar trend. During the period from
2006 to 2008, the median was at relatively stable levels. An increase of about
0.5% was observed from 2008 to 2009. After that the median of the LR stayed
at levels of around 4.4%. The median seems more suitable to analyze the capi-
talization of the banking sector, because it is less affected by outliners, e.g. the
Concord Investmentbank. Overall, it can be concluded that mean and median
increased in year 2009 and banks possessed a higher LR during the second half
of the sample period, from 2009 to 2011. According to the mean and median,
the banks in the sample meet the 3% LR level and can be considered adequately
capitalized at least under the Basel II Tier 1 capital definition. The standard
deviation shows steady levels for year 2008 to 2011. Movements of the standard
deviation in year 2006 and 2007 can be explained due to the enormously high LR
of the Concord Investmentbank, bank number three, which can be seen clearly
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in Figure 3.4. This results in a higher variance of the values.
Figure 3.4: LR graphed by years overlaid
In view of the financial crisis, it can be concluded that on average the LR
increased in the years after the breakout of the crisis in 2008, indicating that
banks were on average better capitalized during and after the crisis than before.
Whether there is a statistically significant relationship between the financial
crisis in terms of increased vulnerability of the banking system and increased LRs
remains to be seen. Another reason could be that banks are already preparing
for higher capital requirements to come in 2013.
In order to compare the empirical results with the Basel III monitoring
exercise, Table 3.6 summarizes average empirical findings for German banks
only, at European and world level for the year 2011. Results of the Basel III
monitoring exercise are stated in parenthesis. Note that the Basel II LR is
compared and not the Basel III LR. The mean for German banks includes 5
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German banks. Adding all other countries in Europe, leads to a sample of 46 at
European level. The World level is equal to the entire sample as stated before.
Additionally four US banks are included, adding up to 50 banks in the sample
of 2011. The results of the monitoring exercise are lower, but only slightly. It
can be seen, that our own calculations are appropriate and show the same trend
as the studies commissioned by the BCBS. Lowest levels of the LR are observed
on average in Germany. At European level the ratio improves and reaches its
high at World level. In contrast to the monitoring exercise, off-balance sheet
items are not included in these calculations. This explains the slightly higher
values. As a result, off-balance sheet items do not seem to have a significant
impact on calculating the LR.
2011 Mean LR (%)
European level 4.59 (4.1)
World level 4.83 (4.4)
Germany 3.14 (3.0)
Table 3.6: Results for German banks, at European and World level
Next, results regarding the LR are provided for each bank. Some cases which
stand out are discussed in detail. Table 3.7 shows the LRs for individual banks.
It can be seen that, overall, the fluctuation within the levels of each bank during
the sample period was not strong. If there are any differences at individual bank
level over the years, usually, the change was within one or two capitalization
categories, see Table 3.1. An exception is the Irish bank Allied Irish Banks. The
ratio continued to decline throughout its history from 2006 to 2010, and sharply
increased by almost 8% in 2011. High fluctuations may result from the Irish
Banking crisis which will be discussed in the next Section 3.3.2. The bankrupt
Concord Investmentbank AG displayed the highest LRs observed for the entire
sample in year 2006 and 2007. Insolvency was filed in February 2009. Thus, the
German bank became insolvent in 2008. LRs in previous years do not give any
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hints that the bank is critically capitalized. As discussed before, a LR restriction
has been in place in the United States since 2007. LR are disclosed in the annual
reports by US banks. The published ratios are reported in Table 3.7 as well.
They are stated in parenthesis next to the calculated LRs for US banks. Note
that slight differences are due to the different definition of the denominator.
The US banks use adjusted quarterly average total assets15. Comparing own
calculations to the disclosed ratios by the banks themselves, proves that the
calibration of the LR is appropriate and in line with US standards.
Regarding the 3% calibration target of the LR, it can be concluded, that four
out of six German banks, two out of three Dutch banks, the two Swiss banks
and the Danish bank Danske struggled most of the time to reach the benchmark.
Furthermore, findings on the LR demonstrate that there is a significant variation
in their levels across countries. For example, banks in Germany (the Concord
Investmentbank is excluded), France and Switzerland had relatively low LRs.
The average LR of the entire sample period for these three countries was less
than 3% (Germany 2.3%, Switzerland 2.43% and France 2.93%). All three
countries struggled to meet the 3% calibration target and will need to increase
their Tier 1 capital extremely to achieve the benchmark level under Basel III
conditions. This group of countries with very low LRs is followed by the United
Kingdom, Spain and Italy with an average LR of 4.15%, 4.92% and 4.81%
respectively. It can be expected that, overall, banks in these countries will
meet the 3% target under Basel III conditions before the framework will be
fully phased in. The peak group is presented by the United States and Austria
with an average LR of 6.35% and 5.88% respectively. LRs of these banks were
high compared to the European countries. Table 3.8 summarizes the results.
Findings are in line with the results of the empirical analysis by Morris and
Shin (2008) and Kamada and Nasu (2010). Kamada and Nasu (2010) argue
15See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011) for the definition of the US LR.
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LR (%) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Commerzbank AG 4.43 4.29 4.09 4.63 3.24 3.77
Deutsche Bank AG 2.27 2.23 2.29 1.14 1.47 1.55
Deutsche Postbank AG 3.20 2.51 2.16 2.09 2.69 2.54
Concord Investmentbank AG NA NA NA NA 40.74 48.48
Comdirect Bank AG 3.13 3.22 3.68 3.50 5.10 10.62
DAB Bank AG 3.49 2.97 2.76 2.09 1.77 2.20
Landesbank Berlin AG 2.32 2.22 2.04 2.09 2.03 1.63
National Bank of Greece 6.38 10.00 9.21 8.07 8.58 9.14
Bank of Ireland 6.53 4.58 4.85 4.77 4.55 4.50
ALLIED IRISH BANKS Plc 11.02 2.92 4.97 5.45 5.90 6.38
PKO BP 7.87 9.66 10.62 6.90 7.82 6.53
Banco Santander Central Hispano 4.53 4.37 4.36 3.71 3.53 3.39
BBVA SA 5.72 5.97 5.09 4.19 4.12 4.76
Banco Espanol de Cre´dito SA 5.83 5.15 4.85 4.48 4.59 4.56
Bankinter 4.53 3.96 4.22 3.93 3.83 3.69
Banco Popular Espanol SA 6.76 6.97 6.54 6.77 6.57 6.75
UBI Banca 6.38 5.40 5.69 5.69 6.33 4.82
Banca Intesa SanPaolo-IMI 5.83 4.73 4.63 4.26 4.01 4.10
UniCredit Italiano 4.63 4.63 4.62 3.62 3.58 3.57
BNP Paribas 3.62 3.43 3.06 2.01 2.22 2.31
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale 3.39 3.44 3.61 2.81 2.02 2.33
Natixis 3.25 3.65 2.83 2.41 2.25 2.44
Cre´dit Agricole S.A. 3.46 3.54 3.37 3.02 3.03 2.92
ING Groep 3.02 3.15 2.92 2.40 2.27 2.10
ABN Amro Holding NV 3.79 3.93 3.78 4.68 2.81 2.41
Kas Bank NV 3.07 2.61 2.29 1.92 2.41 2.74
Dexia Banque 1.53 3.25 3.03 2.47 2.41 2.29
KBC Group NV 5.33 5.21 4.75 3.88 3.07 3.20
BKS Bank AG 8.66 6.68 5.86 4.72 4.10 4.70
Erste Group Bank AG 5.67 5.94 5.79 3.79 3.33 3.40
Raiffeisen Bank International 6.42 7.01 9.27 6.86 7.82 6.64
Oberbank AG 6.68 6.14 6.21 5.39 5.02 5.07
Pohjola Bank Plc 3.61 9.92 4.33 3.80 6.26 6.21
Barclays 3.23 3.60 3.60 1.81 1.87 1.86
Lloyds Banking Group 4.53 4.75 4.63 3.14 3.95 3.73
HSBC Holdings Plc 5.46 5.43 5.17 3.77 4.46 4.72
HBOS Plc 4.30 4.49 4.31 2.81 3.66 3.79
Standard Chartered Plc 6.18 4.70 5.63 4.31 5.10 4.78
Schroders Plc 3.61 3.93 5.26 7.14 6.06 6.99
Royal Bank of Scotland 3.05 3.18 3.06 2.18 3.11 3.14
Jyske Bank A/S 5.33 5.86 5.45 4.14 4.40 5.89
Danske Bank A/S 3.12 2.64 2.55 2.18 2.20 2.70
Svenska Handelsbanken 3.81 4.08 4.03 3.51 3.53 3.31
Swedbank AG 4.16 4.40 4.04 3.56 3.17 3.51
Nordea Bank AB 2.89 3.29 3.50 3.02 3.30 4.09
UBS 2.75 2.68 2.37 1.65 1.50 1.34
Credit Suisse 2.47 2.58 3.51 2.92 2.55 2.80
Bank of America Corp 7.48 (7.53) 7.23 (7.21) 7.21 (6.88) 6.64 (6.4) 4.86 (5.0) 6.24 (5.9)
Citigroup Inc 7.04 (7.2) 6.59 (6.6) 6.84 (6.9) 6.13 (6.1) 4.08 (4.0) 5.21 (5.2)
Morgan Stanley 6.97 (6.8) 6.54 (6.6) 6.05 (5.8) 5.60 (6.6) 3.29 (3.1) 2.83 (3.2)
Wells Fargo 8.67 (9.0) 8.69 (9.12) 7.54 (7.9) 6.60 (6.3) 6.38 (6.8) 7.63 (7.9)
Table 3.7: LR per Bank
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Country Mean LR (%)
Germany 2.3
Switzerland 2.4
France 2.9
UK 4.2
Spain 4.9
Italy 4.8
US 6.4
Austria 5.9
Table 3.8: Average LR per country
that in the United States the LRs are high because a constraint on leverage was
put in place. Morris and Shin (2008) explain that another reason could be the
differences between the IFRS and US GAAP accounting regimes. IFRS results
in higher total asset amounts, and thus lower LRs for similar exposures, than
does the use of US GAAP. The reason arises from stricter netting conditions
using IFRS, showing gross replacement value of derivatives on the balance sheet.
As discussed before, the United States was at the epicenter of the financial
crisis despite already having a LR in place during the financial crisis. After
discussing the empirical results for the US banks in the sample, the question
remains why the LR failed to provide warning signs. One possible reason could
be that the LR does not reflect every type of leverage. During the period of
crisis leverage was assumed through economic leverage, see Section 2.2. This
type is not recorded on the balance sheet. Thus, including off-balance sheet
items could improve the predictive power of the LR. However, the investigation
and comparison of the results of the monitoring exercise has shown that off-
balance sheet items supposedly do not improve significantly the signaling effect
of the LR. In addition, the build-up of funding liquidity risk contributed to a
great extension to the crisis. These risks are not captured by the LR. It can be
concluded that the extent of leverage accumulated over the last several years in
the financial system has only recently become visible. Morris and Shin (2008),
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further, conclude that a constraint on leverage seems particularly appropriate
for Switzerland because UBS and Credit Suisse were both highly leveraged in
2007. This statement can be confirmed. The total assets of UBS at the end of
2006 were 2.4 trillion Swiss francs. With the Tier 1 capital of 32 billion Swiss
francs, this implies a LR of only 1.34%. The relation improved slightly in 2011.
Total assets decreased to 1.4 trillion Swiss francs and Tier 1 capital increased
slightly by 7 billion Swiss francs which resulted in a higher LR of 2.75%. It
could be argued that the introduction of a minimum LR of 3% solely for Credit
Suisse and UBS, see Section 3.1.1, is the reason for the increasing LRs recently.
Nevertheless, neither UBS nor Credit Suisse met the calibration target of 3%.
Credit Suisse only once fulfilled the LR criteria with a LR of 3.51% in 2009.
To sum up, capital capitalization of banks in the dataset varies considerably
and making an overall final statement regarding financial risk in the banking
sector is difficult. Still, the majority of the banks in the sample met the 3%
calibration target of the LR at that point of time. Only a few were below
the 3% level. Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands especially seem to
struggle enormously to meet the 3% LR level. Applying the definition of Tier
1 capital under the Basel III agreement, would probably result in the majority
of banks having trouble meeting the 3% level. Still, there is time to adjust to
the new capital requirement because the Basel III LR will not be fully phased-
in until 2018. In addition, LRs on average increased after the the outbreak
of the financial crisis, from 2009 to 2011 (see, amongst others, Barclays and
BNP Paribas). The panel data analysis in Chapter 4 will analyze if there is a
correlation between the fragility of the banking sector and the LRs, or if higher
LRs are due to increasing capital requirements.
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3.3.2 Distance to Default and Probability of Default Se-
ries
The analyzed financial soundness measures are useful tools in monitoring sys-
temic risk over time in the banking sector. On the basis of the DD and PD
series, over the sample period from 2006 to 2011, it is possible to identify a
build-up of risk in the system, while the series report quick and short-lived reac-
tions to specific market events. The sample period includes the financial crisis
2007/2008, and thus, allows one to track systemic risk during crisis and non-
crisis episodes. The crisis has to be kept in mind while interpreting the results of
the financial soundness measures analysis. Summary statistics of the DDs and
PDs for each year of the sample period are reported in Table 3.9. The number
of observations varies across the sample period. The Concord Investmentbank
and ABN are included only for years 2006 and 2007. Further, HBOS is included
for years 2006 to 2008. For details see Section 3.2.1. In 2011, three US banks
were not tested due to non-availability of data at the time of the data collection.
Note that the minimum value of the PD is zero, i.e. the probability that the
market value of assets declines to the bank specific default barrier within the
given time horizon of one year is zero. Thus, banks with a PD of zero display
no signs of bank distress within the next year and can be considered as stable
and sound. In this case, the DD of the bank can help to make a more precise
and explicit statement regarding the bank’s soundness. Due to the laws of the
Standard Normal Probability Distribution, Equation (3.17) and the negative
relationship between the DD and PD, a DD around the value of 4 or greater
converges to a PD of zero. In every year the PD series reports at least one bank
with a PD of zero. In turn, a DD of zero results in a PD of 0.5. In Table 3.9
it can be seen that in years 2009 and 2011 at least one bank of the sample had
a negative DD, i.e. that the value of assets is below the default point (strike).
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A negative number of standard deviations away from the bank specific default
point increases the PD level in the range of 0.5 up to 1. In compliance to the
negative minimum values of the DD, the highest PDs were observed in year
2009 and 2011. In addition, mean and median of every year is reported. For
the financial risk analysis, again, the median seems to be more appropriate to
evaluate financial risk over the sample period, because this measure of central
tendency is little affected by outliers. Nevertheless, the mean and median of the
DD and PD movements show the same trend. The DD series started at high
levels in the years before the crisis, 2006 and 2007. Correspondingly the PDs
were very low in these two years. Overall, the banking system is considered as
healthy and stable during this period. The DD dropped sharply in 2008 and
kept falling until 2009 where the series hit rock bottom. PD movements were
the same. PD series hit its peak in 2009, also. During the years 2008 and
2009 the effects of the global financial crisis were clearly evident in the sample.
The banking system was considered to be more vulnerable. On average, banks
were under financial distress and bank soundness was dramatically jeopardized.
In 2010 and 2011 DDs increased and PDs declined sharply. The series experi-
enced a recovery. According to the findings, financial health improved again,
even though, levels as before the financial crisis are not reached. The average
DD after 2009 improved but is smaller than the average DD in 2007 and the
average PD in 2010 and 2011 was slightly higher than in 2007. It seems that
banks recovered from the crisis and regained its financial soundness. To sum
up, vulnerability of the banking system decreased and overall soundness was
enhanced.
Next, findings regarding the standard deviation of the DD and PD series
during the sample period are discussed. Movements of the standard deviation
are similar for both series. They fluctuated over the analyzed period. The
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lowest values were observed in year 2007. The standard deviation increases
drastically and hit its peak in 2008 for the DD series and in 2009 for the PD
series. The negative effects of the financial crisis were noticeable and led to a
greater dispersion of the set of data from its mean. Banks were exposed to a
turbulent banking system and responded differently to distress. Turning to the
period from 2009 to 2011, the standard deviation of the DD series was more or
less stable but considerably higher than in 2007. Standard deviation of the PD
series dropped sharply in 2010 but increased again in 2011 and exceeded by far
the standard deviation in 2006 and 2007. The European sovereign debt crisis
could have played a decisive role during the second half of 2011. Overall, it can
be concluded that, according to the DD and PD series, the banking system was
considered as healthy and sound in year 2006 and 2007. These two years are
characterized by high DDs and low PDs, as well as low standard deviations.
In 2008 and 2009, effects of the global financial crisis were felt strongly. DDs
declined sharply, PDs and the standard deviation increased drastically. Banks
experienced financial distress which increased the fragility of the banking system
as a whole. After 2009, the DD and PD series recovered but did not reach levels
of the years before the financial crisis. This indicates that banks soundness en-
hanced and financial health improved slightly. The standard deviation exhibits
a similar trend. Nevertheless, turbulence of the crisis continues to be felt and
banks are exposed to new expected disruptions resulting from the European
sovereign debt crisis in 2011.
After discussing results generally accepted for the entire sample, an exam-
ination of the PD per bank follows. Results are reported in Table 3.10. It is
possible to detect individual banks that were particularly stable and healthy, or
experienced exactly the opposite, vulnerability and financial distress. Results
for most banks are consistent with the overall observable trend of the PD series:
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low default probabilities in 2006 and 2007, sharply increase in 2008 or 2009 and
declining PDs after 2009. A few banks, however, stand out in a positive, as
well as, in a negative manner to which particular attention should be paid. Ex-
tremely high values of the PD are marked in red. Next, these cases are discussed
by analyzing the reasons of these extreme values.
The first case to be analyzed is the German Commerzbank AG, which dis-
played a increase in its PD during the period from 2007 to 2009, where it reached
a value of over 33%. This is the result of an extreme increase in its equity volatil-
ity. In 2009, the Commerzbank has had an equity volatility of around 100%.
Market capitalization has dropped sharply by 72% from 2007 to 2008. In June
2009, the Commerzbank has finalized an agreement with the Financial Market
Stabilization Fund (SoFFin)16. The Commerzbank has increased its capital by
accepting an acquisition of its shares by the SoFFin. In addition, the bank
received a further SoFFin silent participation. After cash injections from the
German government in 2009 the bank experienced a recovery in its PD and
reports very low default probabilities in 2010 and 2011.
The two Irish banks in the sample, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks,
show a similar pattern of their PD series. The series started at very low levels
in 2006 and 2007 or rather at the value of zero. Then PDs increased and hit
their peak in 2009. In 2010, PDs declined only slightly and increased again in
2011. The market capitalization of the Bank of Ireland has dropped by 86%
from 2008 to 2009 and equity volatility is above 200% in 2009 which led to a
PD of almost 90% in this year. The same applies to the Allied Irish Banks which
reached an equity volatility of around 150% in 2009 and 2011. Market capital-
ization dropped by 90% from 2007 to 2008. Both banks accepted a bailout from
the government of the Republic of Ireland in 2009 to withstand the economic
16See Commerzbank AG (2009).
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PD (%) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
1 Commerzbank AG 0.39 0.11 33.19 11.63 0.00 0.00
2 Deutsche Bank AG 0.87 0.42 7.46 4.86 0.00 0.00
3 Deutsche Postbank AG 0.00 0.00 14.90 12.57 0.02 0.00
4 Concord Investmentbank AG NA NA NA NA 3.25 5.05
5 Comdirect Bank AG 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.89 0.57 0.07
6 DAB Bank AG 0.00 0.00 0.83 10.24 0.17 0.00
7 Landesbank Berlin AG 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.12 0.00 0.24
8 National Bank of Greece 9.66 2.78 6.89 3.58 0.00 0.02
9 Bank of Ireland 31.57 29.01 89.31 16.16 0.00 0.00
10 ALLIED IRISH BANKS Plc 66.99 14.92 75.86 9.40 0.00 0.01
11 PKO BP 0.00 0.01 7.49 1.87 0.00 0.00
12 Banco Santander Central Hispano 0.00 0.24 2.22 0.72 0.00 0.00
13 BBVA SA 0.03 0.90 3.27 0.12 0.00 0.00
14 Banco Espanol de Cre´dito SA 0.00 0.36 1.74 0.01 0.02 0.00
15 Bankinter 0.03 0.28 0.37 2.27 1.47 0.00
16 Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.00 1.03 6.47 0.46 0.00 0.00
17 UBI Banca 2.13 0.72 1.13 0.01 0.00 0.00
18 Banca Intesa SanPaolo-IMI 2.63 0.59 0.62 0.75 0.00 0.00
19 UniCredit Italiano 0.82 1.19 11.67 1.86 0.00 0.00
20 BNP Paribas 0.65 0.06 0.74 2.67 0.00 0.00
21 Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale 2.62 2.00 4.36 5.36 0.02 0.00
22 Natixis 0.04 0.24 15.31 7.23 0.00 0.16
23 Cre´dit Agricole S.A. 2.11 2.24 4.70 1.25 0.00 0.00
24 ING Groep 0.50 0.06 28.56 18.89 0.00 0.00
25 ABN Amro Holding NV NA NA NA NA 0.00 0.00
26 Kas Bank NV 0.00 0.00 0.36 4.48 0.00 0.00
27 Dexia Banque 28.43 1.07 19.94 12.63 0.01 0.00
28 KBC Group NV 14.70 0.00 40.42 6.36 0.00 0.00
29 BKS Bank AG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 Erste Group Bank AG 1.32 0.26 23.70 8.48 0.00 0.00
31 Raiffeisen Bank International 0.46 0.11 6.72 17.19 0.00 0.20
32 Oberbank AG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
33 Pohjola Bank Plc 0.00 0.00 8.73 0.00 0.00 0.00
34 Barclays 1.13 0.48 28.39 8.87 0.00 0.00
35 Lloyds Banking Group 0.25 0.81 24.48 0.54 0.00 0.00
36 HSBC Holdings Plc 0.13 0.00 2.73 0.25 0.00 0.00
37 HBOS Plc NA NA NA 26.22 0.00 0.00
38 Standard Chartered Plc 0.00 0.00 3.64 0.83 0.00 0.00
39 Schroders Plc 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.47 0.01 0.00
40 Royal Bank of Scotland 1.19 2.31 40.37 28.69 0.00 0.00
41 Jyske Bank A/S 0.20 0.12 3.58 2.45 0.00 0.00
42 Danske Bank A/S 0.15 0.04 16.21 1.73 0.00 0.00
43 Svenska Handelsbanken 0.00 0.00 1.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
44 Swedbank AG 0.46 0.01 18.91 1.65 0.00 0.00
45 Nordea Bank AB 0.00 0.00 2.78 0.58 0.00 0.00
46 UBS 0.05 0.21 7.82 6.34 0.00 0.00
47 Credit Suisse 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.00
48 Bank of America Corp NA 0.22 47.67 13.13 0.00 0.00
49 Citigroup Inc NA 0.03 59.47 11.56 0.01 0.00
50 Morgan Stanley NA 0.08 0.35 10.06 0.05 0.00
51 Wells Fargo 0.00 0.24 18.69 2.04 0.00 0.00
Table 3.10: PD per Bank
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downturn, especially the impact of a deteriorating credit environment17. Gov-
ernment re-capitalization package enabled the banks to strengthen their capital
position. PDs decreased slightly in 2010 from their high in 2009, but increased
again dramatically in 2011. According to the PDs of these two banks, the Irish
banking crisis seems to continue until today.
The Belgian bank Dexia Banque showed a high PD in 2009 of almost 20%
and its highest value of around 28% in 2011. Dexia accepted a bailout from
the Belgian government in 2008 which helped to recover rapidly18. The PD
dropped sharply from 2009 to 2010. Nevertheless, it seems like that the bank
has not been able to get the burden of the financial crisis under control. The
bank experienced a drop in its value by almost 88% and an increase in equity
volatility by 53% from 2010 to 2011. Dexia Banque (2011) argues that the bank
struggled due to the worsening of the European sovereign debt crisis and the
disruptions to the financial markets involved. In 2011 a breakup took place
when some units were purchased by the Belgian federal government.
The Royal Bank of Scotland reached its highest PD in 2009 (40%). Equity
volatility in this year was about 110%. In addition, the bank experienced a drop
in its value by 56% from 2007 to 2008. The bank has accepted a bailout from the
British government in 2008. The CEO states in a company announcement from
October 8th, 2008 that the bank welcomes the comprehensive package from the
government in order to enhance its soundness and to ensure the stability of the
financial system19. In February 2009, 68% of the shares were owned by the UK
government. Accordingly, the PDs in 2010 and 2011 improved.
The Bank of America possessed a high PD of almost 48% in 2009 due to an
equity volatility of around 120% in this year. The value of the bank declined by
17Further details on the government bailout are provided by the banks themselves, see Bank
of Ireland (2009) or Allied Irish Banks (2009).
18See Dexia Banque (2008).
19See The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (2008).
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61% from 2007 to 2008. In addition, the Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch
in 2008 and revealed massive losses at this bank in its 2009 earning release20.
After this announcement, the stock price dropped to its lowest levels in 17 years.
Obviously financial health in terms of default probabilites of this bank improved
in 2010. The American bank Citigroup Inc displayed a PD of almost 60% in
2009 and possessed an equity volatility of 140% in this year. They suffered huge
losses during the financial crisis and had to be rescued in November 2008 by
the US government21. To sum up, estimates of the PDs are in line with the
Figure 3.5: PD graphed by year
facts depicted by each bank. Some banks would probably have defaulted but
for government bailouts. Figure 3.5 which shows the PD of individual banks
graphed by year, displays clearly the addressed individual cases. The number of
each bank can be found in Table 3.10. The shape of the plots for the Irish banks,
20See Bank of America (2009).
21See Citigroup (2008).
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number 9 and 10, during the period of 2009 until 2011 is striking. Once again,
Figure 3.6 shows the PD of all banks in the sample but this time curves are
overlaid. The figures represent clearly the described overall results. The highest
PDs were observed in 2009 followed by the year 2008. Highest variability of the
data was given in these two years, also.
Figure 3.6: PD graphed by years overlaid
In contrast, there are some banks which had a PD of zero or near zero during
the entire sample period. The Austrian banks, BKS Bank AG and Oberbank
AG, performed best, closely followed by the UK bank Schroeders Plc. The
financial crisis does not seem to have affected these banks negatively. The banks
show low PDs while steering their way through the financial crisis. The market
capitalization was more or less stable during the sample period and the equity
volatility relatively low compared to other banks. During the sample period
the Oberbank AG has had an equity volatility of less than 10%, BKS Bank less
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than 17% and Schroders less than 30%, except in 2008, the bank displayed 38%
which explains the slight increase in PD from 2007 to 2008.
3.4 Conclusion
Two individual measures are applied to analyze financial risk in the banking
sector. Firstly, the LRs and secondly, the DDs and PDs are computed for
all banks in the sample over the period from 2006-2011. Findings regarding
the LR demonstrate that the capitalization level of banks varies considerably.
Furthermore, higher LRs are observed on average in the years after the finan-
cial crisis. During the sample period, the majority of banks are adequately
capitalized regarding the calibration target of 3%. Certainly, banks need to fur-
ther increase their capital in order to fulfill the requirement of 3% under fully
phased-in Basel III Tier 1 capital definition. The case of the German Concord
Investmentbank AG is striking: the bank displayed very high LRs in years right
before bankruptcy. LRs did not show any sign of critical capitalization. Though,
LRs are highly questionable because they are unduly high. The results for the
LR demonstrate significant variation in their levels, and thus may be driven by
country effects or differences in the accounting regimes across countries.
Findings regarding the PD show clearly that the highest PDs are observed
during the period of the global financial crisis in year 2008 and 2009. Financial
distress is very high at individual bank level which contributes to increasing bank
fragility and finally to a very vulnerable banking system. After 2009, financial
health improved slightly but seems to be affected again in 2011 by the European
sovereign debt crisis. Disruptions to the financial markets in 2011 are clearly
observable. Merging the results regarding the LR and the financial soundness
measures, the following can be concluded. Even though a LR requirement had
already been in place in the United States, and LRs were at very high levels
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compared to European banks, US banks displayed comparably high PDs during
the crisis. It seems that high LRs did not protect banks from being affected by
the negative impacts of the financial crisis. Another example is the Allied Irish
Banks bank. This Irish bank possessed averagely high LRs and high PDs. Years
2009 and 2011 are especially striking. German and Swiss banks are in contrast
to banks with high LRs and high PDs. On average, these banks displayed very
low LRs, the lowest of all banks in the sample, and possessed very low PDs
even during the period of 2008- 2009. It can be assumed that a nexus between
these two indicators exists. Otherwise, a closer look at the Austrian banks do
not confirm this assumption. These banks had relatively high LRs, directly
following the US banks, but performed best during the entire sample period
according to the PDs. An example for a sound banking system is Austria where
a good capitalization level, due to the LR requirement, ensures banks soundness.
Nevertheless, these cases are entirely exceptional in the sample and even an
increase of the LR in the year of and after the financial crisis is observable.
A second analysis, a statistical panel data regression, is implemented to depict
possible reasons for the findings of the financial risk analysis and to link the
regulatory measure to the financial soundness measure, the PD.
Chapter 4
Panel Data Analysis
The previous chapter investigated financial risk in the banking sector by using,
on the one hand, a regulatory measure and, on the other, an indicator for fi-
nancial fragility. A closer look at the performance of individual banks suggests
that a nexus between the LR requirement and the proxy for financial stabil-
ity, the PD may exist. For instance, it is observed that banks with very high
LRs possess very high PDs at the same point of time. Firstly, this chapter
analyzes a possible relationship between these two measures by estimating a
panel data regression model, Model 1. Furthermore, reasons for the findings
derived from Model 1, either a positive or a negative relationship between the
LR and PD, are examined. Thus, the focus of this research is not only on the
direct relationship between these two measures, but also on the side effects of
the LR and their impact on global financial stability. To detect possible side
effects, a second regression model, Model 2, is employed. Results are discussed
distinguishing between the micro prudential and macro prudential dimension.
Finally, conclusions are drawn by applying Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) framework.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents the proposed em-
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pirical methodology to base the theory and derive a conclusion. Further, three
hypotheses are developed which are directly related to the research questions.
In Section 4.2, two multiple linear regression models using panel data are es-
timated. The first model tests the first suggested hypothesis while the second
model tests research hypotheses two and three. Further, descriptive statistics
are presented in this section. Section 4.3 briefly reports regression diagnostics
and Section 4.4 presents empirical results independently for Model 1 and 2.
Finally, in Section 4.5, robustness of empirical results is investigated.
4.1 Empirical Methodology and Hypotheses
This chapter analyzes empirically the nexus between the profitability (levels of
net interest margins), a bank’s use of debt and financial soundness. This section
provides the empirical methodology and suggested hypotheses which represent
the research questions. The empirical analysis focuses on 51 stock-listed financial
intermediaries across 16 countries over the period from 2006 to 2011. In-depth
description of the dataset is given in Section 3.2.1.
As discussed before, in Section 3.1.1, the purpose of introducing the LR
is to limit the level of a bank’s debt. More precisely, a bank’s equity can be
leveraged only up to 33 times. The BCBS addresses this issue in order to restrain
excess leverage which might have contributed to the global banking crisis1. Each
financial institutions which does not meet the requirement needs to increase
the level of Tier 1 capital. The LR is introduced to promote essentially each
individual’s soundness. By providing a minimum of regulatory capital in the
future, irrespective to the risk in a bank, risks to the banking system as a whole
are reduced. Amongst others, Blum (2008) supports the idea of supervisors. He
argues that this risk-independent LR reduces incentives of banks to misrepresent
1See Basel Committee (2009).
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their risk and that it helps to increase the bank’s net worth. Overall, regulatory
intention of the proposed constraint aims to promote greater resilience of the
global banking system. It can be concluded that supervisors presume a positive
relationship between a bank’s level of debt and its soundness. Figure 4.1 reflects
the intention by the supervisors. Following this line of reasoning, firstly, it is
investigated, if banks with a high LR (low level of debt) are more stable and
sound than financial institutions with a lower LR (higher level of debt). Still,
financial stability is defined in terms of the PD of each institution, i.e. the lower
a bank’s PD, the better its soundness. Thus, a negative relationship between
the value of the LR and the PD is expected by supervisors. The following main
hypothesis is put forward:
H1: The higher a bank’s leverage ratio, the lower its probability of default.
Imposing a non-risk LR does also encounter negative feedback and has been
criticized in literature. Considerable negative impacts on banks’ business activ-
ity as a consequence of a minimum capital ratio are widely discussed. When
these effects are counter-productive to overall financial stability, they display
a trade-off against the intended positive effects of the regulatory measure. As
a result, critics, e.g. Hakura and Cosimano (2011) and Kiema and Jokivuolle
(2011), argue that this regulatory requirement does not enhance financial stabil-
ity but increases fragility. Theoretical and empirical perspectives on side-effects
are given in the literature review, see Section 2.3. Following this line of argu-
mentation, a rejection of the first hypothesis is expected. In this case, causes
need to be detected and examined to verify the arguments brought forward by
critics. Another hypothesis is suggested to provide information on possible dis-
advantages of introducing a ratio to limit a bank’s level of debt. In order to
discuss empirical results, the empirical methodology is embedded in the theoret-
ical framework by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), see Section 2.1.2 for a discussion.
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Their model can be seen as an explanatory approach why possible side-effects
of the LR result in a destabilizing banking sector.
Introducing this risk-independent requirement can breed undesirable incen-
tives. The most alarming side-effect discussed in literature which possibly leads
to a rejection of H1, is investigated: does the LR requirement impact loan inter-
est rates and as a consequence banks profitability? The line of argumentation
respective to this relationship is multifaceted. Often discussed in literature is
the loan pricing implications of Basel II2. This thesis picks up some ends of
Basel II research and tries to examine these effects for the LR constraint under
Basel III. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) discuss possible implications of this side
effect on a bank’s soundness. To analyze the direct link between the LR and
banks profitability following line of argumentation is followed in this thesis, see
Figure 4.2:
1. It is expected that banks pass on the additional costs, implied by increasing
regulatory capital, to their borrowers via higher loan rates.
2. It is assumed that introducing the LR leads to a cut back on lending which
in turn exerts immediate effects on lending interest rates.
These two reasons for an increasing bank profitability due to the LR require-
ment can be derived directly from the equation of the LR, see Equation (3.1).
Arithmetically, an increase of the ratio can be achieved by raising the nomina-
tor (Tier 1 capital) or reducing the denominator (total assets). The former is
intended by the BCBS and leads to put forward the first hypothesis. If financial
institutions do not meet the LR requirement, they are supposed to increase Tier
1 capital rather than to shrink balance sheets. This is the regulatory intention
of the Basel Committee (2009) of proposing this regulatory requirement, but
this mindset has weaknesses. Fresh equity is not always easily accessible, and
2See e.g Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008) and Repullo and Suarez (2004).
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acquiring new regulatory capital can be very expensive. Gordon (1986) and Re-
pullo and Suarez (2004) argue that factors such as taxes, agency conflicts and
cost associated with the process of acquiring new equity make the regulatory
capital a more expensive form of finance than debt. Thus, the marginal cost of
equity increases with raising required capital. According to Hakura and Cosi-
mano (2011), the marginal cost of loans is the weighted average of the marginal
cost of equity and deposits, and will increase in equal measure. The authors
give empirical evidence that higher capital requirements in general lead to higher
lending rates. The fact that banks pass on these additional costs, implied by a
minimum LR requirement, to their borrowers via higher loan rates is often dis-
cussed by academic researchers. Further, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)
give empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between interest
rates and a bank’s efficiency3. It can be concluded, that financial institutions
seek to maximize their profits by their choice of interest rate. For instance, low
interest rates charged by a bank are pressing on the profit a bank earns on its
lending, and the higher the loan interest rates the higher a bank’s return. Thus,
higher interest rates due to a minimum target of Tier 1 capital to total assets
ratio implies an increasing profitability of a bank’s lending activities.
The latter is a less costly approach but contrary to the intentions of super-
visors. The level of regulatory capital will not be enhanced in order to comply
with the 3% requirement, and the linked assumptions of a more stable banking
system could be invalid. Accordingly, as a result of a LR requirement, it is
conceivable that financial institutions rather decrease the value of total assets
than increase the “expensive” Tier 1 capital. This is a less “costly” approach.
Banks can achieve a lower value of assets by limiting their lending activity only,
keeping all other assets at a constant level. This approach to generate higher
3Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), p. 380, define bank efficiency as a bank’s net interest
income divided by total assets which equals to the net interest margin.
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LRs exerts immediate effects on interest rates. Firstly, an effect of higher in-
terest rates on investors demand is expected on the credit market. A possible
credit crunch involves that demand exceeds supply and interest rates will rise.
Secondly, banks have to generate their earnings from a lower lending volume
and adjust their interest related operations by raising the cost of credit. It is
concluded that banks are likely to increase their charged interest rates in order
to compensate the loss of earnings which are due to the cutback on lending,
and to keep profit levels. In general, shrinking the balance sheet in this manner
while retaining the same amount of equity, improves the LRs overall and reduces
a bank’s risks in its portfolio. Nevertheless, negative impacts on banks regard-
ing the microprudential dimension can be expected. Cutting back on lending
means wasting the possibility of granting loans. Profits will be decreasing while
missing out on the interest a bank could earn. If interest rates are not raised,
a bank will be unable to generate the same profit with lower lending. Thus,
the bank’s stability is not promoted. In addition, enormous macro prudential
effects are anticipated. A radical cut back on lending jeopardizes credit supply
to the real economy. This contraction can finally lead to a downturn. Effects on
macroeconomic parameters and implications for the public sector are discussed
in Thakor (1996), Basel Committee (2010a) and Angelini et al. (2011). Kashyap
et al. (2010) argue that the incentive to increase a bank’s LR through cutting
back on lending, further raises significant concerns about credit supply activity
in financial institutions. A migration of credit provision from the banking to
the shadow-banking sector is expected which potentially increases the vulner-
ability of the financial system. This line of argumentation implies a positive
relationship between the LR and a bank’s profitability. Bank profitability will
be proxied by a bank’s net interest margin4. If banks profitability increases due
4It is assumed that banks generate higher net interest margins by increasing their loan
interest rates. Further details are given in Section 4.2 and 4.4.2.
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to an increase in Tier 1 capital, an decrease in the number of loans a bank will
make, or both, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is expected that banks will
chose the less costly approach. To analyze the relationship between a bank’s
LR and its profitability, the following hypothesis is suggested:
H2: The profitability of a bank is positively related to its leverage ratio.
Figure 4.2 summarizes graphically the discussed side-effects which possibly lead
to a rejection of H1 and provides the explanatory approach for the suggested
hypotheses, H2. In contrast, Modigliani and Miller (1958) do not support this
line of argumentation. The authors are certainly aware of the fact that debt-
financing is “cheaper” than equity financing, but do not find empirical evidence
to support this theory. Results of an employed regression analysis show that
there is no significant correlation between a firm’s average cost of capital and its
capital structure. Note that this is valid for the basic propositions, i.e. the model
does not allow for a corporate profits tax. Thus, it is concluded that the source
of financing is completely independent of the cost of capital. This theorem will
be monitored, also, by interpreting the regression results in Section 4.4. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) present an explanatory approach why the acceptance of the
hypothesis H2 can lead to the rejection of the hypothesis H1. A positive relation-
ship between the LR and a bank’s profitability preconditioned, their work can
be considered as a tentative explanation why a LR constraint is not expected to
enhance a bank’s soundness. In this context, a rejection of the first hypotheses
is expected and a reverse scenario is predicted: the assumption is strengthened
that introducing a LR does not promote each individual’s soundness but creates
vulnerable financial institutions with higher default probabilities. As discussed
in detail in Section 2.1.2, higher interest rates imply worse risk in a bank’s
loan portfolio due to the adverse selection and incentive effect. Thus, a higher
concentration of risk in a bank is conceivable, which enhances vulnerability at
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individual bank level. These indicators do not maintain a bank’s soundness and
result in destabilizing the financial system. Micro- and macroeconomic effects
derived from the LR requirement, taking into account theoretical justification
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), are presented in Figure 4.3.
4.2 Empirical Model and Descriptive Statistics
The next section presents the employed empirical model and descriptive statis-
tics of the panel data. A linear regression model with panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSEs) by Prais and Winsten (1954) is used. A detailed technical dis-
cussion on econometric analysis of panel data is given in Wooldridge (2010) and
Baltagi (2008). Two multiple linear regression models are applied, using panel
data on a sample of 51 international financial institutions and a time period of 6
years, 2006 to 2011. Detailed information on the sample is provided in Section
3.2.1. To test the first hypothesis, the higher a bank’s LR, the lower its PD,
the following multiple linear regression model (Model 1 ) on panel data with 291
observations is estimated
PDit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t + γ5d11t
+γ6c3i + γ7loansit + εit , i = 1, ..., 51; t = 1, ..., 6 , (4.1)
where the idiosyncratic errors satisfy
εit = ρεi,t−1 + uit, | ρ |< 1 , (4.2)
where PDit represents the probability of default (PD) of bank i in a respective
year t, LRit the observable leverage ratio for each bank at time t. Time dummies
for each year of analysis, d07t−d11t, do not change across panels but over time
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and are set to control time-specific effects. The year 2006 is specified as the ref-
erence category and excluded from the regression model. In addition, the model
controls for country effects. As concluded in Section 3.3.2, Ireland displays the
highest PDs observed over the sample period. Thus, this country could behave
significantly different in the regression model than all other countries. This can
distort regression results. To control this effect, a country dummy variable is
added to the model, c3i. The value of one is assigned to the Irish banks, all other
countries are the reference category and assigned a zero.The dummy c3i does
not change across time but across panels. β and γ denote the parameters to be
estimated. εit is the unobservable random error which is explained in detail in
Section 4.3, and β0 is the intercept. This model is tested for including a fur-
ther bank specific control variable: the total amount of loans and receivables to
control for bank lending activity. A reason to include the variable loans, which
changes across panels and time, is to combat a potential bias of the coefficient
on the LR. Table 4.3 shows that the variable PD is correlated with the variable
loans, i.e. there could be another factor influencing the PD other than the LR
while testing the hypothesis. It can be assumed that the PD of a bank may be
affected by the size of its total loans and receivables. The higher the amount
of loans, the higher the PD. To test the second hypothesis, H2, that the LR
requirement affects the net interest margin, another multiple linear regression
model (Model 2 ) with 299 observations is estimated
IMit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t + γ5d11t
+γ6c15i + γ7sizei + εit , i = 1, ..., 51; t = 1, ..., 6 , (4.3)
where IMit is the net interest margin, defined as net interest income divided
by a bank’s total assets, of a bank i in a respective year t, LRit is the LR of
CHAPTER 4. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 105
bank i in year t. Time dummies, d07t − d11t, are included. Results discussed
in Section 3.3.1 show that banks in Switzerland possess on average the lowest
LRs.5 Thus, Swiss banks could behave statistically significantly different than
all other countries, impacting regression results of Model 2. To control for this
effect, a country dummy variable for Swiss banks, c15i, is included in Model 2.
All Swiss banks are assigned the value of one, all other countries the value of
zero, as being the reference category. Again, c15i changes across panels but not
across time. The variable sizei is a bank specific control variable for a bank’s
size. This variable, defined as the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets in
2011, can exhibit a significance p-value due to the argumentation that larger
banks are more likely to have a larger amount of total assets which can result
in higher net interest margins. Thus this control variable is included in Model
2 to help mitigate omitted-variable biases. The variable sizei is constant and
unchanged in this model. Therefore, the control variable does not change over
time but across panels. The intercept is β0, and εit the unobservable random
error as defined in Equation (4.2). The parameters to be estimated are β and γ.
General assumptions about the error term εit are stated in Wooldridge (2010),
p. 53-55 and presented in Table 4.1. Assumptions can be violated due to het-
eroscedasticity or autocorrelation. Regression diagnostics help to further specify
the error structure of a regression model and are presented in Section 4.3. Before
i. E[εit] = 0 zero mean
ii. E[ε2it] = σ
2 constant variance
iii. E[εit, εi,t−1] = 0 no autocorrelation
iv. E[εit, xit] = 0 no correlation with each regressor
v. εit ∼ normally distributed
Table 4.1: General assumptions about the error term of a regression
parameters are attempted to be estimated, the data themselves is examined in
its raw form. For the panel data regression analysis the initial sample described
5Germany only displays lowest LRs when the Concord Investmentbank is excluded.
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in Section 3.2.1 has been extended by various financial data. The balance sheet
positions total loans and receivables and the income statement positions interest
income from lending transactions, total interest income, total interest expense,
and net interest income have been included for the 51 banks over the period
from 2006 to 2011. The additional data is retrieved from a bank’s published
consolidated financial statements. In order to match data from the financial risk
analysis, data of four banks (Comdirect, DAB Bank, ABN Amro Holding and
HBOS) is retrieved at individual bank level. Using exclusively stock-listed finan-
cial institutions ensures a high degree of comparability in accounting standards.
The values at balance sheet date are representative for the respective years and
used to define the four variables loans, interest and IM and size. The set of
variables included in the regression models will be described in the following.
A bank’s soundness is proxied by two different measures. The PD, expressed
as a percentage, is employed in Model 1 as the dependent variable and repre-
sents the probability that a bank will reach its default point within a given time
horizon, one year in this analysis. Figure 4.4 illustrates the development of the
PD graphed by years. The PD is arithmetically derived from the DD. Thus,
the variable DD is included in descriptive statistics and is expressed in numbers
of standard deviations that a financial institution is away from its default point
within one year. For further details and in-depth technical discussion of the
construction of theses two measures see Section 3.1.2. The LR is an indicator of
a bank’s use of debt. This non-risk regulatory measure limits the level of debt
as Tier 1 capital has to correspond to at least 3% of total assets. Discussion and
calculations are presented in Section 3.1.1. Consequently, the ratio is expressed
as a percentage and included in both regression models as the independent vari-
able. The control variable loans of regression Model 1 is an indicator for a
bank’s lending activity and stands for the total amount of loans and receivables,
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Figure 4.4: Development of the variable PD during the sample period graphed
by year
expressed in billions of Euro. Baum (2006) points out that economic researchers
often argue that if a percentage change in the dependent variable is related with
a unit change in an independent or control variable, the relationship could be
better modeled by taking the natural logarithm of the independent variable.
Particularly, log transformations could help to fit the variable into the model, if
the distribution of that variable has a positive skew. In order to decide whether
a natural logarithm needs to be taken of the variable loans, a natural log is com-
puted and both distributions are shown in a histogram Figure 4.5 which can offer
valuable clues. The distribution of loans on the left side looks positively skewed.
As shown on the right side of the figure, the distribution of “lnloans” still looks
skewed, this time negatively. Taking the natural logarithm of the variable does
not make the positively skewed distribution more normal. In contrast, the skew
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shifts from positively to negatively. A log transformation in this case does not
help to fit the variable into the model and the regression output does not change
significantly. Thus, the absolute value is taken. The variable interest represents
Figure 4.5: Histogram of the variable loans and its natural logarithm
a proxy for a bank’s pricing decisions at the loan level and is defined as interest
income from lending business to total loans and receivables. Accordingly, the
ratio provides information on the increase or decrease of lending interest income
per one unit of lending volume which results in a higher or lower cost of credit
a bank charges its borrowers. Note that this variable is only monitored in order
to help interpreting results regarding the net interest margin, but not included
in the regression equation. This approach is selected because the dependent
variable, IM, is biased towards the variable interest, i.e. the effect of interest
is already included in the dependent variable. This effect would distort the re-
gression. Thus, a bank’s profitability in Model 2 is proxied by the net interest
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margin, IM, defined as the accounting value of a bank’s net interest profit to
total assets and employed as the dependent variable. The net interest margin
provides information also on the contribution from maturity transformation of
a bank. A positive contribution is generated due to an actively driven maturity
transformation: accepting short-term deposits and making long-term loans. A
higher net interest margin is due to either higher charged interest rates on loans
or depressing a bank’s deposit rates. The variable interest can give an indica-
tion of which alternative is more likely. IM is expressed as a percentage. The
variable size controls the bank specific characteristic of individual size and is
expressed as the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets. Time and country
dummies are included to see if one year or country is behaving significantly
different from the reference category. To analyze the retrieved data, the Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DD 292 4.5150 6.7916 -1.24 75.7
PD 292 0.0418 0.1108 0 0.8931
LR 301 0.0463 0.0378 0.0134 0.4848
loans 302 270.79 260.86 0.0089 1426.536
interest 247 0.0450 0.0234 0.0013 0.1813
IM 302 0.0145 0.0097 -0.0142 0.0481
size 300 5.73 1.77 1.23 8.14
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics Panel Data Analysis
Analysis and Statistical Software Stata 10.0 is used. After importing the sample
into Stata, the data has to be converted from wide to long form. Reshaping data
into the long format is necessary in order to declare the dataset to be a panel
data set. The panel ID variable is set to “bank” creating 51 panels and the time
variable to “year” representing 2006 to 2011. Missing values, due to inaccessi-
ble information, are replaced and stored with a missing-value code “.a”. Stata
automatically omits these observations from the computation. Six time dummy
variables are tabulated for each year having only 2 categories, denoted by 0 and
1. Thus, coefficients are only estimated for n-1 dummy variables because all
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dummies are perfectly correlated and sum to one. Notes on all variable and
data sources are presented in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics are reported in
Table 4.2, dummies are not reported. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
are carried out using the Stata command “spearman variables, star(.01)”. In
this correlation method values are handled by casewise not pairwise deletion6.
All correlation coefficients significant at the 1% level or lower are marked with
three stars. Table 4.3 provides the corresponding correlation matrix. Note that
DD PD LR loans interest IM
DD 1.00
PD -0.9999*** 1.00
LR -0.0064 0.0074 1.00
loans -0.2129*** 0.2113*** -0.2873*** 1.00
interest -0.0360 0.0355 0.2452*** 0.0896 1.00
IM -0.0053 0.0060 0.7317*** -0.0704 0.5633*** 1.00
Table 4.3: Correlation matrix
the LR is significantly positively correlated with the net interest margin, IM,
whereas the correlation coefficient of the LR and the PD is not significant but
also indicates a slight positive correlation, i.e. there is a trend that the LR
increases as the PD increases. The correlation coefficient measures only the
degree of a bivariate association. The variables are interchangeable. Any con-
clusions about a cause-and-effect relationship cannot be made. The purpose of
correlation matrix is to investigate the relationship between variables, whereas
the purpose of a regression model is to predict or explain outcomes between
variables. Therefore, correlation and regression coefficients are related in the
sense that both deal with relationships among variables but a significant corre-
lation between variables does not necessarily indicate that one variable causes
the other. It is only suggested that a causal relationship might exist. A corre-
lation of zero assumes that there may not exist a causal relationship between
6An observation is dropped if any variable has a missing value. See Sheskin (2003) for
further details on Spearman correlation.
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two variables. However, a lack of correlation or significance may be due to other
factors such as, poor measurements, restricted range, non-linear relationships
or other extraneous factors that mask the true relationship.7
After presenting the empirical model and reporting descriptive statistics of panel
data, regression diagnostics are performed next which explain why employing
the Prais-Winsten transformation as a regression model is a consequent strategy.
4.3 Regression Diagnostics
The regression diagnostics, a set of procedures to identify influential obser-
vations and sources of collinearity, should not be neglected while analyzing
panel data and are done by using Stata 10.0. First, the functional form of
the relation between the variables is examined. A linear functional form is
given when the dependent variable can be described as a linear function of
the independent variables8. A scatterplot matrix is used to have a look at
the relationship between all variables of Model 1 and Model 2. The depen-
dent variable Y is demonstrated as the variable to the side of the graph while
the independent variable X above or below the graph. Thus, the first row
shows the scatterplots of the dependent variable against all independent vari-
ables. The scatterplot smoother “median trace” can help to identify linear
trends in scatterplots and is discussed by Fox (2000). To generate the scat-
terplot and a scatterplot with median trace, the Stata command “graph ma-
trix dependent variable independent variable(s)” and “twoway (scatter depen-
dent variable independent variable(s), ms(oh)) (mband dependent variable in-
dependent variable(s), bands(20) clp(solid))” after ”regress” are carried out.
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show that there does exist a linear trend for the majority of
7See Peat et al. (2009) for an in-depth discussion of correlation and regression.
8See Wooldridge (2010), p. 25-30, for further details on linear projection.
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot Model 1
This figure shows the relationship between the independent variable LR and the
dependent variable PD of Model 1 in a scatterplot in order to identify linear
trends.
the data, linear relations are clearly visible. In addition, it is verified whether
the first assumption of the error term E[εit] = 0, zero mean, holds. Kohler
and Kreuter (2005) argue that a violation of this assumption could result in
biased regression coefficients. A residual-versus-fitted plot is carried out using
Stata command “rvfplot” after “regress” to check if the mean of the residuals9 is
zero locally. Figure 4.8 shows that for any slice of the abscissa the mean of the
residuals is zero. This holds true for Model 1 and Model 2. Thus, a violation of
E[εit] = 0 is not obvious and further tests such as detecting signs of influential
cases or omitted variables can be neglected. Linearity between the dependent
9A residual is defined as the difference or error between the observed observation of a
dependent value or independent variable and the fitted value by the regression model. See
Greene (2012), p. 66 for details on residual plots.
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Figure 4.7: Scatterplot Model 2
This figure shows the relationship between the independent variable LR and the
dependent variable IM of Model 2 in a scatterplot in order to identify linear
trends.
variable and the independent variable(s) is assumed in both regression models
and estimating linear regression models seems reasonable.
Second, independent variables in the multiple regression model have to be
tested for multi-collinearity. Farrar and Glauber (1967) explain that multi-
collinear independent variables pose a threat to the effective estimation and
proper specification of the structural relationship type. A definition is given in
Farrar and Glauber (1967), p. 3: “[...] an interdependency condition that can
exist quite apart from the nature, or even the existence, of dependence between
X and y. It is both a facet and a symptom of poor experimental design.” Bal-
tagi (2008) argues that panel data is less plagued with multi-collinearity than,
CHAPTER 4. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 114
Figure 4.8: Residual-versus-fitted plots
This figure illustrates the residual-versus-fitted plots for Model 1 and Model 2
which clearly show that the mean of the residuals is zero locally.
for example, time-series data because the cross-section dimension can give more
informative data and thus, adds more variability. To measure the degree of
multi-collinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is used. A common rule
of thumb discussed in literature is that a VIF greater than 10 or a tolerance
(1/VIF) less than 0.1 suggest that mutli-collinearity may be a threat10. To gen-
erate the VIF table the Stata command “vif” after “regress dependent variable
independent variables” is used. Table 4.4 indicates that the VIF values do not
exceed the value of 1.7. Accordingly, diagnostics are negative, i.e. there is
no evidence of multi-collinearity among the independent variables. Further in-
formation on the rules of thumb regarding the VIF can be found in O’Brien
10See Menard (2002), Kutner et al. (2004) and Marquardt (1970).
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(2007).
Model 1 Model 2
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
LR 1.0 0.98 1.1 0.9
loans 1.1 0.95
d07 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.59
d08 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.59
d09 1.7 0.61 1.7 0.59
d10 1.7 0.6 1.7 0.58
d11 1.6 0.61 1.7 0.58
c3 1 0.99
c15 1.1 0.95
size 1.1 0.93
Mean VIF 1.4 1.5
Table 4.4: Variance Inflation Factor for estimating multi-collinearity
Third, error structures of both regression equations can be characterized by
panel autocorrelation, i.e. the remainder disturbances are correlated and follow
a first order autoregressive process AR(1). Serial correlation and its impact is
discussed in Baltagi (2008). Due to an unobserved shock, such as the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, the last time period’s observations can affect the behavioral
relationship of current values for the next few periods. Ignoring AR(1) error
structure can result in an underestimation of the standard errors, overestima-
tion of the R2 and too narrow confidence intervals, which lead to consistent but
inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients. The Durbin-Watson statis-
tic11 for panel data and the Breusch-Godfrey test12 are used to test for AR(1)
autocorrelation. The former is carried out using “estat dwatson” after “regress
dependent variable independent variable(s)” and the latter using “test” after
“regress residuals on the lag”. The null hypothesis that there is no autocorrela-
11See research done by Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951, 1971). First of all, Durbin and
Watson (1950) investigated the problem of testing the error term of serial correlation. This
paper is followed by Durbin and Watson (1951). Procedures for the use in practice are
described. Durbin and Watson (1971) considered a number of problems arising from the test
proposed earlier by the authors.
12See Breusch (1978).
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tion of the disturbances, is rejected in each case. Statistics are listed in Table
4.5. The Durbin-Watson statistic gives evidence of positive autocorrelation in
both regression models.13 Thus, AR(1) serial correlated error component mod-
els are existent, which can be transformed into serially uncorrelated classical
errors using the Prais-Winsten transformation.
Model 1 Model 2
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (k, N )
(9, 291 ) (9, 299 )
1.8092 0.9101
Breusch-Godfrey test
p-value
0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.5: Test for autocorrelation
The error structure of the regression models can not only suffer from autocor-
relation but also from panel heteroscedasticity. This topic is covered in detail by
Baltagi (2008). To make the assumption that the regression disturbance terms
have the same variance across individuals and time, homoscedasticity, is very
restrictive for panels, especially as the cross-sectional units, the financial institu-
tions in the present case, are of varying size. Assuming constant variances from
one panel to the next, when heteroscedastic disturbances are present, will re-
sult in consistent but not efficient estimates of the regression coefficients. Also,
the standard errors will be biased. Finally, to test for heteroscedasticity the
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test14 is employed using the Stata command
“estat hettest” after “regress dependent variable independent variable(s)”. The
null hypothesis of constant error variance is tested and can be rejected in re-
gression Model 1 clearly at a significance level of 5%. For regression model 2
the same result applies. The p-value is at the 0.0 level and indicates rejection
of the null hypothesis. Furthermore, Greene (2003) suggest that inspecting a
residual plot can help to see if the variance of the residuals change in any sys-
13Durbin-Watson table to determine the upper and lower critical values based on the number
of observations (N) and independent variables (k) can be found in e.g. Gujarati (2003).
14See Breusch and Pagan (1979) or Cook and Weisberg (1983).
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tematic form with the fitted (predicted) values. The residual-versus-fitted plot
and a plot variation which emphasizes the variance of the residuals is shown
in Figure 4.9. The Figure exhibits that the variance of the residuals slightly
increases for both models. Thus, the pattern of the residuals gives convincing
evidence of heteroscedastic error structure in Model 1 and Model 2, so the as-
sumption of non-constant variance underlying this test seems to be appropriate.
To verify, a second test for heteroscedasticity is employed. White (1980) test
Figure 4.9: Residual plot to test for heteroscedasticity
This figure shows that the variance of the residuals increases for Model 1 and
Model 2, implying heteroscedastic error structures.
is carried out using “imtest, white” after “regress dependent variable indepen-
dent variable(s)” and tests for the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against
unrestricted heteroscedasticity. Greene (2003) argues that this test allows one to
test for every form of heteroscedasticity, such as nonlinearities, by including the
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squares and cross products of the independent variables whereas the former test
detects only linear forms. P-values clearly reject null hypothesis in each model,
i.e. heteroscedastic error terms are present in both models. For p-value output
see Table 4.6. For the detected presence of heteroscedastic disturbance terms,
robust standard errors are computed using the Prais-Winsten transformation.
Model 1 Model 2
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test
p-value
0.0000 0.0000
White’s test 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.6: Test for heteroscedasticity
Regression diagnostics report linearity, no multi-collinearity, first-order au-
toregressive processes and heteroscedastic error structures. Based on these find-
ings, the assumptions in Section 4.2 about εit, the error term, are revised and
presented in Table 4.7.15 Thus, the unobservable random error term as defined
in Equation (4.2), εit = ρεi,t−1 + uit, | ρ |< 1 , follows a first-order autoregres-
sive scheme over time and over individuals with an unknown autocorrelation
coefficient ρ. uit denotes the remainder disturbance. Performing regression di-
i. E[uit] = 0 the mean of disturbances is zero
ii. E[u2it] 6= σ2u the disturbances have no constant variance
iii. E[uit, ui,t−1] = 0 disturbances are uncorrelated
iv. E[uit, εi,t−1] = 0
no correlation between disturbances
at t and the error in the model at t-1
v. -1 < ρ < +1 rho, the autocorrelation parameter is a fraction
Table 4.7: Assumptions about the error term (revised)
agnostics detects the characteristics of the error term in the estimated regression
models and justifies the Prais-Winsten transformation as a suitable regression
strategy. The demarcation to other common regression models is discussed
briefly in the next paragraph.
15For further insight see Greene (2003), p. 950-952.
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The fixed-effects or random-effects regression models are commonly used tech-
niques in existing literature for analyzing panel data and described at length
in Wooldridge (2010). However, these estimation methods obtained by the
ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) do not consider the underlying error
structure in the regression model stated above. In addition, the fixed-effects
method creates individual dummies to control any differences between the indi-
viduals. As generally accepted evidence for the whole banking sector needs to
be found, controlling every individual characteristics of the banks could lead to
misspecification. Parks (1967) is the first to describe a generalized least squares
method (GLS), which deals with typical time-series cross section problems: au-
tocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Kmenta (1997) popularized the feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator, which is a modification of the GLS
and often used by analysts. The FGLS replaces the unknown matrix for the
variance of the error term with a consistent estimator. This Parks-Kmenta
method has all the options to control panel specific error structure but using
it with medium- and large-scale panels is considered to be inappropriate. Beck
and Katz (1995) give an explanation for this argumentation: first, this method
is ruled out, if the dataset has less time dimensions T than panels N, as in
this case. Second, this method tends to estimate unacceptable small standard
errors. In addition, the authors give Monte Carlo evidence that panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSEs) perform more accurately than usual OLS standard er-
rors, even when complicated panel error structure is existent. It is suggested
one could use GLS or FGLS coefficient estimates with PCSE to mitigate prob-
lems of the Parks-Kmenta regression method. Beck (2008) supports the choice
of PCSEs. The Prais-Winsten estimator does precisely that by using an es-
timate of ρ. Thus, the Prais-Winsten estimator can be described as a FGLS
estimator. The disturbances in the Prais-Winsten regression are, by default,
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heteroscedastic (each individual has its own variance) and contemporaneously
correlated across panels (each pair of panels has its own covariance). Baltagi
(2008) argues that cross-sectional dependence is more an issue in macro pan-
els with time series over 20-30 years. This dataset is deemed to be a micro
panel (few time periods), thus a different option is selected. It is assumed that
the disturbances are only panel-level heteroscedastic with no contemporaneous
correlation across panels.16 A further option to specify is whether the pattern
of the first-order autocorrelation, AR(1), is common across all panels or panel-
specific. Beck and Katz (1995) argue in favor of constraining the coefficient
ρ of the first-order autocorrelation process to all panels at the same point of
time when testing the hypothesis of common influence. Likewise it is often
assumed that things differ from case to case which indicates that one should
use the panel-specific pattern of autocorrelation. The authors are aware of the
trade-off between those two options. By using coefficients specific to each panel,
there is a risk of bias in the estimates of the standard errors. Relying on con-
strained coefficients to all panels, misspecification is risked. Evidently, there
does not exist theoretical justification to handle this dilemma. Therefore, for
both regression equations a baseline regression model with common AR(1)17,
and a regression specification with panel-specific AR(1)18 structure is estimated.
Thus, Stata command: “xtpcse dependent variable independent variables, cor-
relation (ar1) hetonly” is used for estimating the baseline regression model and
“xtpcse dependent variable independent variables, correlation (psar1) hetonly”
for the regression specification.
16Stata command: hetonly, see StataCorp LP (2013).
17Stata command: correlation (ar1)“..., within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation
and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is common to all the panels”, see StataCorp LP
(2013).
18Stata command: correlation (psar1) “..., within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation
and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific to each panel”, see StataCorp LP
(2013).
CHAPTER 4. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 121
4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
Empirical results and robustness checks of the panel data regression analysis are
presented in the next section. To assess the impact of the LR on bank sound-
ness the first hypothesis is put forward and tested in a multiple linear regression
model, Model 1. To identify possible interactions between bank profitability and
the LR, hypothesis two is tested in another multiple linear regression model,
Model 2. Estimation results are presented for the baseline regression models
and regression specifications. Missing values are replaced by a missing-value
code in Stata and automatically omitted from the computation. Thus, obser-
vations with missing values in any of the variables are deleted casewise. The
robustness of the findings is investigated by firstly, controlling for differences in
the accounting systems in both models, secondly, omitting observations for year
2009 to 2011 in Model 1, and finally, changing the dependent variable in Model
2. As robustness test show, the regression results are not distorted significantly
and can be reconfirmed.
4.4.1 Model 1
The regression analysis starts with the findings of testing the first hypothesis,
the higher a bank’s LR, the lower its PD. Hence, the model focuses on the
impacts of imposing a limit to a bank’s debt on banks’ soundness in terms of
the PD. Following the line of argumentation of the Basel Committee (2010a),
a negative relationship between the explained and explanatory variable is ex-
pected. However, empirical results in this section confirm the opposite. Robust
evidence is given that there exists a positive relationship between the regula-
tory and the financial soundness measure. The following estimated equation is
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obtained, specified exemplary for the baseline regression model
PDit = −.0201 + .0495LRit − .002d07t + .0536d08t + .1424d09t
+.0091d10t + .0321d11t + .2507c3i + 4.0e
−05
loansit . (4.4)
Further estimation results and goodness-of-fit measures are reported in Table
4.8. The PD is the dependent variable and the explanatory variable is the
LR. Estimation results are also presented for dummies. The baseline regression
model (1) with common AR(1) error structure and the regression specification
(2) with panel-specific AR(1) error structure include 291 observations and 51
panels. The reference category, year 2006, is excluded. The heteroscedastic
corrected standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The constant term is
included in the model, as Equation (4.4) demonstrates, but not reported in
Table 4.8. Statistical significance is marked as follows: ***, **, * for 1, 5 and
10% level. The goodness-of-fit measures R² and Wald statistics are computed
for the entire system of equations whereas the standard errors are reported for
each equation individually. The fit seems adequate. Overall, panel specific
correction improves the results, see results of the regression specification (2).
The pattern of the coefficients on year dummies, d07 -d11, is itself of interest
and can be interpreted as follows: the coefficient on d07, e.g. implies that,
holding all other factors fixed, a bank had on average a “0.2%” lower PD than
in the reference year 2006. In the following years, a bank’s PD is on average
higher than in 2006. Note that the time dummies, d08, d09 and d11, exhibit
a significantly positive effect on the regression (1) and (2) at the 10% level and
lower. The value of the PD of a bank in 2009 is on average 14% higher than
the PD in the reference period 2006. The regression model reflects the financial
crisis with its beginning in 2008 and confirms results of the financial risk analysis
presented in Section 3.3. The coefficient on the country dummy, c3, exhibits
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(1) PD (2) PD
Independent variables
LR
.0495*** .0532***
(.0155) (.0081)
Dummy/ control variables
d07
-.002 .0003
(.0155) (.0147)
d08
.0536*** .0557***
(.017) (.016)
d09
.1424*** .1405***
(.0171) (.0162)
d10
.0091 .0093
(.0172) (.0164)
d11
.0321* .0312*
(.0169) (.0167)
c3
.2507*** .2488***
(.087) (.0761)
loans
4e-05** 5.7e-05***
(1.8e-05) (1.9e-05)
Measure of fit
R² 0.3855 0.4437
Wald chi2(6) 113.99 139.07
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
No. of obs. 291 291
Table 4.8: Estimation results of Model 1
The panel model estimated is PDit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t +
γ5d11t + γ6 c3i + γ7 loansit + εit . Baseline regression model (1) controls common AR(1).
Specification (2) controls panel-specific AR(1). Constant term is included but not reported.
Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant
at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
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a significantly positive effect on the regression at the 1% level in the baseline
regression (1) and in the regression specification (2). The banks in Ireland had
on average a “25%” higher PD than the reference category which is defined
as of the other countries. Thus, it is necessary to control for the country of
Ireland. Further information is discussed before, in Sections 3.3.2 and 4.2. The
coefficient on the control variable loans exhibits a significantly positive sign at
the 5% level in the baseline regression (1) and at the 1% level in the regression
specification (2). The assumption is valid that this control variable is associated
with the dependent variable but the inclusion does not change estimates of the
explanatory variable LR as stated next. The LR variable enters the baseline
regression model (1) significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that the
higher the LR, the higher the PD of each financial institution. More precisely,
a one-percent change in the LR generates a “0.05%” change in the variable
PD. The regression specification model (2) yields identical results and confirms
statistical significance. Exact data of the Stata output is presented in Appendix
B.1.
It is concluded that the sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with prediction
theories provided by the BCBS. Thus, the first research hypothesis put forward
is rejected. The findings do not confirm theoretical models by supervisors pre-
dicting a positive effect of a leverage constraint on a bank’s soundness. Results
show that a bank’s probability of default is positively related to it’s leverage
ratio. Therefore, banks with a higher LR possessed a higher default probability
in the sample implicating that these banks are more vulnerable and less stable.
If imposing a limit to a bank’s debt does not promote greater resilience of
each individual financial institution, least of all, stability of the whole banking
system will be improved. To sum up, banks with a high LR are regarded as
sound and stable by supervisors. However, this empirical analysis suggests that
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there is a positive relationship between the LR and the PD, i.e. banks with
a high LR are more fragile and vulnerable than banks that possess low LRs.
Empirical findings on this effect are in line with the argumentation of academic
researchers who are concerned about the new regulatory measure, see Section
2.3.
Next, results of Model 2 are provided to detect reasons for the significantly pos-
itive relationship between the regulatory and the financial soundness measure.
4.4.2 Model 2
Empirical results suggest that the higher a bank’s LR, the higher its PD. Results
are contradictory to the intentions of supervisors who belief that a binding
constraint on levels of leverage contributes to enhancing financial stability as a
whole. A second regression analysis is employed to detect potential reasons for
the rejection of H1 by testing the suggested research hypotheses H2: a bank’s
LR is positively related to its profitability. Thus, Model 2 focuses on the nexus
between the regulatory constraint of a bank’s debt and its lending business
activity from the perspective of profitability.
The following estimated equation is obtained for the baseline regression
model
IM it = +.0075 + .1333LRit − .0003d07t + .0018d08t + .0012d09t
−.0002d10t − .0006d11t − .0071c15i + .0002sizei . (4.5)
Estimation results for the baseline regression model (1) controlling common
AR(1) and the regression specification (2) controlling panel-specific AR(1) plus
goodness-of fit measures are presented in Table 4.9. Stata output can be found
in Appendix B.2. Numbers and stars can be interpreted the same way as in
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Table 4.8. The net interest margin, IM, is the explained variable, whereas the
LR is the explanatory variable. In addition, the bank specific control variable
size is included. Time and country dummies are included, year 2006 as the
reference category is again excluded. Model 2 includes 299 observations and
50 panels due to unavailability of data of the Concord Investmentbank. Wald
statistics indicate that the model has an adequate fit and the results are slightly
improved by controlling panel specific AR(1). The coefficients are calculated by
controlling the effect of all other explanatory variables in a multiple regression
model. It is ensured that when analyzing the effect of changing one independent
variable by one unit, all other variables are held constant.
Time dummies are not informative and meaningful in this second regression
model. Again, the coefficients can be interpreted as follows: the coefficient on
d09, for example, implies that, holding all other factors fixed, the value of the
net interest margin in 2009 differs “0.12%” from the IM in the reference cate-
gory 2006. However, no coefficient displays a statistically significant sign, i.e.
the banks net interest margin does not behave significantly differently than in
the reference category 2006. Coefficient of the country dummy c15, Switzerland,
exhibits a significantly negative sign at the 1% level for the baseline regression
(1) and the regressions specification (2). Results indicate that the two banks
of Switzerland which display on average the lowest LRs in the sample, possess
on average a “0.71%” lower net interest margin compared to the reference cat-
egory, ’all other countries’. See Sections 3.3.1 and 4.2 for further information.
The control variable size does not enter the regressions significantly. Thus, this
control variable is not associated with the dependent variable. The explanatory
variable, LR, enters both regression equations (1) significantly positive at the
5% level and (2) at the 10% level, suggesting a positive relationship between
a bank’s profitability and its LR, i.e. banks with higher LRs had on average
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(1) IM (2) IM
Independent variables
LR
.1333** .1026*
(.0616) (.0582)
Dummy/ control variables
d07
-.0003 -.0001
(.001) (.0008)
d08
.0018 .0016
(.0012) (.001)
d09
.0012 .0008
(.0013) (.0011)
d10
-.0002 -.0006
(.0014) (.0012)
d11
-.0006 -.0009
(.0015) (.0013)
c15
-.0071*** -.007***
(.0013) (.0011)
size
.0002 .0002
(.0005) (.0004)
Measure of fit
R² 0.2036 0.5879
Wald chi2(8) 125.98 164.48
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
No. of obs. 299 299
Table 4.9: Estimation results of Model 2
The panel model estimated is IM it = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t +
γ5d11t +γ6c15i+γ7sizei+εit. Baseline regression model (1) controls common AR(1). Speci-
fication (2) controls panel-specific AR(1). Constant term is included but not reported. Panel-
corrected standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at
the 1, 5, and 10% level.
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higher net interest margins. More precisely, a one-percent change in the LR
generates a “0.13%” change in the variable IM. Hypothesis H2 can be accepted,
suggesting that a bank’s net interest margin is positively related to its leverage
ratio. A positive contribution is generated due to either higher charged interest
rates on loans or depressing a bank’s deposit rates. The monitored variable in-
terest represents a ratio of interest income to total loans. The strong significant
positive correlation, see Table 4.3, between this variable with the variables LR
and IM, can give an indication that banks generate higher net interest mar-
gins by raising their interest rates on loans. This argumentation is in line with
research done by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), see Section 4.1, giving
evidence of a positive relationship between interest rates and the interest mar-
gin. Whether banks raise their interest rates because they have to generate
profit from less lending, due to steadily increasing capital requirements, or both
is not resolved definitively, see Section 4.1. Nevertheless, the strong correlation
between the variable LR and loans indicates that banks with a high LR had
on average lower lending activity, see Table 4.3. It can be assumed, that the
LR requirement will affect loan supply, i.e. a bank tries to generate higher LRs
in the future by limiting the number of loans. In this context, banks would
offer credit at a price at which demand is expected to exceed supply. The latter
would confirm previous theoretical and empirical models predicting that higher
costs associated with raising the required capital are passed on to a bank’s bor-
rowers, see Section 2.3. In this case, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem,
that a corporation’s decision is not influenced by the source of financing, is not
validated. Consequently, hints of a banks’ level of equity influencing its loan
pricing decision can be taken as a violation of this theorem.
Next, the thesis will discuss possible implications of the interpreted regres-
sion results on financial stability following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) framework.
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In contrast to intentions of supervisors, regression results of Model 1 validate
that a higher LR does not enhance a bank’s soundness but increases the PD
of each financial institution. Banks with a low LR had on average a lower PD
than banks with a high LR in the sample during the tested observation period.
Findings of the regression Model 2 confirm this empirical evidence by identifying
possible triggers of the positive relationship between the LR and PD. Empir-
ical evidence is given that a LR requirement can lead to a higher net interest
margin which presumably results from higher charged loan interest rates. Find-
ings demonstrate that banks with high LRs had on average higher net interest
margins during the sample period. This observable effect can have major im-
pacts on the stability of the financial system as a whole which are discussed by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this context, their framework can be seen as an
explanatory approach why the acceptance of H2 leads to the rejection of H1.
Detailed explanation is given in Section 4.1 and presented graphically in Figure
4.3. The discussed impacts of higher loan interest rates on the “riskiness” of
a bank by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) are conceivable and result in less stability
at individual bank level and a vulnerable banking system. Overall, regression
results show that the LR requirement, as proposed by the BCBS, does not help
to maintain financial stability but has a number of side-effects. The bottom line
is that these side-effects give banks the incentive to cut back on lending and
to raise their net interest margins by increasing loan interest rates. Due to the
adverse selection and incentive effect discussed byStiglitz and Weiss (1981), low
risk investors drop out of the market. Dramatic risk-shifting from low-risk to
high-risk loan portfolios is expected. This concentration of risk in the micro-
prudential dimension increases the vulnerability of the banking system at the
macro-level.
The next section investigates the robustness of the empirical findings.
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4.5 Robustness Check
Several robustness tests for the prior regression results are provided in this
section, in order to ensure their validity. Three different robustness checks
are employed: the robustness check specification (1) controls for differences in
accounting regimes by including the dummy variable IFRS in both models,
Model 1 and Model 2. Specification (2) is estimated for Model 1 by reducing
the observation period excluding observations for 2009-2011. Specification (3) is
estimated by modifying the dependent variable for Model 2. Estimated results
of the robustness check are presented in Table 4.10 for Model 1 and in Table
4.11 for Model 2. Findings demonstrate that initial results are robust. The
exact data of stata output is given in Appendix C. Levels of significance are
unmodified at the 1, 5 and 10% level and starred with ***, **, * respectively.
The pattern of the first-order autocorrelation is specified as common across all
panels, common AR(1), for all robustness checks. It is desists from using panel-
specific AR(1), because regression results did not change significantly, rather
were slightly improved. To begin with, robustness is evaluated by including
a further dummy variable into the regression equations (specification (1)), to
control for different accounting standards. Model 1 is estimated as following
PDit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t
+γ5d11t + γ6c3i + γ7loansit + γ8IFRSi + εit , (4.6)
and Model 2
IM it = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t
+γ5d11t + γ6c15i + γ7sizei + γ8IFRSi + εit . (4.7)
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European banks’ financial statements are reported under IFRS whereas banks
outside Europe are not necessarily required to adopt IFRS. The sample includes
banks of the United States of America which report under US GAAP. Differ-
ent key accounting standards could have material impact on reported financial
results as shown in Section 3.3.1. To investigate, whether different account-
ing systems significantly affect regression results, the dummy variable IFRS is
included and represents all banks which report under IFRS. Hence, US banks
reporting under US GAAP represent the reference category. The dummy does
not change across time but across panels and has no significant coefficient in
Model 1 and Model 2, and thus can be excluded. It is ruled out that results
are driven by accounting-specific factors. Accordingly, reported results of this
robustness check show that main findings are reconfirmed even when controlling
differences in accounting standards. To sum up, hypothesis H1 is still rejected
and H2 accepted.
Further robustness is checked by changing the observation period. All sample
observations for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 are removed. In Model 1 year
2009 and 2011, behave significantly different than the rest. In addition, the
previous financial risk analysis in Section 3.3.2 suggests that the financial crisis
had its worst impact on financial institutions in 2009 and that year 2011 may
be impacted by the European sovereign debt crisis. Thus, robustness check
specification (2) only includes observations for 2006 until 2008. The equation of
Model 1 is
PDit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3c3i + γ4loansit + εit . (4.8)
Note that this robustness check is performed solely for Model 1. Main findings
of Model 2 demonstrate that the regression is not driven by time specific effects
(the coefficients on time dummies do not exhibit a significant sign, see Table
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4.9). It is concluded that significance of the variables remains robust in Model
1, reflecting that results are validated and not driven by the aftermath of the
financial crisis. During this observation period, coefficient of the country dummy
do exhibit a significant sign at the 10% level, indicating that the country Ireland
did behave statistically differently during the years from 2006 to 2008, as well.
To conclude, rejection of hypothesis H1 is reconfirmed.
Finally, another robustness check is provided for Model 2. The regression
equation is modified, specification (3), by using a comparable dependent vari-
able, interestinc, changing the model to
interestincit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t
+γ5d11t + γ6c15i + γ7sizei + εit , (4.9)
where the variable interestinc is another proxy for bank’s profitability, defined as
the interest income a bank earned from lending business divided by total assets.
This variable changes across panels and time. Thus, the dependent variable
IM is modified slightly by changing the numerator of this variable. Interestinc
considers only the interest a bank charged its borrowers per total assets but not
the interest expense. The coefficient on the variable LR exhibits a significantly
positive sign at the 5% level. Banks with a high LR had on average a “0.15”
higher interest income per total assets, i.e. banks with a higher LR were more
profitable than banks with a lower LR. Employing this comparable dependent
variable helps to further determine how banks are generating higher net interest
margins as a reaction to the LR requirement. Findings of this robustness check
give strong statistical evidence that banks generate higher net interest margins
by raising their interest rates on loans than depressing deposit rates. Note that
robustness check specification (3) is driven by time specific effects but these
effects do not change the estimates of the explanatory variable significantly. In
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this respect, the main regression results are valid and H2 still is accepted.
The general performance of all robustness check regression specifications in-
dicate a good model fit. None of the alternative settings changes the main
regression coefficient estimates significantly. The research hypothesis H1 is re-
jected. The variable LR enters each regression significantly positive at the 1%
level. As shown, the two estimated robustness check specifications for Model 1
indicate a statistical significant positive relationship between a bank’s LR and
its PD, indicating that a LR requirement does not enhance banks soundness but
has the opposite effect. In addition, robustness checks for Model 2 show that H2
still can be supported. Thus, the results of Model 2 are reconfirmed, suggesting
that a bank’s profitability depends positively on a bank’s LR. To sum up, the
coefficients are plausible and robust, evidence of structural validity is given.
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(1) PD (2) PD
Independent variables
LR
.0474*** .0375***
(.0154) (.0075)
Dummy/ control variables
d07
-.0023 -.002
(.0153) (.0085)
d08
.0533*** .0539***
(.0169) (.0076)
d09
.1421***
(.0171)
d10
.0088
(.0172)
d11
.0341**
(.017)
c3
.2525*** .0265*
(.0895) (.0138)
loans
3.28e-05* 3.58e-05**
(1.68e-05) (1.62e-05)
IFRS
-.0422
(.0327)
Measure of fit
R² 0.3875 0.3622
Wald chi2(6) 115.73 80.63
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
No. of obs. 291 150
Table 4.10: Results of robustness checks Model 1
The panel model estimated is PDit = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t +
γ5d11t +γ6c3i+γ7loansit+γ8IFRSi+εit for robustness check specification (1), and PDit =
β0 +β1LRit+γ1d07t +γ2d08t +γ3c3i+γ4loansit+ εit for robustness check specification (2).
Constant term is included but not reported. Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
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(1) IM (3) interestinc
Independent variables
LR
.1298** .1459**
(.0632) (.068)
Dummy/ control variables
d07
-.0003 .0042***
(.001) (.0015)
d08
.0018 .0083***
(.0012) (.0019)
d09
.0012 -.0026
(.0013) (.0022)
d10
-.0002 -.0058**
(.0014) (.0023)
d11
-.0006 -.0049**
(.0014) (.0025)
c15
-.0067*** -.0158***
(.0012) (.0031)
size
2.36e-05 .0004
(.0005) (.0007)
IFRS
-.0032
(.0031)
Measure of fit
R² 0.208 0.3656
Wald chi2(8) 130.75 104.69
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
No. of obs. 299 246
Table 4.11: Results of robustness checks Model 2
The panel model estimated is IM it = β0 + β1LRit + γ1d07t + γ2d08t + γ3d09t + γ4d10t +
γ5d11t + γ6c15i + γ7sizei + γ8IFRSi + εit for robustness check specification (1), and
interestincit = β0+β1LRit+γ1d07t+γ2d08t+γ3d09t+γ4d10t+γ5d11t+γ6c15i+γ7sizei+εit
for robustness check specification (2). Constant term is included but not reported. Panel-
corrected standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at
the 1, 5, and 10% level.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Outlook
Research questions which address the constantly evolving regulation of financial
institutions are covered in this thesis. More precisely, the new non-risk based
LR proposed by the BCBS and its relevance to the regulated institutions and
to the stability of the global financial system is analyzed. Existing literature
in this area is picked up and carried further by finding empirical evidence for
recently emerging assumptions by academic researchers on possible side effects
of the LR. Findings of this thesis demonstrate that a LR requirement has the
unintended consequence of increasing risk in the financial system rather than
reducing it. Chapter 3 starts with the theoretical description of the LR, as
an indicator of a bank’s use of debt, and the financial soundness measures DD
and PD. It is argued that the DD and PD are an effective measure for de-
termining the default probability of financial institutions because this model
employs both financial statements and market prices. The Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974) model is applied as a theoretical framework. It is a
well-known option pricing model among academic researchers and practition-
ers. After clarifying the theoretical underpinnings, a financial risk analysis is
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employed to investigate the capitalization and soundness of the banking sector.
The regulatory constraint and the financial soundness measures are computed
for a sample of 51 stock-listed banks headquartered in Europe and the US over
the period from 2006 to 2011. Findings regarding the LR are in line with the
Basel III Monitoring exercise by the EBA, BCBS and German Central Bank.
Overall, it can be concluded that the LR is slightly higher in the years after
the financial crisis and that banks averagely meet the calibration target of 3%
during the sample period even though capital capitalization varies considerably
across countries. Swiss banks display the lowest LR of all banks and struggle
to meet the 3% Tier 1 LR level. In contrast, US banks possess very high LR
of about 6.3% As discussed by Morris and Shin (2008), and empirical findings
in Chapter 4 show, one reason could be the difference in accounting regimes.
Findings regarding the PD series demonstrate that banks have very low PDs in
2006 and 2007. The banking system is considered to be sound and healthy. The
PD increases sharply in 2008 and reaches its peak in 2009. The global financial
crisis has affected the banking sector by putting banks under financial distress.
Financial stability is jeopardized dramatically. After 2009, bank soundness and
the overall stability of the financial system recovers according to the PD series,
even though, the European sovereign debt crisis seems to impact banks in late
2011. In conclusion, banks display higher LRs and PDs during the years of the
global financial crisis 2008 and 2009.
In Chapter 4, a panel data regression is employed to analyze, first of all, the
nexus between the LR and the PD. Statistical evidence is given that there is
a positive relationship between these two measures, implying that the higher
the LR of a bank the higher its PD. It can be concluded that imposing a limit
to a bank’s debt does not promote greater resilience on individual financial
institution and results in destabilizing the global financial system. The theory
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 138
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is considered as an explanation for this effect.
Further, empirical findings are in line with the argumentation of, for example,
Kamada and Nasu (2010) and Hakura and Cosimano (2011) who view the new
regulatory measure with disquiet. Reasons for a positive relationship between
the LR and PD are detected by employing a second panel data regression model.
Further statistical evidence is provided that a bank’s LR is positively related to
its profitability. It is concluded that banks definitely generate higher net interest
margins by raising their interest rates on loans. Furthermore, two possibilities
of how a bank increases its net interest margin are conceivable: due to a cut
back on lending (the bank needs to generate profit from lower lending), and/or
passing on the operating cost of increasing regulatory capital on to borrowers.
The former confirms research done by Kashyap et al. (2010) that banks prefer
to reduce total assets by cutting back on lending than increasing Tier 1 capital
in order to meet the calibration target. Cutting back on lending triggers major
negative effects for the overall economy. The latter, is in line with evidence
given by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) that higher cost, associated with
raising required regulatory capital, are passed on to a bank’s borrowers. This
implies that the theory provided by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) can be seen as
an explanation why the LR requirement leads to higher probabilities of default:
higher charged interest rates by a bank affect the riskiness of a loan due to
the adverse selection and incentive effect. This concentration of risk in the
microprudential dimension strongly destabilizes the global financial system as
discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). To conclude, regression results show that
the LR requirement does not help to maintain financial stability at individual
bank level due to a number of side-effects. These side-effects result in a more
vulnerable and fragile banking sector which is hallmarked by financial distress.
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Still, there is a large number of research questions left for future research. First
of all, regulatory interactions are not considered in this thesis. As the LR con-
straint is proposed just as one part of an extensive regulatory framework, it
might be worthwhile to consider the interaction between the different regula-
tory requirements for future research. No single measure would have prevented
the global financial crisis, and an adequate regulatory framework requires a
menu of macro- and microprudential tools. It is questionable whether results
will differ when the measures are considered in conjunction with one another.
Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of macroeconomic effects of the risk-weighted
measures and the LR is necessary in order to predict implications not only for
the banking system, but for the public sector. In addition, it is up for discus-
sion whether the implementation of Basel III into European law gives financial
institutions in the Euro-zone the incentive to stock up on high risk sovereign
debt which does not require a higher capital charge. Finally, considering the
interconnectedness of financial institutions could be worthwhile, if the factor
“too interconnected” plays a role in evolving regulatory frameworks. The result-
ing exposure of interconnected, systemically important institutions revealed on
balance sheets could have an impact on the LR. To sum up, the high practical
relevance of research in the area of financial regulation continues as banking
crisis have been more frequent than anticipated and regulation seems to lag
behind.
Chapter 6
List of Symbols
The relevant symbols are stated and sorted in order of appearance.
6.1 Symbols Chapter 2
r∗ “Bank optimal” rate
C Random amount
r∗S Max. interest rate (low risk borrower)
r∗R Max. interest rate (high risk borrower)
µ Min. return
fS (·) Density function (low risk borrower)
fR (·) Density function (high risk borrower)
FS (·) Cum. distribution function (low risk borrower)
FR (·) Cum. distribution function (high risk borrower)
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6.2 Symbols Chapter 3
LR Leverage ratio
E Equity
VA Value of assets
D Default point
T Time horizon
t Time
i Panel ID
dVA Change in asset value
µ Drift
µE Expected return on equity
σA Asset volatility
W Standard Wiener process
VE Value of equity
σE Equity volatility
r Risk-free rate
N (·) Cum. stand. normal distribution
Ls Short-term liabilities
Ll Long-term liabilities
ε Random component
d Distance from D
DD Distance to default
PD Probability of default
R Simple interest rate
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6.3 Symbols Chapter 4
y Dependent variable
β0 Intercept
β, γ Parameters to be estimated
ε Random error
ρ Autocorrelation coefficient
µ Remainder disturbance
R2 Measure of fit
b Standardized regression coefficient
Appendix
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Appendix Section 4.2
Variable Description Data Sources
DD First proxy for the soundness Financial statements,
of bank i in a respective year t Datastream,
own calculations
PD Second proxy for banks’ soundness Financial statements,
of bank i in a respective year t Datastream,
own calculations
LR Indicator for a bank’s use of debt Financial statements,
own calculations
loans Indicator for a bank’s lending activity: Financial statements
total amount of loans and receivables
interest Proxy for a bank’s interest income: Financial statements,
income from lending business/ loans own calculations
IM Proxy for a bank’s profitability: Financial statements,
net interest income/ total assets own calculations
size Proxy for a bank’s size: Financial statements,
ln(total assets) own calculations
c3, c15 Country dummies representing:
c3 Ireland and c15 Switzerland
d07 Time dummy variable year 2007
d08 Time dummy variable year 2008
d09 Time dummy variable year 2009
d10 Time dummy variable year 2010
d11 Time dummy variable year 2011
Table A.1: Notes on variables and data sources
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Appendix Section 4.4
B.1 Stata Regression Output Model 1
                                                                              
         rho     .1268412
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0200766   .0113539    -1.77   0.077    -.0423299    .0021767
       loans       .00004   .0000178     2.25   0.024     5.20e-06    .0000748
          c3     .2506802   .0870051     2.88   0.004     .0801533    .4212071
         d11     .0321307   .0169282     1.90   0.058    -.0010481    .0653094
         d10      .009095   .0171801     0.53   0.597    -.0245774    .0427674
         d09     .1424083   .0171304     8.31   0.000     .1088334    .1759831
         d08     .0536256   .0169638     3.16   0.002     .0203772     .086874
         d07    -.0020115   .0155348    -0.13   0.897    -.0324592    .0284363
          LR     .0495125   .0154694     3.20   0.001      .019193     .079832
                                                                              
          PD        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         9          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(8)       =    113.99
Estimated covariances      =        51          R-squared          =    0.3855
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =  5.705882
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        51
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       291
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse PD LR d07-d11 c3 loans, c(a) het
Figure B.1: Stata regression output Model 1 controlling common AR(1)
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        rhos =  .2969041  .0887984  .4243597 -.9501771  .0323769 ... -.3769286
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0238053   .0111267    -2.14   0.032    -.0456131   -.0019974
       loans     .0000569   .0000193     2.95   0.003     .0000192    .0000947
          c3     .2488105   .0761415     3.27   0.001     .0995759    .3980452
         d11     .0312288   .0167147     1.87   0.062    -.0015314     .063989
         d10     .0092628   .0164126     0.56   0.573    -.0229053    .0414309
         d09     .1404734   .0162364     8.65   0.000     .1086507    .1722961
         d08     .0557237    .016049     3.47   0.001     .0242683    .0871791
         d07     .0003472    .014728     0.02   0.981     -.028519    .0292135
          LR     .0531876   .0080862     6.58   0.000     .0373389    .0690362
                                                                              
          PD        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         9          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        51          Wald chi2(8)       =    139.07
Estimated covariances      =        51          R-squared          =    0.4437
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =  5.705882
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        51
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       291
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse PD LR d07-d11 c3 loans, c(p) het
Figure B.2: Stata regression output Model 1 controlling panel-specific AR(1)
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX SECTION 4.4 147
B.2 Stata Regression Output Model 2
                                                                              
         rho     .6039208
                                                                              
       _cons     .0075275    .004514     1.67   0.095    -.0013197    .0163747
        size     .0001624   .0004914     0.33   0.741    -.0008008    .0011255
         c15    -.0070733   .0013326    -5.31   0.000    -.0096851   -.0044615
         d11    -.0006018   .0014728    -0.41   0.683    -.0034884    .0022847
         d10    -.0001825   .0013941    -0.13   0.896    -.0029149    .0025498
         d09     .0012434   .0013041     0.95   0.340    -.0013127    .0037994
         d08      .001819   .0012199     1.49   0.136    -.0005719      .00421
         d07    -.0003027   .0009713    -0.31   0.755    -.0022064    .0016011
          LR     .1332602   .0615791     2.16   0.030     .0125674    .2539531
                                                                              
          IM        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         9          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(8)       =    125.98
Estimated covariances      =        50          R-squared          =    0.2036
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =      5.98
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        50
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       299
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse IM LR d07-d11 c15 size, c(a) het
Figure B.3: Stata regression output Model 2 controlling common AR(1)
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        rhos =  .7468598 -.0757153         1 -.2123531 -.2225956 ...  .8041649
                                                                              
       _cons     .0084381   .0038769     2.18   0.030     .0008394    .0160367
        size     .0001924   .0003926     0.49   0.624    -.0005771    .0009619
         c15    -.0070252   .0010981    -6.40   0.000    -.0091774   -.0048731
         d11    -.0009279   .0012944    -0.72   0.473    -.0034648    .0016091
         d10     -.000613   .0011865    -0.52   0.605    -.0029384    .0017125
         d09     .0008482   .0010867     0.78   0.435    -.0012817    .0029782
         d08     .0015886   .0010028     1.58   0.113    -.0003769    .0035542
         d07    -.0001405   .0007508    -0.19   0.852     -.001612    .0013309
          LR      .102597   .0581879     1.76   0.078    -.0114493    .2166432
                                                                              
          IM        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         9          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        50          Wald chi2(8)       =    164.48
Estimated covariances      =        50          R-squared          =    0.5879
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =      5.98
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        50
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       299
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse IM LR d07-d11 c15 size, c(p) het
Figure B.4: Stata regression output Model 2 controlling panel-specific AR(1)
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C.1 Robustness Check Specification (1)
                                                                              
         rho     .1549299
                                                                              
       _cons     .0209984   .0332194     0.63   0.527    -.0441104    .0861071
        IFRS    -.0422255   .0326787    -1.29   0.196    -.1062747    .0218236
       loans     .0000328   .0000169     1.94   0.052    -3.26e-07     .000066
          c3     .2525147   .0895019     2.82   0.005     .0770941    .4279353
         d11     .0341279   .0170124     2.01   0.045     .0007843    .0674715
         d10     .0088219   .0171639     0.51   0.607    -.0248188    .0424625
         d09      .142077   .0170891     8.31   0.000      .108583    .1755709
         d08     .0533484   .0168825     3.16   0.002     .0202593    .0864376
         d07    -.0023149   .0152723    -0.15   0.880    -.0322481    .0276182
          LR     .0473666   .0154378     3.07   0.002     .0171092    .0776241
                                                                              
          PD        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(9)       =    115.73
Estimated covariances      =        51          R-squared          =    0.3875
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =  5.705882
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        51
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       291
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse PD LR d07-d11 c3 loans IFRS, c(a) het
Figure C.1: Robustness check specification (1) Model 1
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         rho     .5974618
                                                                              
       _cons     .0113806   .0066937     1.70   0.089    -.0017387    .0244999
        IFRS    -.0031572   .0030969    -1.02   0.308    -.0092271    .0029127
        size     .0000236    .000508     0.05   0.963     -.000972    .0010193
         c15    -.0066978   .0012037    -5.56   0.000    -.0090571   -.0043385
         d11    -.0005981    .001469    -0.41   0.684    -.0034774    .0022811
         d10    -.0001823   .0013912    -0.13   0.896     -.002909    .0025443
         d09     .0012391   .0013028     0.95   0.342    -.0013142    .0037925
         d08     .0017925    .001225     1.46   0.143    -.0006084    .0041934
         d07    -.0003267   .0009796    -0.33   0.739    -.0022466    .0015932
          LR     .1298039   .0632358     2.05   0.040     .0058641    .2537437
                                                                              
          IM        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(9)       =    130.75
Estimated covariances      =        50          R-squared          =    0.2080
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =      5.98
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        50
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       299
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse IM LR d07-d11 c15 size IFRS, c(a) het
Figure C.2: Robustness check specification (1) Model 2
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C.2 Robustness Check Specification (2)
                                                                              
         rho    -.2293839
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0094533   .0059936    -1.58   0.115    -.0212005    .0022939
          c3     .0264533   .0138218     1.91   0.056     -.000637    .0535435
         d08     .0539429   .0076191     7.08   0.000     .0390098     .068876
         d07    -.0019735   .0085113    -0.23   0.817    -.0186553    .0147083
       loans     .0000358   .0000162     2.21   0.027     4.00e-06    .0000676
          LR     .0375048    .007453     5.03   0.000     .0228972    .0521125
                                                                              
          PD        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         6          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(5)       =     80.63
Estimated covariances      =        51          R-squared          =    0.3622
                                                               max =         3
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =  2.941176
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        51
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       150
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
. xtpcse PD LR loans d07-d08 c3, c(a) het
Figure C.3: Robustness check specification (2) Model 1
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C.3 Robustness Check Specification (3)
                                                                              
         rho     .6576561
                                                                              
       _cons     .0169697   .0055159     3.08   0.002     .0061588    .0277806
        size     .0004414   .0006583     0.67   0.502    -.0008488    .0017316
         c15    -.0158047   .0030843    -5.12   0.000    -.0218498   -.0097596
         d11    -.0049451   .0024508    -2.02   0.044    -.0097485   -.0001417
         d10    -.0057751   .0023144    -2.50   0.013    -.0103111    -.001239
         d09    -.0025881   .0021589    -1.20   0.231    -.0068195    .0016433
         d08     .0083172   .0019488     4.27   0.000     .0044975    .0121369
         d07     .0042106   .0015019     2.80   0.005     .0012669    .0071544
          LR      .145942   .0679767     2.15   0.032       .01271     .279174
                                                                              
 interestinc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         9          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(8)       =    104.69
Estimated covariances      =        43          R-squared          =    0.3656
                                                               max =         6
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =   5.72093
Panels:           heteroskedastic (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        43
Group variable:   bank                          Number of obs      =       246
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
(note: estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
(note: computations for rho restarted at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  1
. xtpcse interestinc LR d07-d11 c15 size, c(a) het
Figure C.4: Robustness check specification (3) Model 2
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